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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is an attempt to fill the theoretical and empirical gap in current 
conflict management research, which has failed to examine methods of conflict 
management comparatively. Two dominant paradigms exist, neither of which is 
adequate to the task of comparing negotiation and mediation in the real world of 
international politics: the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party Intervention 
paradigm. An alternative theoretical framework, the Contingency framework of 
negotiation and mediation was therefore, constructed. This model suggests that 
negotiation and mediation are conceptually and empirically different, and specifies a 
series of contextual and process variables which are vital to any examination of 
conflict management. 
Utilising a unique data set of thousands of cases of negotiation and mediation 
coded according to the variables specified in the Contingency model, a general 
bivariate analysis, followed by a more in-depth multivariate analysis, revealed a 
number of impotiant differences and similarities between the two methods. The 
results suggest that negotiation and mediation are different forms of conflict 
management, which are most likely to be successful under contrasting conditions in 
international politics. Negotiation is the most successful method overall, but tends to 
be limited to low intensity, interstate conflicts. Mediation tends to occur in the most 
intense, intractable, and primarily civil conflicts, and is useful under a number of 
onerous circumstances. 
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Chapter 1 
UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM OF NEGOTIATION VERSUS 
MEDIATION 
1.1 Introduction: The Problems of Managing Complex International Conflicts 
Controlling the destmctive consequences of international conflict has been a 
central feature of international relations since the formation of the League of Nations 
at the end of World War I. Unfmiunately, the catastrophic outcome of World War II 
and the estimated 15-30 million people killed in inter-state and civil wars since 1945 
(see Brogan, 1989) seems to belie this concern. The failure to deal peacefully with 
conflicts between states is more than just an intellectual failure; it is the empirical 
reality of lives and property destroyed. Although solving the puzzle of the pacific 
settlement of international conflict does not automatically furnish the political will for 
such an outcome, the lack of intellectual solutions almost certainly precludes it. In 
other words, the task of understanding, explaining, and improving methods of 
international conflict management is perhaps, the pressing issue of international 
politics today. 
At the heart of many unsuccessful attempts to manage violent international 
disputes is a basic confusion over the application of alternative conflict management 
methods and approaches. For example, when former US president Jimmy Carter 
announced in December 1994 that he was accepting the invitation of the Bosnian 
Serbs to mediate in the Yugoslavian civil conflict, he was only adding to a plethora of 
diplomatic interventions by various bodies. The Catier mediation came at a time when 
the UN and EU seemed to have lost the initiative, and there were deep divisions 
between the Contact Group and NATO on how and when to proceed with different 
proposals and forms of intervention (Klieboer and t'Hmi, 1995: 307-308). The failure 
to effectively manage this conflict resulted in the dislocation and deaths of hundreds 
of thousands of people, and major political instability across the whole Balkan region. 
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The confusion over matching appropriate interventions to conflicts has been a 
constant feature of the post-war period, and an even greater problem in the post-cold 
war era, when the predominant form of international conflict changed from primarily 
interstate disputes to intractable, often ethnically-motivated intrastate conflicts (see 
Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997; Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). Today, conflicts 
are being fought with varying degrees of ferocity in Afghanistan, Central Africa, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Tadjikistan, and until 
recently, in the former Yugoslavia and Chechnia. Furthermore, violent conflicts still 
plague the Middle East, Latin American states like Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru, 
and Asian states like India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Burma, and the 
Philippines. Virtually all of these conflicts have seen international intervention of 
some sort, but for the most part, these efforts have been ad hoc, uncoordinated, 
sometimes inappropriate, and as a result, largely ineffective. Their (mis)management 
reveals a fundamental bewilderment about how best to deal with international conflict. 
The muddled attempts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia (see Webb et al, 1996), 
as we have already mentioned, are a potent example of this. 
The challenges facing the international community m the post-cold war 
environment are twofold: (1) how to make international conflict management more 
effective; and (2) how to match appropriate forms of intervention to individual cases 
of conflict. The second challenge follows logically from the first, in that conflict 
management methods (specifically, mediation, negotiation, humanitarian intervention, 
multilateral conferences) and conflict management in general, cannot be made more 
effective until they are applied appropriately. For example, mediation will not be 
effective no matter how well planned and executed, if it is applied to situations where 
it is fundamentally inappropriate. 
The attempts by diplomats to manage international conflicts have been mirrored in 
recent years by an upsurge in scholarly interest in the field (see Bercovitch, 1996; 
Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992; Mitchell and Webb, 1988; Princen, 1992a; Touval and 
Zartman, 1985). While much of this research has been focused in the area of 
mediation and third party intermediary intervention, it is concerned with the same 
vexing questions: how can international conflict management be made more effective, 
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what types of interventions are most effective, and at what juncture and to which 
situations should they be applied? 
This thesis was written in part to further explore this problem and the issues it 
raises. It does more than that, however. This research addresses two key problems that 
currently characterise the study of international conflict management: the 
comparative problem (how to know which forms of conflict management should be 
applied to which conflicts?), and the related empirical problem (what do we really 
know about the application of different forms of conflict management?). 
It appears that there are two large gaps in current research. First, there is a 
theoretical and empirical gap in the area of comparing different forms of international 
conflict management ( eg, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, international 
organisations, third party consultation) to determine which are the most successful, 
and under what conditions or in what circumstances they are successful. Efforts in this 
area have been sorely lacldng to date1, and the surprising fact is, that there are no 
studies to tell us; we simply do not know (Dixon, 1996: 654). 
Second, there is an empirical gap in the area of international negotiation 
specifically. To date, no systematic empirical studies have been done on international 
negotiations involving more than a few cases, while such large-scale studies are 
becoming increasingly common in the area of third party intervention (see Bercovitch, 
1986, 1989, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; Bercovitch and Langley, 
1993; Dixon, 1996). Negotiation studies, in contrast to some mediation studies, tend 
to rely on singular historical case studies, game-theoretic approaches, or theorising 
from laboratory research (see Campbell, 1976; Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Cottman, 
1985; Druckman, 1986; Hamner, 1974; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Kremenyuk, 
1991). 
Furthermore, much of the negotiation literature is practitioner-oriented and 
therefore atheoretical. In this sense, the literature does not always provide us with 
evidence of whether the prescriptions offered really work or in what context. In other 
words, while we know something about the conditions under which mediation is 
effective in international politics, we know very little about the conditions under 
which negotiation is effective under the same circumstances. 
1 There are a few exceptions to this, and these works will be discussed in a later section. 
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This thesis is an attempt to fill these gaps. As such it is aimed more at scholars than 
practitioners, although it has obvious prescriptive possibilities. The practical 
usefulness of current conflict management research is severely impaired by the 
existing lack of lmowledge about the efficacy of different conflict management 
methods, and by the current tendency to recommend mediation for most cases without 
a solid understanding of the effectiveness of bilateral negotiation. This over-reliance 
on one method needs to be re-examined (Keashly and Fisher, 1996: 257), because it 
poses the risk that mediation could be misapplied, and as such, damaging to conflict 
management efforts generally. Only when a better understanding of both the relative 
efficacy of mediation and alternative methods, and the conditions under which 
negotiation is likely to be effective is arrived at, can this danger be avoided. In this 
sense then, this study should be regarded as an exercise that will be both of scholarly 
interest and policy relevant. 
1.2 Key Questions and Design of the Study 
In order to examine what is essentially an empirical question ( eg, how effective are 
different conflict management techniques, and under what conditions are they 
effective?), we need to proceed from a sound theoretical base. In general, a sound 
theoretical framework should, first of all, be grounded in existing theory and research. 
This is not to say however, that it should accept blindly, or simply duplicate existing 
research. Rather, it should challenge, critique, and extend existing paradigms and 
findings. 
Second, in order to answer the questions posed here, a theoretical framework 
should allow for a comparison of negotiation and mediation. This is perhaps its most 
important aspect in terms of the problem we have stated here. In other words, 
negotiation and mediation need to be carefully conceptualised in such a way that a 
logically sound and meaningful comparison can be made. A beneficial and important 
side-effect of this thesis will be to aid in the development of an integrated theory that 
embraces both negotiation and mediation; the lack of any such theory currently has 
been recognised as a serious problem in existing paradigms (Pruitt and Carnevale, 
1993: 196). Lastly, such a theory will provide the tools necessary for the excavation of 
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the bedrock of empirical inquiry by: (a) generating relevant and testable hypotheses; 
and (b) providing a framework for the interpretation of the results of empirical 
research. 
The direction of this study, and the sequence of tasks necessary for its completion 
are evident in the key questions that have guided this thesis: 
1 To what extent does current conflict management theory enable us to systematically 
evaluate, analyse, and compare negotiation and mediation in international politics? 
2 Is there an approach which will facilitate a logically sound and meaningful 
comparison of negotiation and mediation? 
3 Can such an approach be applied to the real world of international conflict 
management? 
4 What can this approach add to current conflict management theory, and what are its 
implications for international conflict management practice? 
Answering these questions implies a simple three-step process: (1) an examination 
of existing literature on international conflict management; (2) the construction of a 
theoretical framework for comparing negotiation and mediation; and (3) an empirical 
study utilising the framework. Such a simple and systematic process appears 
straightforward, but as will become obvious in later sections, there are numerous 
pitfalls along the way to be avoided, not the least of which are the problems involved 
in quantitative analysis. The empirical stage of the study will utilise and expand on a 
unique and original dataset which has coded 1,154 discrete cases of negotiation and 
1,666 cases of mediation according to 68 variables relating to the context, process, 
and outcomes of each episode of conflict management. This provides a rich source of 
data on which to base an investigation. 
The justification for approaching negotiation and mediation m this manner 
involves three primary considerations: 
6 Chapter 1 
(I) Theoretical Considerations. 
As has already been mentioned, this study was prompted by a perceived gap in the 
theoretical literature on international conflict management. Scant attention has been 
paid to the twin problems of: (a) comparing methods of conflict management, and (b) 
the nature of international negotiations in the real world. Fmihermore, as will be made 
clear, cunent approaches are inadequate for such a task, and need to be expanded and 
refined considerably if they are to become relevant. This is why the construction of a 
new framework through which different forms of conflict management, especially 
negotiation and mediation, can be comparatively examined is paramount. Part of the 
originality of this study then, lies in its attempt to create a theoretical framework for 
the study of multiple methods of conflict management in similar contexts. To 
paraphrase Klieboer and t'Hart, an understanding of the issue of the efficacy of 
different confiict management methods at the international level is inevitably 
embedded in a more comprehensive theory of conflict management (Klieboer and 
t'Hart, 1995: 337). 
(2) }.!fethodological Considerations. 
This thesis includes an empirical examination because little research into 
international negotiation and mediation has managed to successfully combine 
systemic theoretical models with empirical analysis (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 
299). Rather, it has tended to be limited to studies of specific aspects or cases of 
negotiation or mediation, frequently in anecdotal and descriptive terms, rather than in 
systematic and empirical terms. In other words, this study is aiming for a level of 
generalisability not permitted by historical case studies or extrapolation from research 
at interpersonal or interorganisational levels, which unfortunately, tends to be the 
norm in cunent negotiation and mediation research. For this, a large number of cases 
was necessary. Furthermore, the potential value of such a large study was 
considerable, in light of the fact that virtually no such studies have been attempted. 
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(3) Pragmatic Considerations. 
Pragmatic considerations have played an important role in the approach taken here, 
as they do in most research, especially in regard to the use of a large data set on 
international conflict management. Access to Bercovitch' s Correlates of Mediation 
data set (Bercovitch, 1996) convinced me of the value that would accme from 
building a similar data set on negotiation as the basis of a comparison. Such a project 
was felt to be a valuable and original contribution, and a complement to the work 
being done by Bercovitch and his colleagues on international mediation. The 
negotiation data set was constmcted using the same variables as the Correlates of 
Mediation dataset, and added 1,154 cases of negotiation. 
1.3 Conceptual Clarifications: Negotiation, Mediation, and Outcomes 
Negotiation and Mediation in Perspective 
This thesis is about managing conflict m potentially violent, or violent 
international conflict involving states and sometimes, important non-state 
international actors like liberation movements or stateless ethnic groups ( eg, The 
Tamil Tigers, The Kurds, the PLO). In other words, it is limited to the management of 
interstate conflicts, or intrastate conflicts with international dimensions which then 
become of concern to the international community. Logically, international conflicts, 
or any conflict for that matter, can only be dealt with in three possible modes: 
unilaterally, bilaterally, or with the help of a third party (Bercovitch and Houston, 
1996: 11). The unilateral mode may involve attempting to win over the opponent 
through violence, or it may involve withdrawal or avoidance. The bilateral mode 
implies some form of bargaining and compromise, and the third party assistance mode 
means the intervention of a party not directly involved in the conflict. Here we are 
concerned primarily with the second and third modes, namely, negotiation and third 
party assistance2• 
2 The discussion here will be introductory, as the theoretical aspects of negotiation and mediation will 
be given a more comprehensive treatment in chapters two and three. 
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Negotiation refers specifically to a means of conflict management where the 
principal parties to a conflict of interest communicate directly or indirectly about how 
they will resolve their differences and manage their future relationship (Sawyer and 
Guetzkow, 1966: 466; Stephenson and Morely, 1977: 26). Mediation on the other 
hand, is a means of conflict management where the parties to a dispute seek the 
assistance of, or accept an offer of help from a party not directly involved in the 
conflict, to resolve their differences without invoking the authority of the law 
(Bercovitch et al, 1991: 8). 
The differences between mediation and other forms of third party intervention 
often remains unclear at the international level. Of the many types of third party 
assistance distinguished in the literature, four appear to overlap with mediation: 
conciliation, good offices, fact-finding, and consultation. Conciliation refers to the 
efforts of a trusted intermediary acting as an informal communications linlc between 
the disputing parties, aimed at identifying major issues, lowering tension, and 
encouraging direct negotiations. Related to this, good offices refers to an intermediary 
who acts as a go-between when the parties cannot or will not meet face-to-face, while 
fact-finding involves an intermediary assessing the situation and providing a statement 
back to the parties. The last form, consultation, is a relatively recent addition to the list 
of possible third party roles, and involves a trusted and trained third party who 
facilitates conflict analysis and the development of creative alternatives through 
controlled communication and diagnosis based on social-scientific understanding 
(Fisher, 1996: 40-41). In practice however, all these methods overlap with each other 
and with mediation, and I consider them all part of mediator activities in order to 
avoid unnecessary conceptual confusion. 
Differences do exist between negotiation, mediation, and judicial conflict 
management, the other primary form of third party intervention. I include judicial 
methods (arbitration and adjudication) here as a point of departure in the discussion of 
negotiation and mediation. Together these forms of conflict management can be 
compared along four main dimensions. First, as a mode of conflict management, 
negotiation is strictly bilateral, involving only the principal parties to the conflict. 
Mediation and judicial methods are of a different mode, and the insertion of a third 
party into the dyadic conflict system profoundly alters the nature of the process 
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(Gulliver, 1979: 7; Rubin and Brown, 1975: 63; Wall, 1981: 159). Exactly how third 
parties transform the negotiation system will be examined in later chapters. 
Second, the aim of the conflict management in negotiation and mediation is to 
settle a dispute, resolve a difference, or manage an ongoing relationship. In 
international mediation, objectives are usually confmed to controlling violence or 
seeking an immediate settlement (see Bercovitch, 1984; Klieboer and t'Hmi, 1995: 
315). In contrast, judicial methods are focused on, and limited to, ruling on a point of 
law. 
TYPES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
COMPARATIVE Negotiation Mediation Judicial Methods 
POINTS 
Fmm of conflict Bilateral, dyadic Third Party, triadic Third Party, triadic 
management mode mode mode 
Aim of Conflict Conflict · Ruling on point of 
management effort management, management, law 
·resolution resolution 
Decision-making Joint, voluntary, . Joint, voluntary, Third Pmiy, 
process social influence social influence involuntary, rulings 
Nature of outcomes 'Non-binding, Non-binding; Binding, win-:lose 
. compromise, win- compromise, . wm-
:W;lll. · wm 
. .... ' 
Table 1.1 A Comparison ofNegotiation, Mediation, and Judicial Settlement 
Third, negotiation and mediation both involve joint and voluntary decision-
making processes dominated by social influence strategies. In contrast, judicial 
methods take the decision-making power out of the hands of the parties and put it in 
the hands of the third party, who rules, rather than attempting to influence. Lastly, the 
nature of the outcomes of negotiation and mediation are such that they are always 
non-binding, and usually involve a form of compromise or win-win formula. Judicial 
methods, on the other hand, produce binding outcomes which are necessarily of a win-
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lose character. Table 1.1 summarises the main points of difference and similarity 
between these three basic types of conflict management. 
The Problem of Conflict .Management Outcomes 
The challenge involved in examining and evaluating a highly complex process 
such as international conflict management begins with conceptualising the 
phenomenon and then developing standards for the assessment of outcomes. 
However, the issue of assessing outcomes in international conflict management is not 
as straighforward as it might appear. Often, evaluation criteria are taken for granted, 
but as soon as one starts reflecting upon them, they tend to raise more questions than 
answers (Klieboer, 1996: 361). 
The first problem which is often encountered in assessmg outcomes is the 
temporal problem ( eg, when does a conflict management episode terminate? Should 
outcomes be examined immediately after the conflict management, or, should a time 
lag be allowed for? If so, should we allow for a brief time lag, or a long time lag?). 
For the most part, within recent conflict management research there has been "little or 
no agreement on which episode constitutes the outcome or how to identify a terminal 
point in dealing with a dynamic and ever-changing process" (Bercovitch and Houston, 
1996: 17; see also Bercovitch, 1984: 112). 
The second problem is the perceptual problem. That is, conflict management 
outcomes may be perceived and defined very differently by each of the principal 
parties themselves, outside observers, the international community, or, in the case of 
mediation, by the mediators themselves (Bercovitch et al, 1991: 9). For example, 
outcomes that appear satisfactory or successful to one party may be perceived by 
another party as containing the seeds of future conflict (Bercovitch, 1984: 113). Or, 
outcomes that are perceived as useful at one particular moment of history may 
subsequently be seen to have been rather less so. 
A third problem with assessing outcomes is the evaluative problem, which relates 
to the normative criteria employed by the observer. Analysts often use very different 
vantage points and criteria for judging outcomes: some adhere to what is termed in 
peace research as a "negative" conception of peace ( eg, the absence of physical 
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violence and war), while others cling to a "positive" approach to peace ( eg, a concern 
for social justice and welfare) (Klieboer, 1997: 13). From the positive peace approach 
then, conflict management outcomes are successful or unsuccessful depending on the 
extent to which they meet certain normative criteria such as greater fairness, 
efficiency, legitimacy, justice, and so on (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 19). 
Alternatively, they may be evaluated in terms of either their short-term or long-term 
consequences. 
A review of current conflict management research reveals that typically, analysts 
have tackled the issue of how to assess outcomes in four ways (Klieboer, 1997: 12-
13). The first approach has been to neglect or avoid the issue altogether, assuming that 
success or failure is "common knowledge". For example, Assefa's analysis of 
mediation in the Sudan civil war uses a series of hypotheses identifYing conditions for 
successful mediation outcomes (Assefa, 1987: 29-30), but then leaves the reader 
puzzled about what success actually constitutes in his view (see also Carnevale et al, 
1989; Princen, 1992b ). 
A second strategy has been to formulate a specific definition of success based on 
crit((ria important to the analyst themselves. In these cases, scholars opt for 
idiosyncratic but parsimonious operationalisations to facilitate systematic analysis and 
measurement. In Frei's important study, for instance, he defines success as "a 
situation in which both parties to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator 
and a mediative attempt within five days after the first attempt" (Frei, 1976: 69). 
Another study by Susskind and Babbitt argues that "successful mediation can result 
in: the cessation of violence; agreements that allow each party to save face both 
internationally and domestically; good precedents in the eyes of the world 
community; arrangements that will insure implementation of whatever agreements 
have been reached; and better relationships among the disputing parties" (Susskind 
and Babbitt, 1992: 31). They argue that the extent of success can be measured by the 
number of objectives reached. 
A third group of analysts equates conflict management success with effectiveness 
m terms of the parties' or mediator's objectives as the crucial benchmark for 
evaluation (Klieboer, 1997: 13). Thus, in analysing the efforts of the Reagan 
administration to mediate an agreement between Israel and Lebanon in 1981-1983, 
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In bar (1991) evaluates the outcomes in terms of US goals, which were a pull out of all 
foreign forces and the strengthening of the pro-Western Gemayel regime. Judged from 
this vantage point, the mediation was clearly unsuccessful (see also Smith, 1985; 
Touval and Zartman, 1985: 14). 
The final approach taken by analysts has been to conceptualise conflict 
management success in terms of what the protagonists might define as the underlying 
roots of their conflict. For example, in the work of Burton (1972a; 1987) and 
followers of the conflict resolution school (see Fisher and associates), conflict and war 
are assumed to be the result of patterns of dominance in human relationships. Conflict 
management can be considered successful to the extent that it produces durable 
solutions which are accepted and supported by all disputants, and if it creates 
institutions and practices that serve the needs of individuals and groups in society and 
legitimise authority. For Burton, this often requires a change in existing relationships 
between rulers and ruled both within and between states. 
Partly for operational reasons3, and in order to sidestep some of the conceptual 
disagreements involved in evaluating outcomes, this thesis employs the term conflict 
management success in a strictly behavioural sense. That is, it focuses on the 
behavioural consequences of conflict management rather than on such factors as 
efficiency, legitimacy, satisfaction, fairness, or long-term success. A conflict 
management episode is considered to be successful when it has made a considerable 
and positive difference to the management of a conflict and the subsequent interaction 
between the parties. Conflict management failure, on the other hand, results in no 
discernible or reported impact on the dispute or the parties' subsequent behaviour (see 
Bercovitch and associates). 
1.4 Research Comparing Negotiation and Mediation 
Empirical research which compares different methods of conflict management in 
international politics, and negotiation and mediation in particular, is noted more for its 
brevity, than its insights. A foundational study by Holsti in 1966 focused on 77 
international conflicts between 1919 and 1965 (later expanded to 97 conflicts in the 
3 The operational justifications for taking this approach are given in Chapter 4, section 4.2. 
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period 1919-1986). Each conflict was coded according to six possible outcomes 
(conquest, compromise, successful deterrence, award, avoidance, passive settlement), 
and then examined for the ways it was peacefully managed. Holsti found, among other 
things, that negotiation was successful in 47% of its attempts, while mediation had a 
22% success rate, multilateral conferences had a 44% success rate, referrals to 
international organisations had a 37% success rate, and judicial methods had a 45% 
success rate (see Holsti, 1966, 1968, 1988). Unfortunately, Holsti never pursued the 
comparative aspects of the study any further than the unidimensional correlation 
between conflict management type and outcomes. Also, he never expanded the data 
set to examine more cases or different types of international conflict. 
Northedge and Donelan took a similar approach in their study of 50 major 
international disputes between 1945 and 1970 (see Northedge and Donelan, 1971). 
Examining their data, one finds that mediation was used in 31 (62%) of the disputes 
and had success in 7 (23%) of these cases. Judicial methods were used in only 12 
(24%) of the disputes and had no successes, while UN intervention occurred in 42 
(84%) ofthe disputes and had success in 8 (19%) of these cases. Unfortunately, when 
Northedge and Donelan looked at the cases in which negotiation occurred\ they found 
that other forms of conflict management ( eg, mediation, arbitration, UN intervention) 
were also involved, and they were thus unable to determine whether success or failure 
was the result of negotiation or outside intervention (Northedge and Donelan, 1971: 
295). This limited the comparative usefulness of this study, somewhat. 
From this foundation, comparative studies on forms of conflict management began 
to focus on aspects of third party intervention. Butterworth's seminal work offered a 
detailed account of institutional intervention in international disputes (Butterworth, 
1976), and noted that of 310 disputes between 1945 and 1974, a third party was 
involved in 255 (82%) of the cases. Frei's important study on the conditions for 
success in international mediation set the scene for a plethora of empirical studies on 
aspects of mediation by Bercovitch and his associates (Frei, 1976; Bercovitch, 1984, 
1985, 1986, 1989, 1991; Bercovitch et al, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; 
etc). More recently, Dixon demonstrated how effective mediation is as a form of third 
4 They imply that virtually all the disputes involved some form of negotiation, even if it was to agree 
on which other f01ms of conflict management to adopt (Northedge and Donelan, 1971: 294-295). 
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party intervention compared with public appeals, communication, observation, 
intervention, humanitarian aid, and adjudication (Dixon, 1996). Similarly, Raymond 
examined comparative aspects of mediation and arbitration in disputes involving 
democracies (Raymond, 1994), while Diehl focused on peacekeeping (Diehl, 1993). 
By this stage it should be clear that the field of conflict management research is 
suffering from a serious empirical gap. Recent work by Fisher and associates has 
attempted to build a theoretical framework which could form the basis of an empirical 
comparison of negotiation and mediation, but it has yet to be applied to a data set (see 
Fisher, 1996; Keashly and Fisher, 1996). Later chapters will return to this important 
work. This thesis then, is an attempt to fill this empirical gap by conducting a large 
scale empirical study on comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation in 
international politics. As such, it is something of a return to Holsti, albeit with a 
nanower focus on comparing negotiation and mediation. 
1.5 A Preview of the Thesis 
Context of the Study 
This thesis fits squarely into the field of international conflict management 
research. Furthermore, it falls into the tradition of social science which places an onus 
of responsibility on the shoulders of social scientists to do more than observe. The 
point of research such as this is praxis. In this case, it is aimed at improving and 
strengthening the effectiveness of international conflict management in order to 
facilitate constructive, as opposed to destructive, relations among nations. 
While some believed that the end of the Cold War and the fundamental changes 
that have taken place in international politics over the past few years would lead to a 
new era of relative peace among nations, this expectation proved to be as enoneous as 
it was ephemeral. This misplaced optimism has been replaced by a growing realisation 
that conflicts are likely to remain with us whether the international system is unipolar, 
bipolar, or multipolar. Furthermore, the new international system is as conflict-prone, 
some would argue even more so, than any previous one (Bercovitch, 1996: 1; see also 
Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997). In short, as long as conflict is a regular feature of 
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international politics, the possibility of serious damage exists, as does the need to 
effectively prevent or manage such conflicts. This thesis then, stands side by side with 
other efforts to understand and improve conflict management today (see Albin, 1997, 
for example). 
In terms of the specific approach taken here, this study fits into that relatively 
small, but clearly delineated research tradition which employs systematic comparisons 
over large numbers of cases in a deliberate attempt to establish empirically grounded 
generalisations (see Bercovitch and associates; Dixon, 1996; Frei, 1976; Raymond, 
1994). That is, it employs quantitative methods in order to achieve a high degree of 
generalisability, as opposed to laboratory experiments or computer simulations which 
seek a high degree of control in the precision and measurement of variables, or single 
case studies which aim at a high degree of descriptive accuracy. 
The growing body of research which employs quantitative methods, including this 
thesis, is partly motivated by a dissatisfaction with current methodologies. For 
example, of the criticisms levelled at laboratory studies (Gordon, Schmitt, and 
Schneider, 1984), its tendency to over-extrapolate (Wall and Lynn, 1993: 182) 
particularly limits its applicability to the world of international politics (see also 
Bercovitch and Wells, 1993: 11; Carnevale et al, 1989: 364; Pruitt and Carnevale, 
1993: 195). The dominant methodology in international politics to date has been the 
case study, or, descriptive approach. This approach emphasises the unique aspects of 
every case, implying implicitly or explicitly that all cases are different and nothing 
meaningful can be said about conflict management in general. 
Despairing of the ideographic consequences of single-case description, the 
normative approach offers in a generic fashion, a set of recommendations that could 
lead to successful outcomes in all types of disputes, from the inter-personal to the 
international (Burton, 1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1987; Doob, 1970; Fisher, 1983, 1989). 
That is, the normative, or prescriptive approach "concerns itself with a wide range of 
disputes and collectivities, emphasises subjective elements of perception and 
communication, assumes that no dispute is too intractable for an experienced third 
party, and usually ends up as advice for mediation practitioners" (Bercovitch and 
Houston, 1996: 14-15). Needless to say, neither of these approaches has really 
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stimulated much-needed empirical research (Carnevale and Pegnetter, 1985; Mitchell 
and Webb, 1988; Ott, 1972; Rubin, 1980; Young, 1967). 
At another level, this study was undertaken in the context of a research tradition 
which considered conflict management unidimensionally in terms of its focal points. 
For example, one focus of study has been third party intermediary assistance (see 
Bercovitch and associates; Dixon, 1996; Frei, 1976; Young, 1967). Another focus 
point has been international negotiation (see Bazerman and Lewicki, 1975; 
Druckman, 1973, 1986; Ikle, 1964; Jonsson, 1989, 1991; Kremenyuk, 1991; Lall, 
1966). To date, there has been no multidimensional, comparative research tradition 
which looks at more than one form of conflict management simultaneously. No-one 
has taken up the challenge posed by Holsti to develop a comparative fi·amework and 
gather data on different forms of conflict management. This thesis is an attempt to do 
just that. 
In other words, this study, while firmly established in the context of recent 
quantitative research, represents somewhat of a necessm)' departure from the 
dominant approach. This is because it is comparatively focused at two different types 
of conflict management. Apart fi·om Holsti (1966, 1968), no study has compared 
negotiation and mediation using quantitative techniques and in the international 
context. This is surprising considering that negotiation and mediation are eminently 
comparable (see chapter three), are the most used forms of conflict management in 
international politics, and are often used in tandem by diplomats. Furthermore, to date, 
there has been no large-scale data set compiled on international negotiation. The vast 
majority of negotiation studies have relied on single-case analysis (Hopmann and 
Smith, 1977), or a few selected cases (Druckman, 1986; Stoll and McAndrew, 1986). 
This study, then, attempts to bridge the gap between the different foci of studies, 
namely, negotiation studies and third party assistance studies. By applying the same 
analytical framework to both forms of conflict management, it will be possible to 
widen our understanding of what conditions are associated with successful outcomes 
across different types of conflict management, and not just in the third party assistance 
mode. As a result, this thesis will also initiate the development of a unified theory of 
negotiation and mediation, a critical task for the field as a whole (Pruitt and 
Carnevale, 1993: 198). 
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Contribution of the Study to the Field of Conflict Management Research 
The specific contributions ofthis thesis will be both theoretical and empirical. Its 
theoretical contributions include the identification of weaknesses and gaps in current 
conflict management research (see chapter two). While the task of reviewing and 
evaluating the research in one's field of study is only a first and basic step, it is 
nonetheless a vital one, more so if it reveals fundamental areas of neglect. This study 
then, is important for highlighting the need for greater research efforts to be directed 
at filling the comparative and empirical gaps discussed in section 1.1. Until more is 
known about the success of different forms of conflict management, little can be done 
to improve their application to the real conflicts presently underway in international 
politics. 
Second, this study presents a theoretical framework that not only identifies the 
most important contextual and process factors in international negotiation and 
mediation, but which also provides a useful device for comparative studies (see 
chapter three). The Contingency framework, while still in a fairly mdimentary form, 
can be used to conduct studies comparing negotiation, mediation, arbitration, the UN, 
or any other method of conflict management commonly used in international politics. 
In an area of research which lacks both theoretical tools and previous studies, the 
Contingency framework outlined in this dissertation represents something of a 
watershed. As a by-product, this study also advances a large number of testable 
propositions which could form the basis for later studies. 
Third, this thesis contributes a unique and vital discussion of the differences and 
similarities between negotiation and mediation. Although negotiation and mediation 
have been discussed in the same context (see Carnevale and Pmitt, 1992; Pmitt, 
1986), until now, no attempt has been made to carefully articulate the specific nature 
of their differences and similarities. The attempt in this thesis to bridge the two foci of 
study provides the beginnings of an integrated theory of negotiation and mediation, a 
vital step on the road to improving international conflict management. 
The empirical contributions of this study are no less important than the theoretical 
ones. In the first place, given the relative dearth of quantitative, generalisable studies 
of international conflict management, the constmction of a unique large-scale 
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comparative data set is a laudable achievement. For this thesis, I carefully examined 
295 international armed conflicts between 1945 and 1995 and documented more than 
600 cases of international negotiation. Each case was coded according to more than 60 
variables. This data was combined with Bercovitch's Correlates of Mediation data set 
to produce a substantial comparative data base5• 
Furthermore, the compilation of the first large-scale data set on international 
negotiation of its kind represents a very important contribution, and opens up a whole 
new research area. Here we actually have an analysis of negotiations based on more 
than 1000 real international cases in the last fifty years. This in itself is a substantial 
achievement. The need to collect generalisable data has been one of the primary 
weaknesses in the area of international conflict management research for some time. 
The application of the data set employed here to the propositions generated by the 
Contingency framework (chapters four and five), confirmed in some cases, and 
rejected in others, numerous theoretical notions. For example, it confirmed that 
negotiation and mediation do behave differently in international politics. While some 
might consider this notion axiomatic, until now this theoretical idea had not been 
demonstrated empirically by any research. The process of testing theoretical notions 
by way of empirical studies is perhaps the most important scientific exercise of all. In 
other words, the results of this study allow us to be a little more certain about some of 
the theoretical notions we often take for granted. 
Similar to this, the study has independently confirmed the findings of a number 
of previous studies. Such independent confirmation is again, a vital step in the 
scientific process. Only after extensive independent confirmatory studies can 
researchers begin to feel confident about what is known. For example, this study has 
found that conflict management efforts are enhanced by a mutual willingness on the 
part of the disputing parties to settle peacefully (see chapters four and five). This 
confirms the same findings of numerous previous studies conducted in a variety of 
different contexts (Carnevale and Pegnetter, 1985; Hiltrop, 1989; Klieboer, 1991; 
Brett and Goldberg, 1983; Slaatek, 1990; Tourval and Zartman, 1989). 
Methodologically, this study makes a small contribution to the search for 
appropriate empirical tools by confirming the utility of the loglinear approach in 
5 See Chapter 4, section 4.2 for a more detailed description of the data collection process. 
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political science. Appropriate and effective empirical methodologies are sorely needed 
in the current research milieu. To date, loglinear techniques of statistical analysis have 
been little used in the field of political science. Loglinear methodology has attained a 
much higher profile in psychology, sociology, and psychometrics, for the simple 
reason that it offers advantages over traditional techniques in both theory and 
application (see chapter five). This thesis demonstrates again its utility as a research 
tool (see also Bercovitch and Houston, 1993; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Langley, 
1993; Houston, forthcoming). 
The danger of engaging in an empirical study of this nature is that it leaves one 
open to the charge that the exercise is merely one of inductive "number-crunching". 
The thesis has far greater theoretical significance than this, however. Although a 
statistical analysis lies at the heart of the study, it is based on an examination of 
negotiation and mediation in the real world of international politics. It is not a case of 
pure abstraction, and the results of the analysis cause us to re-examine our perceptions 
and beliefs about how negotiation and mediation function in actual situations of 
international conflict. Furthermore, the study has genuine practical applications for 
conflict management and conflict prevention (see Chapter 6), and as such, puts 
forward socially useful knowledge. In the concluding chapter, I review the important 
empirical and theoretical contributions of this study (see section 6.2). 
Overall then, this thesis contributes a valuable context, direction, and foundation 
for further comparative studies into international conflict management. Furthermore, it 
also opens the way for quantitative research into international negotiation, and offers a 
few practical lessons for the practitioners of conflict management. 
Limitations of the Study. 
It should be obvious by this stage that this thesis will not be the basis of a 
practitioner's manual on how to make negotiation or mediation more successful, even 
though the study does make a few practical recommendations in the final chapter. 
Others have already done this (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Zartman, 1976). Furthermore, 
this thesis will not presume to constmct a full-blown theory of international conflict 
management, or of negotiation and mediation. Although theorising will take place, the 
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pnmary focus will be on the comparative empirical aspects of the problem of 
negotiation and mediation. In this sense, the study should be regarded as an empirical 
exercise; it is an attempt to contribute some empirical findings to the world of conflict 
management theory, and not the other way around. Even here, however, a caveat is in 
order. This study is by nature, exploratory. It will not necessarily answer the empirical 
question satisfactorily; rather, it will uncover the important factors which can be 
associated with successful conflict management and suggest potentially fruitful 
avenues of further research. It is simply a starting point to the question of the 
comparative effectiveness of negotiation and mediation in international conflict. 
Another empirical limitation of the study is the sequential problem. In the real 
world of international politics, negotiation and mediation are not always independent 
of each other, or occur in sequence. In some cases, negotiations may take place, only 
to be complemented by mediation, and then back again to negotiation. Solutions to the 
methodological problems posed by this are not easy. As this study is primarily 
exploratory, the construction of effective methodologies to analyse this effect will be 
left to a later stage. For the time being however, it is enough to aclmowledge the 
problem and be aware ofthe inferential limitations it places on the findings6• 
In terms of the theoretical parameters of the thesis, the study is limited to the 
examination of conflict management in cases of armed conflict, as the title suggests. 
That is, it is concerned with negotiation and mediation that takes place after violence 
has been employed. As later discussions suggest (see chapters two and three), there is 
a conceptual difference that can be inferred between both armed conflict and non-
armed conflict, and between the conflict management efforts applied to each type. 
This means that until further studies can compare them, one cannot assume that the 
findings presented here (ie, findings related to conflict management in violent 
conflicts) should be applied to the usual process of institutional negotiation and 
mediation designed to prevent violence between states. In other words, the study is 
limited to cases where normal diplomatic processes of conflict management have 
failed somewhat and the threshold of force has been crossed. 
Lastly, as has already been alluded to in the previous discussion on conflict 
management outcomes (see section 1.3), and as the title of the thesis suggests, this 
6 This problem is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, section 6.2. 
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study is focused on the limited goal of conflict management, or, conflict settlement, 
rather than conflict resolution. That is, a conflict can be considered settled when 
violent and destructive behaviour has been reduced, and hostile attitudes have been 
lessened. In contrast, a conflict can be said to be resolved when the basic structure of 
the situation giving rise to the violent and destructive behaviour and hostile attitudes 
have been re-evaluated, or re-perceived by the disputants. Negotiation and mediation 
can therefore, be directed at conflict settlement - the aim of the vast majority of 
diplomatic efforts - or, it can be directed toward achieving the more complex, if 
enduring, outcome of conflict resolution. Here we focus on the more limited efforts by 
diplomats of conflict settlement. 
Thesis Structure and Chapter Outlines. 
The structure of the thesis follows the questions outlined in section 1.2. Chapter 2 
reviews the literature on conflict management research, evaluating current paradigms 
for their ability to systematically analyse and compare negotiation and mediation in 
international conflict (question 1). An argument is made here that two dominant 
paradigms predominate in the field, the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party 
Intervention paradigm. Neither approach is entirely adequate for the question at hand. 
Chapter 3 introduces an improved theoretical framework which can systematically 
compare negotiation and mediation, and generate testable propositions (question 2). A 
number of initial and exploratory propositions are then suggested here. Chapters 4 and 
5 make up the heart of the study by applying the framework to the real world of 
international conflict management, testing the propositions on a large-scale data set, 
and evaluating the results (question 3). In chapter 6, I review and discuss the findings 
of the study, and evaluate its theoretical implications and practical lessons (question 
4). 
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Chapter 2 
EXAMINING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: 
TWO PARADIGMS 
2.1 Conflict Management Research: The State of the Art 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate existing conflict management paradigms, 
specifically, their ability to analyse and compare negotiation and mediation. This is 
the first step along the path to the constmction of a framework conducive to an 
empirical investigation. The initial challenge however, is to identify which paradigms 
dominate the field and the yardsticks by which they can be evaluated. Every social 
scientific theory attempts to understand, explain, and predict the phenomenon which 
it holds as its focus of inquiry by examining it through an organising framework, or 
paradigm. A framework is made up, first of all, of a series of assumptions concerning 
such objects as: the nature of reality (eg, subjective versus objective), human nature 
( eg, voluntaristic versus deterministic), appropriate methodologies ( eg, ideographic 
versus nomothetic), etc. For example, one theory of conflict management may assume 
that conflict is inherently and necessarily destructive; another may assume that it is 
potentially constmctive. 
Second, a framework is made up of a senes of related conceptualisations, 
definitions, and distinctions which delineate the phenomenon from related 
phenomenon. For example, a theory of conflict management will have definitions of 
both conflict and what it means to manage a conflict, and will distinguish conflict 
management from conflict resolution. Third, frameworks attempt to identify the most 
important variables which affect the phenomenon. Thus, a theory of conflict 
management might specify that the motives of the parties in conflict will determine 
the type and outcome of its conflict management. Lastly, frameworks are often 
identified by the type of scientific methodology they adopt; the methodology utilised 
is determined by the variables which the framework specifies as important. If motives 
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are thought to be the most important variable in conflict management, then for 
example, psychological methods will be needed to examine them. 
Therefore, we begin the task of identifying and evaluating current paradigms on 
conflict management by asking the following set of questions: 
1 What assumptions does this framework make about international conflict, states, 
the goals of conflict management, and the nature of negotiation and mediation? 
2 How does the framework define and conceptualise international relations, conflict, 
and conflict management, and how does it distinguish between negotiation and 
mediation? 
3 Which variables does the framework focus on as having the greatest explanatory 
power? 
4 What primary methodologies does the framework tend to employ? 
Conflict management research - especially research on negotiation and mediation -
is remarkably interdisciplinary, with important contributions coming from the fields 
of international relations, psychology, economics, sociology, anthropology, legal 
studies, industrial relations, organisational studies, and the field of communications. 
In particular, and reflecting a rapid proliferation in practice, studies on mediation have 
increased dramatically in the past few decades. Long an important part of industrial 
relations and international negotiation, mediation is now found in realms as diverse as 
neighbourhood feuds, civil and criminal litigation, police interventions, family 
disputes and divorce, public disputes, environmental planning and siting, and 
organisational decision-making (see Carnevale and Pruitt, 1993: 561). Negotiation is 
no less multifarious. 
Despite the burgeoning number of studies in recent years however, conflict 
management studies suffer from a number of unfortunate conditions. For negotiation, 
it is that the vast majority of studies concentrate in the field of psychology, and focus 
on aspects of decision-making or the approaches and tactics negotiators use (see 
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Chertkoff and Conley, 1967; Hamner, 1974; Kimmel et al, 1980; Pruitt, 1991). 
Furthermore, these studies rely almost entirely on laboratory studies for their 
methodologies (Gilkey and Greenhalgh, 1986: 245; Druclanan and Harris, 1990: 234; 
Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992: 538). When mediation is discussed in this context, it is 
generally of a prescriptive nature, outlining what mediators can do to help negotiators 
overcome their difficulties (Princen, 1992a: 13; see also Bigoness, 1976; Haynes, 
1985; Hiltrop, 1989; Jones, 1989). Furthermore, at the level ofintemational relations, 
the study of negotiation is largely confined to historical case studies, and is not 
intended to be the basis for broad generalisations (see Campbell, 1976; Cottman, 
1985; Druclanan, 1986; Hopmann and Smith, 1977; Koh, 1990; Touval, 1982). 
Mediation studies, with a few notable exceptions (see Bercovitch, 1984, 1985, 
1986, 1989, 1991,1992; Dixon, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; Kresse! and Pruitt, 1989; 
Princen, 1992a), reflect the same limitations. Many studies of mediation come from 
the fields of psychology or labour relations, and also tend to use laboratory studies for 
their main methodology (see Bartenuk et al, 1975; Barsky, 1983; Carnevale, 1986; 
McLaughlin et al, 1991; Rubin, 1980; Wall, 1975, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1979, 1981, 
1984). At the level of intemational relations, again, most research concentrates on 
detailed case studies with little intent towards generalising (see Assefa, 1987, 1988, 
1992; Bailey, 1985; Brown, 1990; Hume, 1994; Jabri, 1990; Princen, 1987; Rubin, 
1981; Stein, 1985; Touval, 1982; Touval and Zartman, 1985). 
Using the four guiding questions outlined above, it is possible to identify and 
distinguish between two paradigms, or theoretical frameworks, that tend to dominate 
the field. The first can be termed the Psychology Paradigm. This approach, derived 
from psychological theories of conflict, produces the vast majority of all research on 
conflict management. The second approach I have termed the Third Party Intervention 
Paradigm. This approach tends to be concentrated in the field of international 
relations, and has also produced voluminous research in recent years (see Bercovitch, 
1996; Bercovitch and Rubin, 1992; Kresse! and Pruitt, 1989; Mitchell and 
Webb,1988; Princen, 1992a; Rubin, 1981; Touval and Zartman, 1985; Touval, 1982). 
Each paradigm can be distinguished in terms of its underlying assumptions, its 
definitions and conceptualisations, its focus on the specific variables it sees as the 
primary explanatory variables, and its primary methodologies. 
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In section 2.2 of this chapter, I will outline the four dimensions of a theory of 
conflict management that will be used to compare the two paradigms. Section 2.3 and 
2.4 will then examine each paradigm with respect to the four dimensions. The final 
section in the chapter will give a brief analysis and evaluation. Here we will attempt to 
answer the question posed in chapter one: To what extent does current conflict 
management theory enable us to systematically evaluate, analyse, and compare 
negotiation and mediation in international politics? I will make an argument that 
neither of these two paradigms are sufficiently equipped for the task. 
Caveats 
A number of caveats are in order at this point. First, this discussion will not be a 
comprehensive classification of existing theories of conflict and conflict management. 
The two approaches under examination here - the Psychological and Third Party 
Intervention approaches - have already been identified as such (see Klieboer, 1996; 
Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 7-8), along with a number of other approaches. However, 
they have yet to be examined with regard to the specific question posed here; namely, 
the relative efficacy of negotiation and mediation 1 • This chapter will confine itself to 
discussing the two paradigms which it sees as being of primary interest and 
importance to the topic. 
Second, there will be no comprehensive descriptions covering all the intricacies 
and subtleties of these currents of thought. Rather, broad brush-strokes will be used to 
highlight how each paradigm tends to focus on specific aspects of conflict 
management, and as a result, makes certain assumptions. The purpose here is not to 
provide a deep theoretical critique, but simply to examine the parameters of each 
paradigm in terms of its ability to study and compare negotiation and mediation. 
A third important caveat applies mainly to the Third Party Intervention paradigm, 
but also concerns the Psychology paradigm. For some crucial areas of each paradigm, 
the underlying theoretical assumptions have remained largely unarticulated (Klieboer 
1 See also Bercovitch, 1982, 1984; Kolb and Babbitt, 1995; Kremenyuk, 1991, for further discussion of 
different approaches to the study of negotiation and mediation. 
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and t'Hart, 1995: 309). Thus, in order to draw out these underlying beliefs, I have had, 
at times, to logically extend existing assumptions and beliefs. 
Lastly, in examining these two paradigms, I will be drawing on a body of 
literature that is multi-level in terms of focus (eg, from inter-personal conflict 
management to international conflict management), multi-disciplinary, and which 
employs multiple methodologies ( eg, historical case studies, laboratory and field 
research, large-scale quantitative research, game-theoretic approaches, etc.). While it 
is possible to point to areas of overlap between the two paradigms, and to authors who 
seem to take eclectic approaches, I believe that it is possible and prudent to 
distinguish between them. 
2.2 Paradigmatic Comparison 
Theories of conflict management can be compared along three key dimensions: (1) 
the nature of conflict (including international conflict); (2) the nature of (international) 
conflict management; and (3) the primary methodological approaches to studying the 
phenomenon. A fourth dimension can be added to this when we focus specifically on 
the nature of (international) negotiation and mediation. In order to comb the literature 
and uncover competing theories of conflict management, it is necessary to transform 
these broad dimensions into a specific set of questions which can guide the search. In 
Table 2.1 the four key dimensions are disaggregated into a series of specific research 
questions based loosely on the questions posed earlier in section 2.1. Thus, 
dimensions 1-3a reflect the need to uncover the assumptions, definitions, and 
conceptualisations of conflict management expressed in questions 1 and 2, while 
dimension 3b corresponds to question 3, and dimension 4 corresponds to question 4. 
Using this approach, I will attempt to draw out the unique features of each 
paradigm, highlighting how the manner in which each paradigm deals with the earlier 
questions ultimately determines its ability to effectively deal with the comparative 
question of negotiation and mediation. In other words, there is a logic in the sequence 
of questions posed; the way negotiation and mediation are conceptualised and studied, 
is largely dependent on the assumptions, definitions, and conceptualisations of 
international politics, conflict, and conflict management. 
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2.3 The Psychology Paradigm: Generic Conflict Management 
The ongms of the Psychology Paradigrn2 can be found in conflict research 
conducted primarily in the fields of psychology, economic game-theoretic studies, and 
organisational studies. The number of studies utilising this paradigm numbers in the 
hundreds (see Rubin and Brown, 1975; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992, for a review), 
although only a few have applied it directly to the level of international relations (see 
Burton, 1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1987; Druckman, 1973; Fisher, 1989, 1995, 1996; 
Kelman, 1965, 1972; Zartman, 1977, 1978, 1991; Holsti, 1976; Jonsson, 1982, 1989, 
1991; Cross, 1977; Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994; Larson, 1991). Along with the field of 
2 Although it would be more accurate to refer to this approach as the "Socio-Psychology" paradigm in 
light of the fact that both social interaction and psychological factors are commonly utilised, I employ 
the term Psychology paradigm for two simple reasons. First, to avoid confusions over its usage, and 
second, to provide relevence and continuity to previous authors who follow my terminology (see 
Bercovitch, 1984a; Klieboer, 1994, 1996, 1997). 
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conflict research, foreign policy decision-making studies also make extensive use of 
psychological approaches to international relations (see Allison, 1971). 
A comprehensive outline and critique of the Psychological approach 1s not 
possible here. In any case, this has already been attempted (Pmitt and Carnevale, 
1993). A brief outline of its main features, as related to the question of the relative 
efficacy of negotiation and mediation, will suffice. While the Psychology paradigm 
has been examined in a comparative manner with regard to other questions (see 
Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995), it has yet to be applied to the question 
under examination here. 
I The Nature of International Conflict 
As its starting point, the Psychology paradigm rejects the traditional neorealist so-
called billiard ball approach to international politics, where actors are assumed to be 
homogenous and unitary, and the decision-making process is "black-boxed". Rather, 
international actors are assumed to be complex entities made up of leaders, agencies, 
bureaucratic organisations, factions, and constituencies, all of which consist of 
individuals who have to make decisions in the context of competing demands, role 
expectations, and internal and external pressures. This view contrasts with the 
neorealist view, where foreign policy decisions are made rationally in the national 
interest, which is itself a reflection of the logic of the state's position in the 
international system (see Section 2.4 below). 
In other words, international politics can best be understood by focusing on the 
behavioural motives and policy-making processes of the individuals concerned. 
Specifically, the Psychology paradigm focuses on: (1) the personal variables of policy 
makers, such as identity and attribute factors ( eg gender, ethnicity, friendliness, sense 
of humour, etc), attitudinal and perceptual variables ( eg degree of flexibility or 
cooperativeness), and cognitive process factors (eg cognitive complexity, cognitive 
consistency); (2) the organisational dimensions of decision-making, such as the role 
of expectations on individuals, the interplay between personalities and routinised 
procedures, levels of accountability, the occupation of boundary roles, and 
bureaucratic factional competition; and (3) the role of domestic constraints within 
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which policy-makers operate, such as political parties, pressure groups, and public 
opinion. In short, international politics is conceived of here as simply a complex form 
of problem solving, similar in every other respect to the types of decisions made by 
individuals and organisational elites at every other social level. International 
interaction is the interplay between systems of decision-making. 
Within the Psychology paradigm it is assumed that the perceived similarities 
between conflicts at different levels ( eg the similarities between interpersonal conflict 
and inter-organisational conflict), justifies its study as a distinct field (Mitchell, 1981: 
3; Boulding, 1962: 1). It follows from this that the study of conflict at one level, for 
example the level of international politics, can be informed by studies at another level, 
such as the interpersonal level. Within this paradigm, conflict has been defined as: 
" ... a perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations 
cannot be achieved simultaneously" (Rubin, Pmitt, and Kim, 1994: 5). Similarly, it 
has been argued that "a conflict situation is one where two or more social entities (or 
parties) perceive that they possess mutually incompatible goals" (Mitchell, 1981: 17), 
or, "conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are 
aware of the incompatibility of future potential positions and in which each party 
wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other" 
(Boulding, 1962). 
In other words, the Psychology paradigm takes a generic approach to conflict. 
International conflict is not a special case or especially unique, but rather is simply the 
same phenomenon at another level of social interaction. Combined with earlier 
assumptions about international actors, it follows that international conflict is caused 
by perceptions of mutually incompatible goals, or diverging interests, by policy elites. 
They arise because political leaders harbour subjective, situation-specific images of 
the national interest and the actions and motives of competing national leaders, and 
not necessarily because of any objective incompatibilities (see Klieboer and t'Hart, 
1995). In this sense, conflict is subjectively constmed, and the essential problem of 
international conflict 1s the perceptions of relationship, need, and goal 
incompatibilities, and at times, misperceptions about the meaning of certain 
behaviours. The most important causes of international conflict are misperceptions 
arising from distmst and underestimation and overestimation of the other's 
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capabilities to exert coercion. This can lead to an escalatory spiral of self-reinforcing 
misperceptions and conflictual actions leading to violence (Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 
321). 
II The Nature of International Conflict Management 
Conflict as such, is neither good nor bad. At times, parties can be dissatisfied with 
the outcomes and feel that they have lost as a result of the conflict, or, they may be 
satisfied with the outcome and feel that they have gained as a result of the conflict. In 
other words, there are destructive conflicts and constructive conflicts (Deutsch, 1969: 
1 0). The problems with conflict at the international level are twofold: (1) from a 
decision-making perspective, conflicts at this level often have built-in escalation 
mechanisms which can cause them to spiral out of control; and (2) conflicts at this 
level have tremendous destructive potential. 
The good news is, however, that because conflict is subjectively construed, 
constructive management of international conflict is in principle, possible. That is, 
because conflict is seen here to be largely in the eye of the beholder, there is no reason 
why its complete resolution should be impossible (Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 321). A 
conflict can be considered settled when destructive behaviour has been reduced and 
hostile attitudes have been lessened. In contrast to that, a conflict is said to be resolved 
when the basic structure of the situation giving rise to destructive behaviour and 
hostile attitudes has been re-evaluated, or re-perceived by the parties in conflict. 
Conflict management can, therefore, be directed toward conflict settlement, or it can 
be directed toward achieving the more complex, if enduring, outcome of conflict 
resolution (Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). 
On this basis then, the goal of international conflict management is to alter the 
behaviour and perceptions of decision-makers in order to arrest conflict spirals and 
resolve deep-rooted differences. This is done by working with decision-makers to 
build trust, re-align perceptions, identify underlying needs, construct innovative 
solutions, and improve relationships. This implies that in practice, the very process of 
initiating and sustaining a dialogue in a conflict is as important as reaching a 
resolution. 
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The primary method of conflict management is bargaining and negotiation. This is 
true at all levels of conflict, and is not surprising given that joint bilateral decision-
making has greater advantages and less risks than dealing with a conflict unilaterally 
( eg struggle, withdrawal, submission), or allowing a third party to adjudicate (Pruitt 
and Carnevale, 1993: 2-6). It is certainly the principal means of handling all 
international disputes, and is employed more frequently than all other techniques of 
conflict management put together (Merrills, 1991: 2). This is because: 
... direct negotiation between sides in a dispute is the ideal way to resolve 
conflict on all levels. It is the most efficient method because it requires the least 
formality, eliminates the expense of third parties and helps avoid adversary 
proceedings which often aggravate hostility. The complexily of the 
communication problem may be reduced ... privacy of discussion allows for 
flexibility and candour so important issues can be discussed with fewer risks. 
One of the major advantages of bilateral negotiations is that they can be more 
binding. Mutual consent to a resolution gives it legitimacy ... (Suter, 1986: 10) 
From this viewpoint, the way to improve international conflict management is to 
improve negotiator ( eg, foreign policy-makers') skills, if necessary, by employing 
skilled facilitators who can educate and teach negotiators how to find creative 
solutions to their conflicts. Facilitators need to be neutral actors with analytical and 
communication skills who can bring into practice the lessons of applied conflict 
analysis (Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995: 321-322). 
III The Nature of Negotiation and Mediation 
Negotiation and mediation are both voluntary conflict management methods with 
non-binding outcomes (see chapter one). This is the basis for considering them 
together. Within the Psychology paradigm, mediation is considered to be simply, "a 
special case of negotiation" , in that "mediation is like negotiation except that a third 
party helps the disputants reach agreement" (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 165, 4). In 
other words, mediation is a variation of negotiation, and there are few essential 
differences between them (see also Gulliver, 1979; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; 
Touval, 1982; Princen, 1992a; Schelling, 1960; Faure, 1989). 
The basis for treating negotiation and mediation as a singular conflict management 
method comes from two primary considerations: (1) the mediator as bargainer; and (2) 
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the differences between negotiation and mediation on the one hand, and adjudication 
on the other. First, the task of a mediator consists largely of "trying to persuade each 
party to accept the largest concession which the other is willing to make" (Pruitt, 
1971: 230). In this sense, mediators can be conceived of as influence agents, 
themselves functioning in a bargaining role (Rubin and Brown, 1975: 63). That is, 
mediators transform a dyadic bargaining structure into a triadic bargaining structure 
(see Figure 2.1 ), and become another party to a bargaining relationship. Gulliver 
expresses it in the following terms when he argues that a mediator: 
interacts with each party and with both together, and they may communicate to 
and through him. He becomes a party in the negotiations. He becomes a 
negotiator and as such, he inevitably brings with him, deliberately or not, certain 
ideas, lmowledge and assumptions, as well as certain interests and concerns of 
his own and those of the people he represents (Gulliver, 1979: 7). 
What Gulliver is emphasising here, and what can be seen in Figure 2.1, is that 
mediators have the same characteristics as negotiators. Mediators bring with them to 
the negotiations their own goals, motivations, orientations, and constituencies (Faure, 
1989: 425). Furthermore, mediators then engage in a series of social influence 
strategies, bargaining with the principal negotiators in an effort to help them 
overcome the difficulties of negotiating a voluntary agreement (see Touval, 1982; 
Princen, 1992: 221). 
In a mediated negotiation system (see Figure 2.1), a number of different 
bargaining dynamics are possible. First, the mediator can try to strike a side deal by 
bargaining directly with one of the disputants. Second, the mediator can threaten to 
form a coalition with one disputant in order to compel a concession from the other. 
Third, a mediator can "create a three-way, circular bargain in which the mediator 
makes a deal with one disputant who, in tum, makes a deal with the other disputant 
who, to complete the circle, makes a deal with the mediator" (Princen, 1992: 23). In 
other words, as Figure 2.1 clearly illustrates, mediators expand and complicate the 
relational possibilities, and the communication dynamics of a negotiation system. 
What was once a relatively simple, essentially bilateral process, becomes with 
mediation, a highly complicated multi-lateral bargain. 
However, an important caveat to the notion of mediator as bargainer, is that if 
mediators go too far in pursuing their interests, turning the negotiation into a coalition 
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game for instance, they negate the mediation process. In other words, mediators, while 
functioning to a large degree as negotiators in their own right, are circumscribed in 
their behaviour by the voluntary nature of the process. An example from international 
mediation occurred in the case of Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war, when 
Syria's intervention as a military force in June 1976 on the side of the Maronites 
turned it from a peacemaker to a direct participant. 
Second, one of the most important characteristics deliminating various kinds of 
conflict management techniques is that of voluntarism. There is a vast psychological 
Figure 2.1 The Transformation of a Dyadic Negotiation System into a Triadic 
Mediated Negotiation System (adapted from Wall, 1981: 159). 
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difference between techniques where full responsibility for the outcome is in the 
hands of the main protagonists, such as in negotiation and mediation, and those where 
it is in the hands of a disinterested third party, such as adjudication and other judicial 
or semi-judicial processes (Morley and Stephenson, 1977: 24-25). Accordingly, the 
Psychology paradigm excludes all judicial and semi-judicial methods of conflict 
management from categories of negotiating behaviour, while treating mediation as a 
form of bargaining (Lall, 1966, 1985; Morley and Stephenson, 1977: 25). In other 
words, the primary distinction between species of conflict management techniques, as 
it were, is drawn between negotiation (and its adjunct, mediation), and adjudication. 
Voluntarism also has important implications for the behaviour of the parties to a 
negotiation. It means that both negotiation and mediation are systems of social 
influence, where the parties use social influence strategies to alter the perceptions and 
behaviour of the other parties. They cannot use coercion or sanctions, as adjudicators 
can. 
Based on the preceding assumptions and conceptualisations of international 
politics, conflict, and conflict management, the Psychology paradigm denotes three 
clusters of variables that affect negotiation and mediation: (1) situational or contextual 
factors; (2) personal and role factors; and (3) interactional factors. Situational or 
contextual factors refer here to all the social and physical conditions under which the 
negotiations take place, each of which can impinge upon the conflict management 
process and exert a powerful influence on its nature and quality (Druckman, 1971). 
Situational factors include: (a) physical components, such as the location of the 
negotiation, the neutrality of the site, or the physical arrangements for discussions; (b) 
social components, such as the number of parties involved in the process, the presence 
or absence of audiences, or the presence of third parties; and (c) issue components, 
such as the type of issues (tangible or intangible), the number of issues, or the 
availability of alternative solutions (Bercovitch, 1984: 131 ). 
Second, it seems logical that personal factors influence bargaining and negotiation 
in as much as it is an activity undertaken by human subjects. The effect of personal 
and role factors on the bargaining process is perhaps the most widely studied area of 
negotiation and mediation research within the Psychology paradigm, producing 
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hundreds of laboratory experiments designed to determine the effect of personal 
factors on negotiating behaviour, or to understand the cognitive processes of 
negotiators (see Benton, 1975; Carnevale and Pruitt, 1992; Gilkey and Greenhalgh, 
1986; Kimmel et al, 1980; Rubin et al, 1990; Thompson, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1991; 
Wall, 1976). 
Personal factors include all of the individual characteristics, needs, attributes, 
expectations, and other enduring dispositions which the actors bring with them to the 
negotiation. These personality traits predispose the individual to certain perceptions 
and behaviour, and include characteristics such as age, gender, religion, intelligence, 
and cognitive complexity, as well as motivations and attitudes such as trusting, 
cooperativeness, authoritarianism, or machiavellism. Role factors, on the other hand, 
describe a set of influences which stem from the negotiator's reference group, or from 
expectations attached to their position (Bercovitch, 1984: 130). They determine the 
decision-latitude of the negotiator by producing a field of pressure in which each actor 
has to be responsive to the needs and expectations of their own constituency (see 
Kahn, 1991). 
Interactional factors refer to the multitude of variables which affect the conflict 
interactions between the parties; that is, the way each party responds to the other 
during the negotiations. These factors highlight the importance of the antagonists' 
prior relationship and the nature of their present interdependence. They are normally 
considered under the following clusters: (a) the parties' motivational orientation 
towards each other, whether it is of a cooperative, competitive, or individualistic 
nature; (b) the distribution of power between the parties, whether it is equal or 
unequal; (c) the process of communication, whether it is open and trusting, or 
misleading and controlled; and (d) the parties' utilisation of social influence 
strategies, such as rewarding or coercive strategies (Bercovitch, 1984: 131-132; Rubin 
and Brown, 1975: 38-39; Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965: 471-486). It is argued that the 
process of the negotiation and its eventual outcome will be, to a large degree, 
determined by the way the parties perceive each other, and perceive the actions of the 
other during the bargaining process. 
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IV Studying Negotiation and Mediation 
Comparing negotiation and mediation within this paradigm is difficult, and in one 
sense, pointless. This is because it is assumed that they are essentially the same 
process, and the factors which affect the one will affect the other in a similar way. 
Thus, studies within this paradigm tend to focus on the effect that mediators have on 
negotiator behaviour (see Bartenuk et al, 1975; Bigoness, 1976; Brookmire and 
Sistrunk, 1980; Conlon and Fasolo, 1990; Harris and Carnevale, 1990; Johnson and 
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Tullar, 1972; Rubin, 1980; Wall, 1984). Little or no work has been attempted on 
comparing them as two distinct methods of conflict management, which has been 
recognised as a major wealmess of the paradigm (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 165-
192, 196). 
In order to understand international conflict management, and g1ven the 
underlying assumptions of this paradigm, researchers have a variety of appropriate 
methodologies (see Gordon et al, 1984). Laboratory studies at the level of 
interpersonal conflict, and field studies at the level of inter-organisational conflict can 
all inform our understanding of international conflict. Similarly, game theoretic 
approaches can form the basis of prescriptive studies designed to enhance negotiator 
strategy choice, while in-depth historical studies (see Beriker and Druckman, 1991) 
can shed light on the motivations and personal dispositions of key players in past 
cases of negotiation and mediation. In other words, both quantitative and qualitative 
approaches are appropriate here. Table 2.2 summarises the basic tenets of the 
Psychology paradigm of international conflict management. 
2.4 The Third Party Intervention Paradigm: Special Conflict Management 
The origins of the Third Party Intervention par:adigm can be found in two separate, 
but related, developments within international relations literature. The first 
development was an emerging critique of the Psychology paradigm, in particular, its 
efforts to apply findings from laboratory studies on interpersonal conflict to the level 
of international conflict. It is an oft heard cry within the Third Party Intervention 
literature that extrapolating from the interpersonal context to the complex world of 
international politics is an exercise in futility, as "international disputes are not 
interpersonal disputes writ large" (Bercovitch and Wells, 1993: 11). 
The second development has been the increasing tendency to rely on detailed case 
studies of international negotiation and mediation (see Campbell, 1976; Asseffa, 
1987; Ikle, 1964; Inbar, 1991; Jabri, 1990; Lall, 1962; Hume, 1994; Mandel, 1990, 
1996; Princen, 1987, 1991, 1992b; Rubin, 1981; Touval, 1982, 1992). Such narrow 
and detailed focus inevitably highlighted the complexities and unique aspects of 
international conflict, reinforcing the existing criticism of the Psychology paradigm. 
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The Third Party Intervention paradigm is almost exclusively limited to international 
relations scholars, and is embedded in neorealist theorl. However, many of the 
authors in this paradigm rely on research conducted in the labour and industrial 
relations literature for notions of third party intervention in conflict (see Carnevale 
and Pegnetter, 1985; Hiltrop, 1985, 1989; Jones, 1989; Kochan and Jick, 1978; Kolb, 
1983a, 1983b, 1985; and Wall, 1975, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1979, 1984). 
A comprehensive outline of this approach is not possible here and will not be 
attempted. Rather, a brief overview of the main assumptions and conceptualisations at 
the heart of the paradigm will be given, with emphasis on how negotiation and 
mediation are conceptualised and compared. Although this paradigm has been 
identified and examined in regard to other questions (Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and 
t'Hart, 1995), it has so far avoided examination in regard to the question of the 
comparative efficacy of negotiation and mediation. 
I The Nature of International Conflict 
States are a special kind of social entity. Their unique roles, functions, and abilities 
set them apart from other social actors. In opposition to the Complex Interdependence 
School, and other structuralist views of the erosion and diffusion of state sovereignty 
in contemporary international relations (see Kegley and Wittkopf, 1993: 28-38; 
Keohane and Nye, 1988; Holsti, 1989), the Third Party Intervention approach assumes 
that states are the only actors that enjoy sovereignty. That is, they possess inherent 
absolute, indivisible, and unlimited power and authority over a given territory, and 
this authority is recognised under international law. States also command allegiance 
of a people inhabiting a certain territory, having a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
physical coercion. Non-state actors then, exist and operate only with the consent of 
states. Furthermore, only states possess the right and ability to wage war, and unlike 
most non-state actors, governments are responsible for a full range of welfare and 
security issues for the population they govern. 
3 Important contributors within this paradigm include Bercovitch and associates, Dixon, 1996, Gross-
Stein, 1985, Kriesberg, 1991, 1996, Mandell, 1990, 1996, Touval and Zartman, 1985, Young, 1967, 
1972. The Third Party Intervention paradigm does not l~ave to make neo-realist assumptions, but in its 
most common manifestations it does. Thus, the following discussion describes it in such terms. 
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On this basis then, the Third Party Intervention paradigm assumes that states are 
the primary actors in international politics, and that the most important political 
activity in the contemporary world still takes place among them. The nature of the 
interaction between states is unique, because states themselves are unique. Thus, the 
domestic and international spheres of politics are bifurcated, each having distinctive 
characteristics and subject to their own laws ofbehaviour. 
One of the distinctive features of international politics is its complexity. All states 
seek to rationally pursue their national interests. The primary national interest is to 
secure physical, political, and cultural survival through the maintenance of territorial 
integrity, preservation ofthe existing political-economic regime, and enforcing ethnic, 
religious, linguistic, and historical norms within states. Secondary national interests 
follow and may include maintaining spheres of influence or standing in the hierarchy 
of states, securing access to markets and resources, maintaining systems of commerce, 
creating allies by preserving or creating similar political regimes, or promoting 
international cooperation through intergovernmental organisations. The pursuit of a 
myriad of interests and needs by an increasing number of state actors makes 
international politics - the balancing of each state's needs and interests - a highly 
complex affair. 
Although states are judicially equal, in reality there exists major inequalities 
between them. This fuels rivalry and attempts to gain comparative advantage ( eg, the 
struggle for power) as states pursue limited resources and values. This competition is 
reinforced by the decentralised and anarchical structure of the international system, 
which has no legally and politically superordinate authoritative political institution 
wielding a monopoly of power capable of regulating such competition. Without such 
an institution, the potential always exists that competition will tum into violent 
conflict. This creates the need for states to arm themselves in order to feel secure, 
leading to a paradoxical situation whereby the means by which one state provides for 
its security enhances the insecurity of others. In short, conflict is embedded in the very 
structure of the international system; it is both inherent and ubiquitous. 
Furthermore, international conflict is a special case of conflict due to, first of all, 
its potential level of violence and destruction. Technological advances have meant 
that today, international conflicts have the potential to threaten the very existence of 
40 Chapter 2 
the international system if they reach the point of nuclear escalation. Second, 
international conflicts possess significant contagion elements, whereby conflict can 
spread far beyond its initial centre of contact. The two world wars are an example of 
this effect. Third, international conflict is resistant to traditional forms of conflict 
management. When two states go to war, there is no judge or police force which can 
rule on the dispute and forcibly separate them, nor is there any reason why they 
should submit to the norms of bargaining. Lastly, international conflicts like all 
aspects of international politics, extremely complex. Each state's needs and interests, 
the limited and sometimes indivisible nature of resources, and the increasing levels of 
interdependence and interaction between groups and organisations, mean that every 
international conflict is exceedingly complicated. In short, international conflict 
cannot meaningfully be compared to conflict at lower levels. 
II The Nature of International Conflict J\1anagement 
Conflict management is often confused with conflict prevention or conflict 
control. This is a common confusion. To suggest that conflicts can be managed 
implies that conflicts are dynamic social processes, moving from an incipient, latent 
stage, to maturity and termination. It also suggests that conflicts have certain 
consequences for the parties involved as well as for the environment in which they 
occur. The proper concern of conflict management is thus with increasing values and 
beneficial consequences and decreasing costs and harmful consequences. Conflict 
management is an attempt to inject learning into the process of conflict, learning 
which can make conflict more productive and less costly (see Bar-Simon-Tov, 1994). 
The primary purpose of conflict management is to arrest the expansion and 
escalation of conflicts and create a structure or conditions which would be conducive 
to realising beneficial consequences. Because the anarchical structure of the 
international system makes it almost impossible to completely resolve the roots of 
international conflict, the goal of conflict management can only feasibly be conflict 
settlement; that is, the containment of conflict, the minimisation of its destabilising 
effects, crisis management, or the deescalation of violence and war. In other words, 
given the parameters of this paradigm, the best that conflict management can achieve 
41 Chapter 2 
is the control or lessening of violence, and the maintenance of some kind of stable 
order. 
The primary method of international conflict management is third party 
intervention, or mediation. This is because typically, war or acute conflict is usually 
associated with the breaking off of diplomatic relations, making bilateral negotiations 
difficult (Frankel, 1969: 146). Furthermore, when negotiations fail, as they usually do 
in the lead-up to a confrontation, this can encourage the use of force by seeming to 
eliminate other alternatives (Merrills, 1991: 22-26). The other main form of conflict 
management, judicial methods, also suffers from a number of handicaps. Apart from 
the unenforcibility of its decisions in the international arena due to the lack of capable 
enforcement agencies, international law is unsuited to complex political questions, 
which make up the majority of conflicts in international politics, and states are thus 
reluctant to submit their disputes to judicial bodies (Merrills, 1991: 140, 150). Legal 
methods are also inherently inflexible, and as indicated in section 1.3, take the 
decision-making power away from states. 
From this viewpoint then, the way to improve international conflict management is 
to enhance mediator abilities. This means improving mediator leverage, as well as 
mediator skills. The mediator needs to discern when the "ripe" moment for , 
intervention is, and what strategies to apply and how much leverage to exert (see 
Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996). Improving mediator 
effectiveness will lead to reductions in the levels of destructive conflict in 
international politics. 
III The Nature of Negotiation and Mediation 
States in conflict logically, have only three choices. They can manage peacefully, 
they can confront violently, or they can withdraw altogether from the conflict. In the 
context of international politics, these alternatives have been expressed as "diplomacy, 
war, or renunciation" (Morgantheau, quoted in Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965: 466). 
That is, they can attempt to peacefully settle their conflict through diplomatic means 
such as negotiation, mediation, international arbitration or UN forums. Either that, or 
they can go to war and use military force in the attempt to simply physically 
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overwhelm their opponent, or, they can withdraw from the conflict and renounce their 
claims. This is often a useful choice if the costs of pursuing the conflict are higher 
than the expected gains of winning or compromising. Alternately, states can 
voluntarily withdraw from the conflict and cease those actions which started it in the 
first place. 
A more refined typology comes from Holsti, who outlines six theoretical modes of 
behaviour available to states in conflict (Holsti, 1968: 543-551). First, states can avoid 
or voluntarily withdraw by ceasing those acts which caused the conflict, and desisting 
from any attempts to press their claims. This is extremely common, especially among 
states which have friendly or cordial relationships which they may not want to 
jeopardise. Second, states can attempt to resolve their conflicts by physically 
overwhelming their opponent through the use of force, or, violent conquest. Third, 
states can decide to submit to their opponent's demands or withdraw in the face of 
threats of violence or ultimata. The difference between submission and conquest is 
that in conquest the threat of force is implemented. Fourth, states can manage their 
conflict through some sort of compromise, in which all parties agree to a partial or 
complete solution by withdrawing or modifying their objectives, positions, demands, 
activities. Normally this is achieved by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, or some 
other pacific method of conflict management. Fifth, states can agree to settle their 
conflict by award. This involves a third party arbitrating or adjudicating according to 
internationally prescribed mles found in treaties, custom, or general principles of 
international law. Finally, conflicts can be passively settled when after a long period 
of time the parties implicitly accept a new status quo as partially legitimate, and 
quietly reduce the degree of their commitment to a specific objective. 
Expressed another way, states can be said to attempt to settle or manage their 
conflicts unilaterally, as in avoidance or voluntary withdrawal, violent conquest, and 
forced submission. Or, they may attempt a bilateral solution, such as when they agree 
to a compromise or passive settlement. Lastly, a third party may become involved, 
such as in the case when states agree to solve their differences through award. 
Excluding the unilateral modes ( eg violent conquest, avoidance, withdrawal, 
submission), it is possible to discern three overall approaches to conflict management 
in international relations. The first approach, which is advocated and pursued largely 
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by states themselves, attempts to maintain the primacy of states in the international 
system and their absolute sovereignty by keeping the conflict management process 
solely in their hands. Bilateral and direct methods of conflict management ( eg 
negotiation, mediation, conciliation, inquiry) express the desire of states to maintain 
control over all their relationships. 
The second approach, advocated by both individuals concerned for international 
peace and order, and international lawyers, sees the establislunent of international law 
as the panacea for international conflict (see Delbruck, 1987). If states could be 
convinced or forced to submit their conflicts to international courts or tribunals, the 
peaceful rule of law would prevail. This approach is at odds with the state-centred 
bilateral approach, as arbitration and judicial settlement take away a great deal of 
control from states themselves during the conflict management process. This factor 
alone has made legal techniques of conflict management unpopular. Out of the 
hundreds of conflicts between states every year, the ICJ considers only a handful. 
Even then, when a state gets a judgement it believes unfavourable, it will disregard the 
ruling. When the ICJ ruled in favour of Chile in the Beagle Channel Dispute (1952-
68), Argentina simply ignored the ruling and pressed its claims militarily. 
Thirdly, what is called the functionalist approach sees the establislunent of 
international organisations with specialised roles, such as the UN, as the most 
promising means of achieving peace and order in international relations. If states can 
cooperate in international organisations and utilise their peaceful settlement 
mechanisms, eventually these organisations could fulfil similar functions to that of 
national governments and national legal systems. They might be able to provide order 
in international society. Again, however, states are reluctant to relinquish any 
sovereignty to a body they cannot directly control. Morocco, which has been fighting 
the Saharan nationalist group, Polisario, for control of the territory of Western Sahara 
(1974-present day), has been delaying UN attempts to hold a referendum in the 
territory since 1992. It wants to run the referendum on its own terms, fearing the 
outcome of a UN-sponsored event. 
Negotiation and mediation then, are particular types of conflict management, 
namely, they are essentially bilateral, diplomatic methods. However, in contrast to the 
Psychology paradigm which treats them as a singular form of conflict management 
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(eg as variants of negotiation), the Third Party Intervention paradigm sees them as two 
very different forms of conflict management, treating mediation as a separate, 
autonomous topic (see Bercovitch, 1985, 1986, 1989; Brett et al, 1986; Dixon, 1996; 
Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and t'Hart, 1996). This is because the injection of a third 
party into a bargaining situation affects: (1) aspects of the social context of 
negotiation; (2) the parties in the negotiation; and (3) the process ofthe negotiation. 
The addition of a mediator to a negotiation alters the context of the negotiation in 
a number of ways. Most noticeably, the presence of a mediator upsets the social 
component of the negotiation by increasing the number of parties to the bargain. This 
can dramatically affect the nature of the parties' interaction, as has already been 
discussed. Also, the mediator brings with them their own set of constituencies and/or 
audiences (see Figure 2.1). In terms of the issue component of the bargain, the 
involvement of a mediator can expand or contract the number of issues, and it can 
expand the number and availability of alternative solutions. 
Second, the injection of a mediator affects the parties in the negotiation, because 
when mediators join a negotiation system as third bargainers, they bring with them a 
whole new set of personality traits, motivations, interests, orientations, and role 
expectations. These personal and role factors affect the way they perceive the other 
pmiies, and the way they behave towards them. Similarly, the parties' perception of 
the mediator, their orientation towards them and their antagonist, will all affect the 
way they behave. In this sense, mediators change the psychological environment of 
the negotiation simply by being present. However, if a mediator has only a minor 
interest in the outcome of the negotiation and perceives their role as non-
interventionist and limited to communication-facilitation, then the effect of their 
presence may be minimal. 
Lastly, mediators alter the process of negotiation. The mere presence of a third 
party profoundly changes the interaction between the disputing parties, simply by 
changing the relational possibilities in the bargain (Rubin et al, 1994: 198). That is, 
the possibility of the mediator siding with the opponent forces the negotiator to 
rethink their strategy. However, the mediator can also be much more active than this, 
and can attempt to alter their interaction in a number of important areas. The mediator 
can alter the parties' motivational orientation towards each other through supplying 
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information, enhancing communication, promoting trust, etc. Similarly, the mediator 
can alter the distribution of power between the parties by siding with the weaker party 
or giving more weight to their suggestions. In short, through the use of social 
influence strategies mediators can profoundly alter the way the parties behave towards 
each other. Again however, the impact of the mediator will be determined somewhat 
by the degree and intensity of their intervention. 
In this context then, mediation is very different from negotiation. Furthermore, its 
unique qualities make it ideally suited to the complex world of international politics. 
It is flexible, with mediators able to perform a variety of roles in a multitude of 
contexts. Skilled mediators are able to adapt a variety of strategies to enable the 
parties to overcome deadlock or impasse. And, as has already been discussed, 
mediation enables states to retain control over the process and outcome of the bargain. 
The utility of mediation is reflected in its extensive use in international politics. 
Butterworth found that of the 310 disputes between 1945 and 1974, a mediator was 
involved in 255 (82%) of the cases (Butterworth, 1976). 
Based on the underlying assumptions and conceptualisations of the Third Party 
Intervention paradigm, three clusters of variables are thought to be the most important 
for explaining mediation. These are: (1) the situational or contextual factors inherent 
in the conflict itself; (2) the identity and characteristics of the mediator; and (3) the 
strategies and behaviour of the mediator. Contextual factors refer to such components 
as the issues in conflict, the intensity of the conflict, the nature and number of the 
parties, the international environment, the distribution of power between the parties, 
and the availability of alternative solutions. However, of more interest are the 
variables to do with the mediator and their activities. 
While some scholars see mediators as vital actors who can alter the antagonists' 
behaviour and affect the outcome of the negotiation (see Brett et al, 1986; Carnevale, 
1986; Young, 1967; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993; Donohue and Burrell, 1988), 
others do not see the mediator as a critical determinant and play down the importance 
of mediators' personal characteristics (see Harbottle, 1979; Kochan and Jick, 1978; 
Ott, 1972). Among the studies that do consider mediator attributes as central to the 
process and outcome of mediation, there are a number of variables that stand out. 
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Mediator rank and identity is thought to play a very important role. For example, 
whether a mediator is a representative or not carries important implications in terms of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the disputants, and constituent pressures. Mediators can act 
purely as individuals, representing their own idiosyncratic points of view, or they can 
occupy representative roles instead (Rubin et al, 1994: 199-200). Representative roles 
have the advantage of being able to speak for constituencies that may possess vast 
sources oflegitimacy or resources. For example, part of Richard Holbrooke's success 
in the Bosnian conflict was attributable to his status as representative of an extremely 
powerful state with many resources. However, if the constituency represented is seen 
by the disputants as being illegitimate or lacking in desirable resources, mediator 
effectiveness will be hampered. The legitimacy of US mediation in the Middle East 
has often been questioned. 
Mediator rank and identity also raises the important issue of mediator 
acceptability. Mediators are not necessarily accepted because they are thought to be 
neutral and impartial, but because the mediator may help the disputants to realise 
some of their aims and interests, and because they use a cost-benefit paradigm. That 
is, mediators are accepted to the extent that they are thought capable ofbringing about 
an acceptable outcome (Zartman and Touval, 1985: 36), and to the extent that the 
disputants view the costs of rejecting the mediation as being higher than the benefits 
to be accrued (Touval and Zartman, 1985: 15). 
Mediator acceptability is also part and parcel of the notion of mediator leverage 
(see Zartman and Touval, 1985: 40-43), which is the mediator's power or ability to 
employ successful strategies that will realise the disputants' (and the mediator's) 
interests. Mediators will, to some degree, be acceptable if they are perceived to have 
leverage. Leverage has its most important source in the disputants' need for a 
solution. The mediator's power comes from the disputants' perception that the 
mediator has the power to engender an acceptable solution. Thus, in order to increase 
the mediator's source of leverage, they may need to foster the perception that the 
conflict is unsolvable without their help, and the costs of non-settlement are higher 
than the costs of the mediator's proposed settlement. Other sources of mediator 
leverage include their coalition-making ability, and the material and non-material 
resources which the mediator brings to the bargain, and which the disputants value. 
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The mediator's relationship to the parties is also an important variable. Here we 
refer to such factors as mediator bias, or impartiality, the level of trust between the 
mediator and the parties, and whether or not there is a continuing relationship between 
the mediator and the parties (see Donohue and Ramesh, 1992: 211-212). As 
Bercovitch and Houston observe, "a mediator who shares a common experience or 
affiliation with the parties may enhance the effectiveness of mediation through the 
existence of intimacy, understanding, trust, commitment, interdependence, rapport, 
and confidence" (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 302). It was once assumed that for a 
mediator to be both acceptable and effective, they had to be neutral and impartial, and 
only interested in resolving the conflict (see Folberg and Taylor, 1984; Moore, 1986; 
Ott, 1972). This notion has been successfully challenged within the Third Party 
Intervention paradigm on a number of grounds. First, it has been noted that in many 
recent instances of successful international mediation, the mediator has been neither 
neutral nor impartial (Touval, 1982: 12; see also Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Smith, 
1985). The mediation by Kissinger in the Middle East comes to mind here. 
Second, assuming that the disputants use a rational cost-benefit paradigm in their 
conflict management attempts, the partiality of the mediator may be considered an 
asset (Zartman and Touval, 1985: 35-37). That is, if one disputant views the mediator 
as being closer to the other disputant, they may assume that the mediator will be able 
to wield more influence over their opponent, and extract more concessions :fi:om them 
than would otherwise be possible. At the same time, perceived mediator bias may 
encourage either party to offer concessions in an effort to avoid being left out of a 
coalition. 
Third, the fact that mediators become negotiators in a three-cornered bargain 
makes the communication process that much more complex. Negotiators interpret 
information according to their perceptions, biases, and orientations, and will of 
necessity, take into account any perceived bias or partiality on the part ofthe mediator 
when assessing mediator communications, In other words, if either or both of the 
disputants regard the mediator as partial, this need not detract from the mediator's role 
as a communication channel (Touval, 1982: 17). 
The mediator's skill and experience are important factors influencing the outcome 
of mediation. Among the specific attributes cited by practitioners and researchers as 
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being important for effective mediation are skill, energy, effort, credibility, 
confidence, knowledge, authority, originality of ideas, rapport, intelligence, and a 
sense ofhumour (see Bercovitch, 1984, 1986, 1991; Gross-Stein, 1985; Kolb, 1983a, 
1983b; Wehr, 1979; Young, 1967). Clearly, many of these aspects of the mediator's 
character are regulated by their own goals, interests, motivations, and orientations. 
The behaviour of the mediator has been suggested by some scholars to be the 
crucial detenninant of the success or failure of the intervention. The two most 
important aspects of mediator behaviour are thought to be: (1) the timing of the 
mediator's intervention; and (2) the mediator's choice of strategy. Timing is crucial, 
because it seems reasonable to assume that in the course of a conflict there will be an 
optimum moment when the conditions are more conducive to mediation than at any 
other time. However, it is also problematic because there is scant agreement or 
empirical evidence to suggest when that optimum point in time is. Some have argued 
that mediation early in the conflict is more likely to be effective, because the 
disputants are still reasonably flexible, and their positions have not yet hardened 
(Touval, 1982: 8-1 0). Others however, claim that a "hurting stalemate" later on in the 
conflict provides the best motivation for policy changes, and hence, the mediator has 
the best opportunity to move the parties towards deescalation and agreement (Touval 
and Zartman, 1985: 9-10). 
Of greater importance is the mediator's choice of strategy, as this can often be 
the crucial element in getting talks started, breaking a deadlock, or creating 
momentum towards agreement. The most widely used typology of mediator strategies 
in international politics is that offered by Touval and Zartman, who classify all 
mediation strategies as either communication, formulation, or manipulation 
approaches (Touval and Zartman, 1985). Communication strategies consist of 
searching for, supplying, and clarifying information; that is, acting as a go-between. 
Formulation strategies are designed to help the mediator gain and retain control over 
the process of interaction, using such tactics as setting the agenda and controlling the 
environment. The most active strategy, that of manipulation, involves the mediator 
directly in changing the parties' decision-making process through rewards, offering 
solutions, or exerting pressure. 
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Numerous studies have attempted to uncover which strategies are effective under 
different conditions (see Rubin and Brown, 1975; Young, 1972; Pmitt, 1971; Wilson, 
1992; Carnevale and Pegnetter, 1985; Donohue, 1989; Donohue and Burrell, 1985; 
Hiltrop, 1989). How mediators decide which strategy to employ is an important 
related question, not without controversy (see Bercovitch and Wells, 1993). For the 
most part, mediators' behaviour is not based on a predetennined plan of action, but 
reflects the context of the dispute, and the needs and interests of the parties. 
Furthermore, as the dynamics of the dispute and context of a mediation change, so too 
will mediators adapt their strategies (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 304). 
IV Studying Negotiation and Mediation 
Comparing negotiation and mediation within this paradigm is difficult and rarely, 
if ever, attempted. This is because they are assumed to be very different processes, 
with different dynamics and casual factors. That is, mediation transforms the 
negotiation so completely that comparing the two results only in underlining the 
singularity and uniqueness of mediation as a method of conflict management. In this 
sense, it implies the old chestnut of comparing apples and oranges, as it were. Thus, 
the vast majority of studies within this paradigm tend to focus solely on aspects of 
mediation, without considering comparative aspects of negotiation (see Bercovitch, 
1984, 1985, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1992; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; 
Bercovitch and Langely, 1993; Brown, 1990; Carnevale and Arad, 1996; Dixon, 
1996; Frei, 1976; Gross-Stein, 1985; Hume, 1994; Inbar, 1991; Rubin, 1981; Touval 
1975, 1982; Touval and Zartman, 1985). 
Given the underlying assumptions of this paradigm, two main methodologies are 
used to collect data and explain mediation. Firstly, historical case studies provide in-
depth understanding of the strategies and goals of the mediator, the effect that they 
had on the negotiation, and the outcome of the intervention. Most studies on 
international mediation fall within this category. Second, there has been a recent 
attempt to conduct large-scale, quantitative studies of international mediation using 
data sets which code mediator behaviour and dispute characteristics according to 
quantifiable variables (see Bercovitch, 1986; Frei,1976; Dixon, 1996). These studies 
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attempt to find associations between variables, thus providing the beginnings of 
generalisations. In both methodologies, studies normally attempt to describe as well as 
prescribe. Table 2.3 summarises the main features of the Third Party Intervention 
paradigm. 
Table 2.3 Paradigm 2: The Third Party Intervention Paradigm 
THE THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION PARADIGM 
I THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
Actors States primarily; unique among social actors; complexity of 
. interests, needs, dilenunas; strict boundary domestic and 
international politics 
Nature of Conflict Special case defmed'by its complexity, violence, resistance to 
traditional forms of conflict management; caused by system- . 
induced clash of competing national interests in an anarchical 
society 
II THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
Goal of International Conflict Conh·ol violence; conflict regulation or management; the 
Management maintenance· of order 
Methods of Conflict Primarily mediation; improve mediator skills, resources, abilities 
Management to intervene; mediation as systemregulation . 
III THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 
Conceptualising Negotiation Important differences between bilateral and third party methods; 
and Mediation mediation as a special f01m ofconflictmanagement, ideally 
suited to international conflict 
Factors Affecting Negotiation Largely contextual and interactional; power; parties, strategies; 
and Mediation outcomes; international context 
IV STUDYING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 
Comparing Negotiation and Difficult due to implicit assumptions of uniqueness of mediation; 
Mediation not attempted ' .. 
Methodology Historical case studies; large-scale quantitative studies; 
association-building, generalising; descriptive and prescriptive 
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2.5 Evaluating Current Conflict Management Paradigms 
In this chapter, I have outlined two currently dominant approaches to the study of 
international conflict management. Neither approach appears adequate to the task of 
meaningfully comparing negotiation and mediation at the conceptual and empirical 
levels. For the Psychology paradigm, this inadequacy is related to three specific 
aspects: (1) its generic approach to conflict; (2) its lack of a comparative theory of 
negotiation and mediation; and (3) its reliance on experimental methodologies. 
First, conceptualising conflict as generic fails to acknowledge the important 
differences between international conflict and conflict at other levels. Actually, the 
Psychology paradigm often fails to distinguish between individuals and groups, even 
though groups make decisions in very different ways to individuals (Pruitt and 
Carnevale, 1993: 196). International conflict, due to its sheer scale and potential level 
of destruction, is different to conflict at other levels. Thus, not only is extrapolating 
from other levels problematic, but it logically follows that managing conflict at the 
international level will require different methods to those at other levels. In this, the 
Third Party Intervention approach is correct; international conflict is best dealt with 
employing conflict management methods suited to international politics. 
Furthermore, even if one were to concede that international conflict and its 
management was essentially a problem of the psychology of elite decision-makers, the 
level of complexity at the international level is so much greater than at other levels 
that it would still have to be considered a special case. This is not to say that findings 
from the Psychology framework are completely irrelevent to international politics, but 
simply to highlight the limitations involved in extrapolating from these findings to the 
world ofinternational conflict management. 
, Second, the Psychology paradigm's conceptualisation of mediation as essentially 
the same as negotiation leaves it with a weak theoretical basis for comparison. In this 
view, mediation is not only the same genus as negotiation, it is essentially the same 
phenomenon and thus, there is little basis for comparison. That is, scholars from this 
perspective see mediation as "assisted negotiation", or, as a slightly more complex 
form of "three-cornered negotiation". Lastly, trapped as it is within psychological 
constructions of negotiation and mediation, the paradigm has no option but to pursue 
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lmowledge using methodologies which are ill-suited to the world of international 
politics (see Bercovitch and Wells, 1993: 11; Carnevale et al, 1989: 364; Gordon, 
Schmitt, and Schnieder, 1984; Wall and Lynn, 1993: 182). Furthe1more, the focus on 
personal and role variables· seems to exclude a world of relevant contextual or 
environmental factors which impinge on conflict management (Pruitt and Carnevale, 
1993: 195). 
In other words, the Psychology paradigm does not provide an adequate theoretical 
basis for a comparison of negotiation and mediation, and its limitations precludes its 
adoption here. Although the Third Party Intervention paradigm is a vast improvement 
on the Psychology approach, it also fosters a number oflimitations: (1) an incomplete 
conceptualisation of international conflict; (2) an over-emphasis on the differences 
between negotiation and mediation; and (3) its tendency to rely, for the most part, on 
historical methodologies. 
First, the Third Party Intervention paradigm, without going into detail, appears to 
take an undifferentiated approach to international conflict. That is, it does not 
distinguish conceptually between armed conflict and non-armed conflict, even though 
there would appear to be important differences. Armed conflict threatens the very 
existence of a state by threatening its territoriality. This puts it in a very different 
category to political incidents, diplomatic exchanges, or economic conflicts (see 
Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). In this sense, it is a "one-off' dispute which cannot be 
dealt with through normal diplomatic practice (see Princen, 1992a: 7-8). Furthermore, 
once the threshold of violence has been crossed in international conflict, most often, 
states break off diplomatic contact. This makes negotiation difficult. It follows that 
international armed conflict requires different conflict management methods than non-
armed international conflict. By not specifying which type of conflict management 
fits which type of conflict at the international level, this approach could be 
characterised as an incomplete contingency approach. 
Second, the Third Party Intervention paradigm over-emphasises the differences 
between negotiation and mediation, implying that mediation is a separate type of 
conflict management. This again, is not to say scholars from this perspective do not 
recognise similarities between the two methods, but simply that they tend to under-
play the similarities in order to highlight the differences for the purposes of their 
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research. If indeed it is the case that negotiation and mediation are of a different genus 
as it were, then again, comparison becomes difficult. In other words, this paradigm 
too, lacks a comparative theory of negotiation and mediation which could provide a 
solid basis for an empirical study. Related to this, the emphasis on mediation has, as 
we have already stressed, led to an empirical neglect in the area of international 
negotiation. The lack of studies on international negotiation, or comparative studies 
involving several methods of conflict management, has meant a serious empirical gap 
remains unfilled. Lastly, the Third Party Intervention paradigm's reliance on historical 
case studies with little or no generalising power hampers the quest for knowledge 
about international conflict management that could be applied prescriptively. What is 
required are more large-scale quantitative studies that can generate knowledge about 
negotiation and mediation in general. 
In short, the Third Party Intervention paradigm also poses limitations for the 
comparative study of negotiation and mediation, although it is clearly an improvement 
over the Psychology paradigm. What is required is a modified Third Party 
Intervention framework that specifies which type of conflict management methods fit 
which type of conflict at the level of international politics, and which also provides a 
theoretical framework for comparing negotiation and mediation. In the next chapter, I 
will propose a more complete contingency approach which will do just that, and 
which will provide the basis for an empirical study in chapters four and five. 
Table 2.4 summarises and compares the two paradigms discussed in this chapter. 
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Table 2.4 Conflict Management Paradigms in Comparative Perspective 
I 
THE PSYCHOLOGY PARADIGM 
II 
THE THIRD PARTY 
INTERVENTION PARADIGM 
I THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
Actors States akin to mdividuals and 
org~rlisations; state lead~rs as. 
individuals; intermesliing of domestic 
·. and international politics 
·. States primary; uhiqt1e among social 
: act~"rs; complexity ~f intei'est, need~; 
di~eminaSi· stri~t. br.nllidaiy dqmestic , · 
_. and h~temational:policics · : . · · · · . _ . 
Nature of Conflict Genetic; similar at~ all ievels; essential : Sp~cial case defmedby its compf~~ity, ' 
' pr.oblem of.intemational conflict is; . violence; resistance to traditional forms 
· reHitionships, needs; misperceptions, . • of conflict .inanagenient; caused· by .. 
: goat:'.incompatibillties; a c·omplex form ·• ' system• induced, clash of~otnpeting 
of problem-solving nati(mal futerests_'i.ii an amirchical 
:society 
II THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
Goal of Conflict 
Management 
Methods of 
Conflict 
Management 
Improve relationships, meet underlying . . Control violence; conflict regulation 
needs;.realign perceptions; conflict ' • or niaiiage'ment; the maintenance of · 
·resolution ·. ordef . . .. 
. :Pdmarily,negotiation; improve . 
negotiatorskills; if necessary by using 
sldlled facilitators 
Primarily mediation; improve mediator 
. ·skills~ resources; abilities to in~~rvene; 
-inediation ~s system reguiatio~ ' 
III THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 
Conceptualising 
Negotiation and 
Mediation 
Factors Affecting 
Negotiation and 
Mediation 
Mediation as a variation of negotiation; 
: few: essential d!fferendes·;. tr.eated as· a 
singular conflict management method 
Psychological, role factors ·most 
. important; focu~ on interactionaL 
process· of negotiation .. 
. Important differences betWci.en bilateral ; 
and thii'dpartymethods; mediation as a 
speeialfonn of conflict 'manag~meilt, ; 
. ideaily· suited to ilitemationaLpoFtics:· .. 
. ·Largely contextUal:.and_intera'ctlon;l; · 
~ power) parties, stfategi~s, outco~es;. ' 
interriationaf.context · ·.·, i "· · •. 
,:· 1 •• 
IV STUDYING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 
Comparing 
Negotiation and 
Mediation 
Methodology 
. Difficult due to ·underlyingassumption 
t~at negotiation ~tni:i:m~diation . 
· essentiaily the same; ·not· attempted 
''I)iffictilt ·<;Iue to . emphasis on ' . 
d-ifferences · ' - · ... 
. ' 
.. '.· 
" 
Laboratory studies, organisatiOnal field·. Historical case sfudies; ·la'rge~si::ale 
studies, case· histories, mathematical · quaittitati\re;stUdies; assoCiation- i~. • 
approaches; quantitative and' · buil~ingtgep~ralisfug; desc~iptive' aild~' 
qualitative; descriptive and prescriptive prescriptive ~ ·· · · · .. · 
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Chapter 3 
CONTINGENT CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: 
TOWARDS A COMPARISON OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 
3.1 Comparing Negotiation and Mediation: An Alternative Framework 
In chapter one I posed the question: To what extent does current conflict 
management theory enable us to systematically evaluate, analyse, and compare 
negotiation and mediation in intemational politics? Chapter two examined two 
dominant paradigms, and concluded that cmrent conflict management theory is 
inadequate to the task, lacking the necessary theoretical tools for comparative 
analysis. In this chapter we move on to the next question and ask: Is there an approach 
which will facilitate a logically sound and meaningful comparison of negotiation and 
mediation? Answering this question in the affirmative, and outlining such an 
approach, will take us some way toward disceming which forms of conflict 
management should be applied to which conflicts. 
In terms of comparing negotiation and mediation in intemational politics, current 
paradigms suffer from two predominant defects. First, they fail to provide a 
framework for understanding the different dynamics of conflict at different levels of 
social interaction. As a consequence, they also fail to appreciate that different types of 
conflict may require different methods of conflict management. Second, and most 
impmiantly, current paradigms lack a sound or articulate theoretical basis for 
comparing different methods of conflict management, such as negotiation and 
mediation. That is, although negotiation and mediation have been mentioned together 
on occasion (Camevale and Pruitt, 1992: Pruitt, 1986), no attempt has been made to 
dissect or systematically evaluate the differences and similarities between them. 
The task of this chapter is threefold: first, it aims to develop an altemative 
approach to current paradigms which can provide a framework for understanding the 
dynamics of conflict at different levels of social interaction. This will provide a 
general theoretical context for evaluating different forms of conflict management. 
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Second, the chapter will attempt to articulate a theoretical model which can be used as 
a comparative device for evaluating negotiation and mediation. This model will 
identify the most important contextual, process, and outcome variables in the study of 
conflict management. The utility of this model is that it can be used to systematically 
evaluate, analyse, and compare different forms of conflict management ( eg, 
negotiation, mediation, arbitration). Alternatively, it can be used to study the same 
form of conflict management, such as negotiation, across different levels of social 
conflict ( eg, inter-personal, inter-organisational, international). Lastly, this chapter 
aims to generate a series of testable propositions which can form the basis of an 
empirical study. 
The general approach developed in this chapter for the purpose of facilitating a 
comparative inquiry of negotiation and mediation has been termed the Contingency 
approach. The Contingency framework is predicated on the notion that conflict 
management is a social process whose outcomes are dependent upon, or contingent 
on, aspects of the structure and process of the conflict. That is, outcomes are 
determined by the interaction of certain input variables mediated through the structure 
and actual situation of the conflict management (Bercovitch, 1984: 140). As 
mentioned, at the heart of this approach are three clusters of variables which impact 
on the conflict management: contextual, process, and outcome variables. This implies 
that successful conflict management outcomes ( eg, negotiation outcomes and 
mediation outcomes) are associated with particular variables. Logically then, 
assummg that negotiation and mediation are different methods of conflict 
management (eg, not a singular type), the specific variables which are associated with 
mediation success will be different to the variables associated with negotiation 
success. 
The advantages of taking such an approach are many. In the first place, and 
perhaps most importantly, the Contingency framework is a comparative device which 
can be used to compare conflict management across types, or across social levels. For 
example, the effect of large disparities in power between the protagonists could be 
examined and compared in cases where the disputants negotiated bilaterally, engaged 
a mediator, or submitted their dispute to the UN. Similarly, the same power disparity 
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effect could be compared in cases of negotiation at the inter-personal, inter-
organisational, or international levels. 
Second, the Contingency framework encourages systematic empirical research, 
because it stipulates variables and attributes with explicit operational criteria 
(Bercovitch et al, 1991: 9). That is, it encourages data collection, the lack of which 
poses a serious obstacle to our understanding of conflict management. Third, the 
approach helps to identify variables which have been observed as associated with, or 
facilitators of, successful outcomes (Bercovitch, 1984: 140). Furthermore, it offers a 
useful framework for organising and integrating much of the research on conflict 
management. Fourth, it facilitates theory development by articulating a rudimentary 
theory of conflict management (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 673). In this sense, it 
improves upon current paradigms by highlighting different types of international 
conflict and conflict management. Lastly, the Contingency framework allows the 
researcher to focus on either detailed studies of single cases, or the utilisation of large 
data sets on conflict management. 
The specific theoretical contributions of this chapter to current conflict 
management research are, first, that it fills some of the conceptual gaps identified in 
earlier chapters. Specifically, it outlines a general understanding of conflict from 
which a comparative study of conflict management can logically emerge. Second, it 
articulates for the first time the specific similarities and differences between 
negotiation and mediation. Thus, it provides the beginnings of a comparative and 
integrated theory of negotiation and mediation. In other words, we are seeking to 
answer the following questions: Are there any real differences between negotiation 
and mediation, and how important are those differences? What is the nature of their 
similarities? Is mediation simply another form of negotiation? Are they more likely to 
be successful under different circumstances? To date, no study has attempted to 
systematically address these kinds of questions. 
We begin the task of identifying and explaining the Contingency framework by 
asking the same set of questions we posed in chapter two to evaluate the Psychology 
and Third Party Intervention paradigms: 
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1 What assumptions does this framework make about international conflict, states, 
the goals of conflict management, and the nature of negotiation and mediation? 
2 How does the framework define and conceptualise international relations, conflict, 
and conflict management, and how does it distinguish between negotiation and 
mediation? 
3 Which variables does the framework focus on as having the greatest explanatory 
power? 
4 What primary methodologies does the framework tend to employ? 
Using these four dimensions, section 3.2 will outline and explain the mam 
features of the Contingency framework. The comparative dimensions of this 
framework in regard to negotiation and mediation will be summarised in section 3.3. 
In section 3.4 the primary propositions of the study will be presented, followed by a 
number of secondary, exploratory propositions. These propositions will be drawn 
from both conflict management literature and the Contingency framework. The final 
section of the chapter will summarise the argument thus far, and preview the 
following chapters. 
A few caveats are in order at this point. First, the Contingency framework is a 
heuristic, exploratory theoretical framework. Its primary purpose is to facilitate an 
empirical investigation, and not necessarily to articulate a full-blown theory. In this 
sense, it is an investigative device which proposes a set of theoretical propositions, 
each of which will be supported or unsupported by the empirical study. Thus, it will 
take the form of broad brush-strokes rather than intricate machinations. Second, the 
framework draws on a disparate body of literature, incorporating as it does, some 
aspects of existing paradigms ( eg, the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party 
Intervention paradigm). It is based on, and extends, the Third Party Intervention 
paradigm, and thus, logically extends underlying assumptions that, at times, remain 
unarticulated. Lastly, the propositions drawn from the Contingency framework are 
based on both logical extensions of the theory, and existing research. The task of 
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constructing testable propositions which relate to a comparison of negotiation and 
mediation has been severely hampered by the lack of studies on the topic. In other 
words, the propositions presented here are largely exploratory, and while they fit the 
logic of the model generally, they are not meant to be the theoretical underpinnings of 
a complete theory. 
3.2 The Contingency Framework: Filling Conceptual Gaps 
The Contingency framework has its origins in two separate, but complementary, 
areas of research. The first is research on third party intermediary intervention in 
international politics that fits squarely within the Third Party Intervention paradigm. 
Bercovitch and his associates developed a contingency framework of mediation (see 
Bercovitch, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; Bercovitch and Lamat·e, 
1993; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993), which built on comparable but less refined 
models developed by others (Raymond and Kegley, 1985; Wall, 1981). A few have 
since utilised a similar approach (see Dixon, 1996). The second area of research 
comes from the Burton "problem-solving school", which fits more closely into the 
Psychology paradigm. Recent work by Fisher and associates has developed an as yet 
untested contingency model of conflict management, which attempts to coordinate 
and complement "Track Two Diplomacy", or, "Third Party Consultation", with 
traditional forms of international intermediary assistance (see Fisher, 1995; Fisher and 
Keashly, 1988, 1991, 1996; Webb et al, 1996). 
The main problem with both of these approaches are that they are incomplete. 
That is, they confine themselves to investigating and matching conflicts to forms of 
third party intervention only. They do not consider a wider range of conflict 
management methods that may be applicable, and as a consequence, they do not 
articulate any comparative theory of negotiation and mediation. The Contingency 
framework presented here extends these existing models to allow for a wider 
comparison between bilateral modes of conflict management (negotiation), and third 
party modes (mediation). 
The success of the Contingency framework depends to a large part on 
constructing typologies of conflict and conflict management. That is, because this 
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approach is predicated on matching types of conflict management to types of conflict, 
articulating useful typologies is central. To construct a typology, it is necessary to 
identify the theoretical characteristics of the phenomenon that will differentiate it 
from related phenomenon, and which will aid analysts in uncovering its important 
aspects (Vasquez, 1993: 64). In the following discussion, I will present a number of 
relevant typologies focusing on conflict, and more specifically, international conflict, 
and conflict management. 
I The Nature of International Conflict 
Without completely rejecting neorealism, the Contingency framework takes what 
has been termed the "complex interdependence" view of international politics (Kegley 
and Wittkopf, 1993: 31-32). That is, it challenges the prevailing neorealist assumption 
that states are the most impotiant actors in world politics. Instead, other actors, such 
as transnational corporations (eg, IBM, BP, United Fruit Company), liberation groups 
(eg, the PLO, IRA, Tamil Tigers), ethnic groups (eg, the Palestinians, the Kurds, the 
Serbians, the Croatians), movements (eg, the Peace Movement, the Environmental 
Movement), organisations ( eg, Greenpeace, the EU, the UN), and even some 
individuals ( eg, the Pope, Jimmy Cmier, the Dalai Lama), are also important actors. 
This is not only because of the impact of their activities as they pursue their own 
interests, but also because they act as transmission belts for government policies. 
International politics then, is the sum of a complex web of interacting parts in a global 
society. 
Furthermore, international conflict, like peace, is a process, rather than an end 
state. It is active and dynamic, rather than passive and static. In its behavioural 
manifestation it consists of all the organised and collective efforts by one nation to 
control, influence, injure, or destroy the persons and property of another. International 
conflict is also a multi-casual and multi-faceted phenomenon, not easily accounted for 
in terms of single traits or approaches. Its occurrence should not (unless it is violent) 
be taken as an interruption of "normal" interactions. It is a very natural and probable 
consequence of the existence of multifarious actors with different values and interests. 
Given a system with fairly autonomous and diverse units, linked together in a 
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relationship that is both competitive and cooperative, the potential for conflict is 
unbounded. This does not mean that every relationship manifests itself in conflict. 
Whether or not a relationship will in fact develop in this way will depend upon a set 
of diffuse structures, attitudes, and behaviours. 
However, before we look more closely at international conflict, we need to locate 
it theoretically. Within the Contingency framework, conflict itself is seen as a 
complex, dynamic social process consisting of three important and inter-connected 
dimensions: (1) the conflict situation; (2) behaviour associated with the conflict; and 
(3) a set of conflict attitudes (Mitchell, 1981: 16-17). These dimensions are usefully 
illustrated in Galtung's Conflict Triangle (Galtung, 1971: 125), shown in Figure 3.1. 
The conflict structure refers to the situation which generates incompatible goals 
or values among parties, while the conflict attitudes consist of the psychological and 
cognitive processes which engender, or are consequent to conflict. The conflict 
behaviour consists of actual, observed activities undertaken by the parties to the 
conflict designed to injure, thwart, or eliminate the other party (Bercovitch, 1984: 6). 
Each dimension interacts with the other in a dynamic process. For example, a 
structural incompatibility may arise, producing hostile attitudes between two parties, 
which in tum leads to violent behaviour. This may reinforce each party's negative 
perceptions of the other, while also altering the structural situation. The same or a 
similar cycle may then repeat itself several times. 
STRUCTURE 
(incompatible situation) 
(tensions, hostility) (violence, aggression) 
Figure 3.1 Galtung' s Conflict Triangle 
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This framework allows the researcher to study all the important elements of the 
dynamic process of conflict in a systematic and holistic fashion. Furthermore, it can 
be applied to any level or type of conflict, and aids in the identification of the essential 
characteristics of any conflict situation. That is, conflict situations are identified as 
having: 
1. at least two parties; 
2. mutually exclusive and/or mutually incompatible values based on resource or 
position scarcity; 
3. behaviours designed to injure, thwart, or control the other party; 
4. mutually opposed actions and counter-actions; and 
5. attempts to acquire or exercise power (Mack and Snyder, 1957: 217-219). 
However, conflict situations have differences as well as similarities, and the 
differences are what distinguish types of conflict. Care must be taken in determining 
definitions and types, because amorphous concepts that include seemingly related but 
in reality different phenomena, preclude the possibility of establishing clear patterns 
or correlates (see Vasquez, 1993: 51). For this reason, the following section goes into 
some detail in the attempt to clarify what we mean by conflict, types of conflict, and 
international conflict. 
The theoretical dimensions along which conflicts can be typologised and the 
resulting possible types is infinite. A few of the main typologies discussed in the 
conflict research literature include the following. The first dimension by which 
conflicts can be distinguished is that of the methods used by the disputants ( eg, the 
conflict behaviours), and the outcomes they produce. For example, parties in conflict 
can pursue their goals violently or non-violently (Nicholson, 1992: 16; Mack and 
Snyder, 1957: 220). Wars are a type ofviolent conflict, for example, while strikes are 
a type of non-violent conflict. Related to this, Deutsch argues that conflicts are either 
destructive in that the parties are dissatisfied with the outcomes and feel that they have 
lost as a result of the conflict, or they are productive, where the parties are satisfied 
with the outcome and feel that they have gained as a result of the conflict (Deutsch, 
1969: 10). In reality, such simple distinctions can rarely be drawn, as conflicts usually 
have a mixture of violent and non-violent behaviours, and most outcomes have a mix 
of destructive and productive consequences. 
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A second dimension focuses on the nature of the pa1iies involved in the conflict, 
assuming that "each kind of social unit, having its own range of size, structure, and 
institutions, will also have its own modes of interaction and thus its own patterns of 
conflict with other social units" (Fink, 1968: 417). At the most basic level, conflicts 
can be distinguished in terms of whether the parties are individuals, or collective 
entities (groups). Similarly, Boulding distinguishes between individuals, groups, and 
organisations, which are well-structured groups with clearly defined roles and 
constitution (Boulding, 1962: 1 05). Related to this, Galtung focuses on the size of the 
parties in conflict and distinguishes between symmetric conflicts between actors of 
the same rank, and asymmetric conflicts between actors of different rank (Galtung, 
1971: 123). 
A problem with this approach is that there is no recognised classification of social 
units (Fink, 1968: 41 7), and the possible list of different parties may be endless, such 
as families, tribes, teams, organisations, classes, nations, regions, races, etc 
(Brickman, 1974: 4). Furthermore, many conflicts occur between individuals and 
groups, and between vastly different types of groups. The conflict between an 
individual and a state over human rights is an example of an asymmetric conflict 
between two disparate types of actors. 
Conflicts can also be distinguished m terms of the issues in dispute. At a 
fundamental level, issues might be classified along the lines of material issues ( eg, 
resources), and non-material issues (eg, ideology), or, resource conflicts where the 
parties contest limited resources, and survival conflicts where the continual survival of 
one ofthe parties at the end ofthe conflict is at issue (Mitchell, 1981: 43). This might 
also be described as object-centred conflict, and opponent-centred conflict (Fink, 
1968: 448). Another simple classification distinguishes between conflicts of interest, 
where the parties basically agree about the value of some position, roles, or resources, 
but diverge over the obtaining of it, and conflicts of value where the parties differ 
fundamentally about the nature of desirable end-states, or, social and political 
structures (Mitchell, 1981: 37). 1 
1 Much more detailed classifications of conflict by issue can be found in Mitchell, 1981: 43-44; and 
Deutsch, 1973: 15-16. 
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Typologies of conflict have also been made on the level of structure, or, the 
context in which the conflict occurs. In this classification, conflicts can be divided 
into institutionalised conflict characterised by explicit rules, predictable behaviour, 
and continuity, and non-institutionalised conflict which lacks those characteristics and 
is often disorganised (Mack and Snyder, 1957: 220). Similar to this, Brickman refers 
to unstructured conflicts not bound by any rules, partially structured conflicts where 
rules constrain certain behaviours but leave others free, and fully structured conflicts 
where all behaviours are regulated by rules, such as in some forms of competition 
(Brickman, 1974: 7). 
Despite some of the problems associated with deliminating types of conflict, it is 
possible to construct a typology which locates and distinguishes international conflict 
specifically, by combining the internal-external dimension and the nature of the 
parties dimension. That is, conflicts which originate within one person or group (intra-
personal, intra-group), or, conflicts that originate between persons or groups (inter-
personal, inter-group) (Deutsch, 1969: 7-8). Dahrendorf refers, in this regard, to 
exogenous conflicts which are brought upon a social unit from the outside, and 
endogenous conflicts which are generated from within a social unit (Dahrendorf, 
1958: 171). 
Combining this aspect with the previously mentioned typology of identifying 
parties as individuals, collectives (groups), and nations, it is possible to create a 
significant classification which distinguishes between: (1) intra-personal, intra-group, 
and intra-national conflict; and (2) inter-personal, inter-group, and inter-national 
conflict (Galtung, 1965: 348; Fink, 1968: 421; Deutsch, 1969: 8). The utility of this 
typology is that it locates international conflict theoretically, and importantly, 
distinguishes it from civil wars (intra-national conflict). In short, it allows for a 
meaningful study of international conflict as a distinct field from other types of 
conflict, while allowing for the cross-pollination of findings from other levels. 
International conflict itself can be divided into various types. Here I divide all 
international conflicts into four main types, which help to identify their theoretical 
characteristics. These are: (1) conflicts between states (inter-state conflicts); (2) 
internationalised civil conflicts; (3) militarised disputes; and ( 4) political incidents 
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(see Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997: 5-8). How does one distinguish between these 
different kinds of conflict? 
The first type, inter-state conflicts, are defined by a high level of violence, and by 
the nature of the parties. Both parties are states. Inter-state conflicts are usually fought 
over territory by states that share a border or are close to each other. In some cases, 
states will go to war when they have competing ideologies, or when they feel 
insecure. Occasionally, inter-state conflicts can escalate and bring in other states, and 
the result is a regional conflict which affects many countries in a given geographical 
area. This was the case in Indochina in the 1960s and 1970s, Southern Africa in the 
1980s, and Central Asia (Afghanistan, Tadjikistan, Azerbaijan) in the 1990s. 
Another cause of inter-state conflicts may be termed rivalries (see Geller, 1993; 
Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Kuenne, 1989; for discussion of rivalries). These are conflicts 
between states that feel threatened or intimidated by their opponents, and where each 
engages in a dangerous cat-and-mouse game of provocation and escalation that may 
often result in an armed conflict. In these cases, over a few decades, a pair of rivals 
might have four or more wars and many smaller incidents and periods of tension. 
India and Pakistan have been rivals since their independence in 1948 and have gone to 
war more than six times since then. 
The second type of international conflict occurs when another state becomes 
involved in a violent civil conflict, either directly by invasion, or indirectly by actively 
supporting one of the factions (see Bull, 1984; and Regan, 1996 for a discussion on 
intervention). Internationalised civil conflicts then, are also characterised by a high 
level of violence, but in this case, the primary parties are not both states. Second or 
third states are only secondarily involved. Examples of direct intervention in a civil 
conflict include Saudi Arabia's invasion of Yemen on the side of the Royalists, and 
Egypt's invasion on the side ofthe Republicans in Yemen's 1962-70 civil war. Also, 
in 1965 the US invaded the Dominican Republic on the side of the government, which 
was then fighting a civil war against the constitutionalists, who wanted to restore Juan 
Bosch, a former president ousted in a military coup. 
Indirect support, on the other hand, can take many forms. In some cases it can 
involve sending arms and providing training and advisers for one faction in the 
conflict, such as the US's aid to the Contra rebels fighting the Nicaraguan government 
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(1980-94), or it can involve allowing rebels to use adjacent territory from which to 
latmch attacks. Zambia's support for the Rhodesian rebels allowed the Zimbabwe 
African Peoples Union (ZAPU), one of the African nationalist factions fighting 
Rhodesia's white minority government in the war of independence (1967 -80), to have 
bases and training camps on Zambian territory. ZAPU guerrillas would then launch 
attacks across the Zambezi border into Rhodesia and then return across the border to 
relative safety. 
Some civil conflicts last decades and take the form of guerrilla insurgencies. 
Often the guerrillas live in dense forest in border areas and move across the borders at 
will, attacking government targets and then disappearing into the jungle again. The 
insurgencies in Burma (1949-present) by etlmic Karen guerrillas and in Colombia 
(1965-present) by Marxist guerrillas have gone on for decades, as neither side has the 
ability to completely defeat the other. Other civil conflicts result from attempts by 
particular ethnic groups living in one area to break away, or secede, and try to form 
their own state. The Biafran War (1967-70), the invasion of East Timor by Indonesia 
in 1975, and the attempt by Western Sahara to secede from Morocco in 1974 are all 
examples of this. In each case, states from outside the conflict gave their recognition 
and support to the seceding party, and some even gave them military aid. This 
represented secondary, but significant, involvement by second and third states in the 
conflict. 
The third type of international conflict is the militarised dispute. This occurs 
when two states face off militarily, and escalate a crisis or spark an incident, which 
may not result in an all-out war, but has the potential for being a very serious conflict 
and is a real threat to international peace and security. The militarised dispute is 
conceptually distinct from interstate conflicts not because of the nature of the parties 
involved. After all, they are both conflicts that involve states. Rather, the distinction 
relates to the level of hostilities reached. Militarised disputes do not reach the level of 
large-scale hostilities, usually being characterised by small-scale military "incidents". 
In most cases there is also some loss of life. 
The most famous militarised dispute was the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when 
the Soviet Union tried to station medium range nuclear missile in Cuba and the US 
navy threatened to sink any Soviet ships that entered the waters around Cuba. 
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Although this crisis did not result in any direct military conflict, it was serious enough 
to take the world to the brink of nuclear war. Militarised disputes are important 
because they occur in the context of a tense and hostile relationship, and are almost 
always preceded by a history of violence. Thus, they contain a very real risk of 
escalation into all-out war. Relations between rival states are usually characterised by 
a high number ofmilitarised disputes. 
The last type of international conflict is the political incident. These are inter-state 
disputes that escalate beyond the level of normal day to day conflicts between states, 
such as conflicts over trade, visas, diplomatic etiquette, and such like. Usually, 
political incidents involve verbal and political demonstrations, such as denunciations, 
propaganda, name-calling, diplomatic insults, and maybe even threats and ultimatums. 
In a very few cases, armed incidents may even take place. However, political 
incidents occur between states that are normally friendly, most often both states are 
democracies, and there is not a history of violence, or the likelihood that the dispute 
will escalate into a war. 
Examples of what can be considered a political incident include the Anglo-
Islandic fishing dispute in 1972-73. This involved several acrimonious verbal and 
political demonstrations, as well as the use of naval vessels to prevent boats from 
fishing in disputed waters. While force was used in this case, there was no real threat 
of war, and it occurred in the context of otherwise friendly relations between two 
democracies. In recent years, similar fishing disputes between Canada and Spain, and 
Britain and Spain, have also escalated into political incidents. 
In short, the argument being made here is that, in opposition to the Psychology 
paradigm view of conflict as generic, there are in fact, different types of conflict. 
Furthern1ore, in opposition to the Third Party Intervention paradigm, international 
conflict is not one special type, but can itself be divided into different varieties. The 
three most important dimensions for distinguishing types of conflict are: (1) the 
internal-external dimension ( eg, whether the conflict is within or between parties); (2) 
the nature of the party dimension (eg, individuals, groups, nation-states); and (3) the 
mode of behaviour dimension (eg, violent, non-violent modes). Combining these 
dimensions, it is possible to classify twelve primary types of conflict. These are 
summarised in Table 3.1. The most important observation here is that there is a 
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NON-VIOLENT MODES VIOLENT MODES 
ACTORS 
Individual 
Endogenous 
Conflict 
Iiltra-b.ersqmil 
· Conflict (deCisional 
conflict,. dilellllTia, 
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Exogenous 
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Conflict 
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Groups Intra-gl'olip Conflict Inter~group Conflict : Intta-gro~p: Conflict 
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Table 3.1 A Typology of Conflict 
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~ ~ter,..peiisenal 
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Itlter-naticina1 · 
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riv alrie~:. arin:ed 
disputes, world 
.wars) 
distinction between armed international conflicts and non-armed international 
conflicts. That is, they constitute separate types of conflict. If we assume that different 
types of conflict respond best to different forms of conflict management ( eg, intra-
national legal conflicts respond best to legal methods of conflict management), then 
we may find that the method of conflict management that is most successful in non-
violent international conflict is not necessarily equally successful in violent 
international conflict, and visa-versa. 
II The Nature of International Conflict Management 
In chapter two the difference between conflict settlement and conflict resolution 
was discussed. A conflict can be considered settled when violent and destructive 
behaviour has been reduced, and hostile attitudes have been lessened. In contrast, a 
conflict can be said to be resolved when the basic structure of the situation giving rise 
to the violent and destructive behaviour and hostile attitudes has been re-evaluated, or 
re-perceived by the parties in conflict. The goal of conflict management then, can be 
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conflict settlement, or it can be directed at the more complex, if enduring, outcome of 
conflict resolution (see Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). 
While the normative goal of all conflict management efforts is to resolve the roots 
of conflict and provide the basis for constructive future relationships, in reality this is 
often an unrealistic goal (see Dixon, 1996: 656). This is especially true of conflicts 
that have reached the point of physical violence. Violent conflicts are usually 
perceived in zero-sum conceptions by the parties, and are accompanied by the highest 
level ofhostile attitudes. Furthermore, every act of violence tends to reinforce existing 
attitudes and create new sources of grievance. Violent conflicts are most often only 
amenable to conflict settlement; only when the conflict has been transformed into a 
non-violent mode can conflict resolution be contemplated. In other words, the goal of 
the conflict management has to be matched to the kind of conflict being managed. A 
summary of conflict management goals matched to conflict types can be seen in Table 
3 .2. In the case of violent international conflict, for example, the initial goal is to 
arrest the expansion and escalation of the conflict and reduce the level of violence. In 
some intractable cases, this may even be t~e maximum realistic goal. 
Endogenous Conflicts (e.g. intra-
personal, intra-group, intra-
national) 
Exogenous Conflict (e.g. inter-
personal, inter-group, inter-
national) 
Non-violent Modes 
Conflict Resolution 
Conflict Resolution 
Violent Modes 
Conflict Settlement initially, 
then Conflict Resohiti6t1 
ConflictSettlement iriitially, 
then Conflict Res6lution, 
Table 3.2 A Summary of Conflict Management Goals Matched to Conflict Types 
Despite popular perceptions of international politics as anarchical and completely 
unregulated in terms of conflict, the international system has evolved numerous 
methods, or types, of conflict management. Article 33(1) of the UN Charter, in a 
section titled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", says: "The parties to any dispute, the 
continuance of which is likely to engender the maintenance of international peace and 
security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
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arrangements, or by other peaceful means of their own choice." States can employ any 
of these methods in the peaceful management of their conflicts. Negotiation and 
mediation have already been discussed in some detail to this point, and will be 
discussed further in the following section. 
One of the lesser known types of international conflict management, conciliation, 
has been described as "an attempt to induce negotiations" (Bailey, 1982: 167). More 
formally, it may be described as "a method for the settlement of international disputes 
of any nature according to which a Commission set up by the parties, either on a 
permanent basis or an ad hoc basis to deal with a dispute, proceeds to the impartial 
examination of the dispute and attempts to define the terms of the settlement..." 
(Merrills, 1991: 59). That is, two states in conflict nominate officials to sit on a panel. 
The panel then gathers and examines all relevant infonnation on the dispute and 
suggests how it should be settled. Another way to conceive of conciliation is to think 
of it as "institutionalised negotiation" (Merrills, 1991: 67). 
Theoretically, the line between conciliation and mediation is sometimes difficult 
to draw, suffice to say that in many cases, conciliation puts the intervention of a third 
party into a conflict on a more formal footing and institutionalises it to a greater 
degree (Merrills, 1991: 39). It is usually instituted by treaty. The role of the 
conciliator is to propose either the rules for governing the settlement, that is, the 
means by which the parties shall come to agreement, or, the actual terms of the 
settlement itself (Suter, 1986: 11). Historically, conciliation emerged out of treaty 
practice in Europe, and reached its height between 1925 and WWII, when nearly 200 
treaties involving conciliation were concluded (Merrills, 1991: 61 ). Since then, its 
practice has declined and in fact, in comparison to other forms of conflict 
management, it has never been a widely used technique. In the past 70 years, less than 
20 cases of formal conciliation have been heard out of the thousands of conflicts and 
disputes (Merrills, 1991: 76). Informal conciliation through international 
organisations is used only a little more often. 
The reasons for this are many. First, many bilateral treaties restrict the categories 
of disputes open for conciliation to a small area of relatively unimportant issues. 
Areas of political concern, where conflicts are most likely to occur and most likely to 
be violent, are not covered by the treaties. Second, the expense and difficulties 
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involved in convening and operating a conciliation often make other procedures more 
attractive. Third, conciliation is too elaborate for many minor disputes, and lacks the 
political authority for major disputes. In short, conciliation has only ever 
demonstrated some success for disputes which were strictly legal in character and of 
minor importance (Merrills, 1991: 76-77). 
Another method, or type, similar to conciliation is inquiry. Inquiry is " ... a 
specific institutional arrangement which states may select in preference to arbitration 
or other techniques, because they desire to have some disputed issue independently 
investigated. In its institutional sense, then, inquiry refers to a particular type of 
international tribunal, known as the commission of inquily ... " (Menills, 1991: 43). In 
other words, inquiry is the attempt by a third party to "establish the relevant facts and 
to elucidate those aspects of the dispute where incomplete or misleading information 
has been an unnecessary cause of contention" (Bailey, 1982: 162-163). 
Like conciliation, inquiry is a fairly recent addition to the range of conflict 
management techniques used by states, and has been little used, largely because it is 
only designed for dealing with conflicts which revolve around disputed facts or 
information. There were only four inquiries between 1905 and 1922, and then there 
was one in 1962 and none since (Merrills, 1991: 55). Although international 
organisations make much more use of it than this, it is still a relatively unimportant 
conflict management technique in international politics. 
Another conflict management method, arbitration, has been defined by the Hague 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1907) as follows: 
"International arbitration has for its object the settlement of disputes between states by 
judges of their own choice, and on the basis of respect for law. Recourse to arbitration 
implies an engagement to submit in good faith to the award" (Quoted in Schuman, 
1969: 157). In other words, states in conflict agree to turn their dispute over to 
arbitrators who will decide between them on the basis of international law. For 
example, when Chile and Argentina began to dispute the ownership of the Beagle 
Channel after WWII, they both submitted their claims to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). The ICJ judges investigated the relevant information and treaties, and 
ruled that on the basis of international law, Chile was the rightful owner. Argentina 
later repudiated this ruling, leading to armed conflict. 
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There are four sources of law that may be used by arbitrators to decide a dispute: 
(1) international conventions establishing rules recognised by the states; (2) 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general 
principles of law recognised by civilised nations; and (4) judicial decisions and 
teachings by recognised experts (Bull, 1977: 17). The last source is, of course, only a 
supplementary source of international law, while the others are primary sources. 
Furthermore, arbitration may proceed by ad hoc tribunals, or individual arbitrators. 
For example, in some cases, the states may establish a commission. In other cases, 
they may refer to a foreign head of state or specially qualified individual, or they may 
use a tribunal or collegiate body (Merrills, 1991: 80-83). Normal practice is to have an 
uneven number of judges, with each party having at least one of their own 
representatives on the panel. 
Another legal method, adjudication, refers to "the reference of a dispute to the 
World Court or some standing tribunal, such as the European Court of Human Rights" 
(Merrills, 1991: 80). The only essential difference between arbitration and 
adjudication is the manner by which the judges are chosen. They are identical in all 
other respects. In arbitration, states choose judges themselves, whereas in 
adjudication, states refer to established courts. 
Legal techniques do have some advantages. In a general sense, legal techniques 
supply a way of settling disputes which is rational, orderly, and authoritative. More 
specifically, the strong and binding, impartial decisions handed out by arbitrators and 
adjudicators allow not only for states under domestic pressure to save face, but also 
legitimise the successful party's claim in the eyes of the international community. 
Also, litigation is a good way of disposing of troublesome issues, the choice of judges 
gives states confidence in the process, and the permanent tribunals relieve states of the 
need to set up new tribunals for every new dispute. In a general sense, legal 
techniques discourage unreasonable behaviour by reminding states that there are 
alternatives to violent behaviour. Surprisingly, arbitral awards are usually observed in 
international politics (Merrills, 1991). 
Two final methods of conflict management include, first, settling conflicts 
through the UN. This involves states submitting their dispute to the UN Security 
Council, which then recommends a course of action. Actually, unlike other forms of 
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conflict management, the Security Council does not need the consent of the disputing 
parties to consider any conflict. It has the right, under the UN Charter, to consider any 
conflict if it might pose a threat to international peace and stability. 
Other mechanisms the UN Security Council has at its disposal are, that it can 
appoint mediators or mediating committees, it can instruct the Secretary General to 
use his good offices, it can refer the dispute to regional organisations or other 
specialist agencies, or it can itself facilitate quiet negotiation between the disputants 
(Merrills, 1991: 180-195). Furthermore, unlike other conflict management techniques, 
the Security Council can, theoretically at least, enforce its decisions "by any means". 
Usually, this includes imposing sanctions, or military intervention. The UN has also 
employed peacekeeping operations in an attempt to keep disputant forces apart while 
a negotiated settlement is sought. 
However, with UN encouragement, states will normally refer their conflicts to 
regional organisations before they tum to the UN. Regional organisations are agencies 
created by treaty among states situated within a recognisable geographical area. 
The most important regional organisations include: the OAU, the Organisation of 
American States (OAS), the Arab League, the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the EU, and the Islamic Country Organisation (ICO). Most of 
these organisations originated in the post-war period, and like the UN, all have built-
in mechanisms of conflict management. In fact, for some like the OAU, conflict 
management among its members was its primary founding purpose. Most regional 
organisations effectively use mediation, conciliation, fact-finding, arbitration, and 
good offices in attempting to settle disputes. In other words, this represents conflict 
management through rather than by regional organisations (Merrills, 1991: 217). 
The important dimensions along which conflict management methods can be 
compared have already been alluded to. The first dimension is that of principal 
parties, namely, bilateral versus third party conflict management methods. Second, 
whether the conflict management is of a voluntary, non-binding nature, or, is 
involuntary and binding. Conflict management methods can be fitted into one of the 
four broad types produced by combining these two dimensions (see Table 3.3). 
Conciliation fits into the involuntary, bilateral type only under specifi9/conditions: (1) 
when the conciliation panel is made up of officials from each of the disputing parties 
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( eg, it is institutionalised bilateral negotiation); and (2) it is established by treaty and 
bound to consider specific disputes (eg, it is legally binding on both parties). When 
only condition (1) is fulfilled, then it fits into the voluntary bilateral type. If the 
conciliation commission is permanent and given a degree of relative autonomy, then it 
may fit into the third party voluntary mode. 
Bilateral Mode 
Third Party Mode 
Voluntary, Non-binding 
_Neg!)tiation, 
co:b.ciHatiol1: 
., ' . . :; ... !.>.'.'· .. •; ''i 
,:;,·,:·· : -• ., . 
M~(Hation, Conciliation, 
-plquily, BN, Regional 
0rganisati()~s ' 
Table 3.3 A Typology of Conflict Management Methods 
Involuntary, Binding 
(Conciliation) 
It has already been discussed how the flexibility, possible roles, and strategies of 
intermediaries makes mediation a form conflict management ideally suited to 
international conflict. In practice, mediation is usually applied when: (1) the conflict 
is complex, long, drawn-out, and costly; (2) the antagonists have reached a deadlock 
or impasse in their own conflict management efforts, or been unable or unwilling to 
initiate negotiation; (3) continuation of the conflict is seen as an exacerbating factor 
by all concerned and there is a desire to limit its costs; and (4) there exists some 
communication or cooperation between the parties (Mitchell, 1981; see also 
Bercovitch, 1984: 13). In other words, it would seem that mediation is most usefully 
applied to violent international conflicts, while non-violent international conflicts can 
be dealt with by negotiation, conciliation, inquiry, and judicial settlement. 
III The Nature of Negotiation and Mediation 
Negotiation is a method of conflict management in which the principal parties to 
a conflict communicate directly or indirectly about how they will resolve their 
differences and manage their future relationship (Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1966: 466; 
Stephenson and Merely, 1977: 26). Negotiation is a bilateral, voluntary, non-binding 
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method of conflict management aimed primarily at conflict resolution. Mediation, on 
the other hand, is a means of conflict management where parties in conflict seek the 
assistance of, or, accept an offer of help from a party not directly involved in the 
conflict, to settle their differences without invoking the authority of law (Bercovitch et 
al, 1991: 8). Mediation is a third party assisted, voluntary, non-binding method of 
conflict management aimed primarily at conflict settlement. Some of the important 
comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation have already been established 
(see Table1.1, Figure 2.1, and Table 3.3). 
Within the Contingency approach, the basis for comparing negotiation and 
mediation empirically rests on the premise that negotiation and mediation belong to 
the same genus, as it were, but are different types. That is, they have similarities that 
put them into a single species of conflict management ( eg, voluntarism, non-binding 
outcomes, diplomatic, the use of social influence strategies), but they also have 
differences which make them distinct types within the context of being part of the 
same genus ( eg, bilateral versus third party modes, expanded relationship possibilities 
within a mediated negotiation system - see Figure 2.1 ). Furthermore, as different types 
of conflict management, albeit of the same genus, it seems logical to assume that they 
will be successfully applied to different types of conflict. In other words, it is at this 
point that the Contingency framework makes a major departure from the Psychology 
paradigm and the Third Party Intervention paradigm. 
The theoretical device which can facilitate a comparison of negotiation and 
mediation is the Contingency Model, shown in Figure 3.2. This model suggests first, 
that conflict management takes place in three time dimensions: (1) antecedent, or, 
past; (2) concurrent, or, present; and (3) consequent, or, future (see Sawyer and 
Guetzkow, 1965; Druckman, 1973; Bercovitch, 1982, 1984). The antecedent 
dimension refers to all those inputs and variables which exist prior to engaging in 
conflict management. The concurrent dimension, on the other hand, describes a 
comprehensive range of factors which characterise the conditions and process of a 
particular conflict management situation, while the consequent dimension draws 
attention to the outcome of the conflict management. The importance of the time 
dimension is that it allows the researcher to move beyond a static analysis of the 
background or structural factors associated with the conflict management, to a 
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dynamic analysis of what actually occurs m the process of the negotiation or 
mediation. 
L'"" []""" CONSEQUENT CONDITIONS ~---·~·~ .... ,,_, ···~"·--- ~ .... ________ ,M•>" --
CONTEXT PROCESS OUTCOME I 
I 
1 Nature of Dispute 1 Conflict 1 Type of 
2 Nature ofParties Management Outcome 
and their Method 2 Outcome 
Relationship 2 Conflict Characteristics 
3 International Management 
Context Characteristics 
4 Nature of 3 Mediator 
Mediator Activities 
Figure 3.2 A Contingency Model oflnternational Negotiation and Mediation 
The Contingency Model stipulates three clusters of variables with specific 
operational criteria, each of which may have an impact on the process and outcome of 
the conflict management. The success or failure of the conflict management is 
logically seen as the result of the interaction between variables in the context and 
process (see Figure 3.2). 
The first cluster ofvariables, contextual variables, refers to aspects of the nature 
of the dispute, the nature of the parties and their past and ongoing relationship, the 
international context, and in the case of mediation, the nature of the mediator. Dispute 
variables include the issues in conflict and the intensity with which the parties pursue 
their aims. The model assumes that what the parties are fighting over ( eg, tangible 
issues such as control over territory versus intangible issues such as competing 
ideologies), and the intensity of that fight ( eg, whether they are prepared to risk total 
war) will have some impact on how they interact in a conflict management situation. 
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I CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 
Nature ofDispute 
Nature ofParties and 
their Relationship 
International Context 
Nature of Mediator 
II PROCESS FACTORS 
Conflict Management 
Method 
Conflict Management 
Characteristics 
Mediator Activities 
III OUTCOME FACTORS 
Type of Outcome 
Outcome Characteristics 
· Issues: sovereignty, ideology, security, self-
determination, etlmicity; intensity; duration; 
fatalities · · 
Chapter 3 
Identit~ : state, non~state;. power; regime type; . 
homogeneity; previous and ongqfug relatiopship: 
' dispute, conflict, friendly 
System: period; party alignment; involvement of 
other states 
Rank and identitY: partiality, leverage, status, 
legitimacy; functional identity 
Negotiation, mediation, arbitration, inquiry, 
conciliation,..arbitration; adjudiCation 
Timing; etivironment neutrality; I1eg()tiator 
identity; presence ofhostiHties; .c6nflk1:; · 
management initiation < · .,,.. · ·. 
Timing; strategies: c6mmunication-facilitat1on; 
procedural;. directive 
Settlement; partial settlement; cease" fire; 
unsuccessful• 
Durability 
Table 3.4 Factors Affecting Negotiation and Mediation Within the Contingency 
Model 
Similarly, party variables and the international context are also thought to 
impinge on the conflict management process. For example, it is logical to assume that 
the identity of the parties ( eg, states versus non-state actors, large states versus small 
states, democratic states versus non-democratic states), their ongoing relationship ( eg, 
friendly versus conflictual), and the international context (e.g. Cold War versus post-
Cold War, alignment of the parties, wider international interest or disinterest), will 
affect to no small degree the behaviour of the parties, the level of cooperation or 
hostility between them, their willingness to compromise, and the kinds of agreements 
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they will accept. In cases of mediation, the identity and relationship of the mediator to 
the parties will affect the process and outcome in similar ways. The variables thought 
to be the most important in determining conflict management outcomes are 
summarised in Table 3.4. 
The cluster of process variables refers to activities that take place during the 
conflict management itself, and to the factors immediate to the parties' interaction. In 
chapter two, we discussed the issue of timing in regard to mediation. This model 
assumes that when the conflict management occurs ( eg, early in the conflict before 
positions have hardened versus late in the conflict when a "hurting stalemate" has set 
in) will affect the patiies' attitudes and behaviour. Similarly, the conflict management 
environment (eg, neutral territory versus opposing party's territory), the identity ofthe 
principal negotiators (eg, high-level representatives versus low-level representatives), 
and the strategies employed by the mediators, also impinges on the outcome of the 
conflict management (see Table 3.4 for summary of process variables). 
/ 
The final cluster of variables, outcome variables, are the dependent variables. 
The nature of the exercise is to unravel what effect the process and the context have 
on the success or failure of the conflict management. There are several problems 
associated with assessing outcomes and devising success indexes (see Bercovitch and 
Houston, 1996: 17-19; Klieboer, 1996: 361-362; Dixon, 1996: 656-657). First, there is 
the problem of identifying terminal points in what is a dynamic and ever-changing 
process. Second, conflict management outcomes can be perceived and defined 
differently, depending upon whether one is a party to the conflict, the mediator, the 
international community, or simply an interested observer. Third, perceptions can 
change over time, and what might have been considered successful at one point may 
be considered a total failure a few years later. Lastly, outcomes can be evaluated in 
terms of certain normative criteria, such as fairness, efficiency, and legitimacy, which 
produces its own set of evaluation problems. 
To avoid these confusions, the Contingency Model adopts a strictly behavioural 
approach which focuses on the observed differences the conflict management has on 
the parties' behaviour. Thus, it is deemed to be successful when it has made a 
considerable and positive difference to the management of a conflict and the 
subsequent interaction between the parties, it is partially successful when it has 
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initiated dialogue between the parties, and of limited success when it has achieved a 
cease-fire or a break in actual hostilities only. A conflict management episode is 
considered to be a failure, or unsuccessful, when it has no discemible or reported 
impact on the dispute or the parties' behaviour (see Bercovitch et al, 1991). Another 
dimension which has been added to this classification in order to provide another level 
of evaluation is the notion of durability. That is, success is considered more than just 
securing an agreement or a cease-fire. It also refers to the quality of the agreement in 
terms of its ability to satisfy both parties in the long tenn (see Table 3.4). 
It should be obvious by this stage that the Contingency model 1s an ideal 
theoretical device for comparative research into conflict management. Different types 
of conflict management, whether they be bilateral negotiations, mediations, or 
interventions by international organisations, can be examined for the way in which 
contextual and process variables affect their outcomes. In this case, the focus would 
be on how similar extemal conditions affect different kinds of conflict management 
efforts. Altemately, bilateral negotiations, for example, can be examined at different 
levels of social conflict. Here, different extemal conditions would be exan1ined for 
their impact on the san1e form of conflict management. 
IV Studying Negotiation and lY!ediation 
In contrast to both the Psychology paradigm and the Third Party Intervention 
paradigm, comparing negotiation and mediation within the confines of the 
Contingency framework is theoretically possible and practical. This is primarily 
because negotiation and mediation are considered to be similar forms of conflict 
management, while having some important differences. 
The primary theoretical vehicle for studying negotiation and mediation is the 
Contingency Model, which specifies which avenues of research will be most fruitful. 
As has already been mentioned in section 3.1, the Contingency framework allows 
researchers to focus on detailed studies of single cases (qualitative research), or the 
utlilisation oflarge data sets (quantitative research). It also facilitates description ( eg, 
illuminating which factors affect the process and outcome of conflict management), 
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and prescription ( eg, suggesting the conditions under which conflict management will 
succeed). Table 3.5 summarises the main dimensions of the Contingency framework. 
THE CONTINGENCY FRAMEWORK 
I THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 
Actors States uhiqtie; individtiaJs,' organisations; nations, groups, etc _ 
· important;' p!terlocking-web of contemporary international;politics 
Nature of Conflict , Different types deftned by issues; actors, modes; important 
-differences between aimed and non~anned <:;onfliCt-
II THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
Goal of Conflict Control violence; conflict regulation or inamtgenient; conflict 
Management · resolution of non-armed-confliCts 
·-
. . 
Methods of Conflict Different types: negotiation,. mediation;-conciliation; inquiry, 
Management arbih·ation, adjudication; problem of m:atcning methods to cypt;:s. of 
conflict 
III THE NATURE OF NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 
Conceptualising Negotiation Thesamegenus; some differences; Co1;1tingency Model; 
and Mediation adva'ntages ·of mydiation in armed .co11flic.ts; negotiation suited·to 
; less violent conflicts . -
; 
Factors Affecting Contextual; interactional, and_ outcoTIJ-e variables; power, parties; 
Negotiation and Mediation issues, intensity, strategies; i'utematiorial context, em~ir~nment1 et~.; -_ 
IV STUDYING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 
Comparing Negotiation and Facilitated by using Contingency Model'ofNegotiation and 
Mediation Mediation 
Methodology Both qualitative and quantitative; descrip~ive and prescriptive _ 
Table 3.5 The Contingency Framework 
3.3 Expanding the Comparative Dimensions of the Contingency Model 
Thus far in the thesis I have examined how various paradigms and theoretical 
approaches seek to compare negotiation and mediation, without explicitly outlining 
such a comparison. In this section I will directly compare the strengths and 
weaknesses of each method for their ability to resolve conflict. The purpose of 
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reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of negotiation and mediation is twofold. 
First, we are seeking to articulate more carefully the nature of the similarities and 
differences between negotiation and mediation. That is, we are expanding the 
Contingency approach into a comparative framework. This will go some way towards 
providing a theory of negotiation and mediation which can then be tested empirically. 
The second aim of this discussion is to expand the theoretical basis from which 
exploratory propositions may be inferred. In other words, outlining in theory those 
circumstances in which each type can be effective, will suggest their practical 
outcomes in intemational conflict. The comparative advantages and disadvantages of 
negotiation and mediation are summarised in Table 3.6. 
1. The Advantages of Negotiation and Mediation 
One of the main advantages of negotiation derives from its flexibility. Of all the 
methods of conflict management, it requires the least formality. By definition, 
negotiation need not even involve verbalised communications. Instead, it can be tacit, 
as in a series of moves and counter-moves. Furthennore, depending on the wishes of 
the disputants, it can be conducted formally or informally, in secret or in the open, by 
primary decision-makers or by representatives, with closed or open-ended agendas, 
and using concession-convergence strategies or formula-detail strategies. In other 
words, the flexibility of negotiation means that it can be adapted to any type of 
conflict, whether it be simple or complex, between individuals or collectives, or over 
tangible or intangible issues. 
A second set of advantages of negotiation flows from the fact that it is a joint, 
voluntary, non-binding form of conflict management. This means that outcomes can 
be construed in win-win terms, as opposed to the normally win-lose outcomes of 
adversarial, judicial methods, for example. Also, it makes the process more legitimate 
in the eyes of the disputants because it is not imposed, and the outcomes more binding 
in the sense that mutual consent to a resolution adds legitimacy to it (Suter, 1986: 1 0). 
In other words, negotiation can produce mutually satisfactory and durable outcomes. 
Third, the fact that negotiation is a bilateral form of conflict management makes it 
relatively simple in comparison to other methods. In this sense, it reduces the 
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complexity of the communication problem ( eg, communications do not have to go 
through a third party), it simplifies relationship possibilities and dynamics ( eg, 
eliminates the possibility of coalition-formation), and eliminates the expense and risks 
which can be associated with involving third parties (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 2-6; 
Suter, ibid). 
In most cases, although not all, negotiation occurs in situations where parties have 
to manage ongoing relationships. In this case, negotiations, if undertaken often, can 
have the effect of institutionalising bilateral conflict management nonns through 
building up habits of commtmication and cooperation. In international politics, 
diplomacy functions primarily as an institutionalised, relationship-stabilising form of 
negotiation. Over time, parties can learn how to communicate more effectively and 
even institute conflict management regimes. This is in contrast to third party forms of 
conflict management, which are normally temporary arrangements designed to deal 
with more immediate problems, such as the outbreak of hostilities. For example, many 
aspects of superpower relations during the cold war were dealt with through 
institutionalised, on-going arms control negotiations (see Breslauer and Tetlock, 
1991). 
Similar to negotiation, mediation is also an extremely flexible form of conflict 
management. Mediation can, like negotiation, be formal or infonnal, secret or open, 
and involve any kind of party (eg, individuals or collectives, primary decision-makers 
or representatives). Furthermore, depending on the wishes of the parties and the 
mediator, it can involve greater or lesser levels of intervention, and mediators can 
perform a multiplicity of roles. This is not to say however, that mediation has the 
same degree of flexibility as negotiation. After all, mediators cannot mediate tacitly in 
the same way that negotiators can. Rather, mediation usually requires a greater degree 
of structure to the conflict management, with clearly defined representatives who have 
decision-making authority, and clear issue and interaction structures ( eg, definable 
issues, time limitations). It is unlikely a mediator will step forward to intervene in a 
conflict where it is unclear who the parties are, what the issues in conflict are, and 
how long it may take them to reach a conclusion. 
The second set of advantages is identical to negotiation. Because it is a joint, 
voluntary, non-binding form of conflict management, mediation also generates win-
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win outcomes and has process and outcome legitimacy. Again however, the degree to 
which mediation enjoys these advantages is lower than for negotiation, for the simple 
reason that the presence of third parties provides a ready excuse for non-adherence to 
any agreement. It can always be claimed that the third party used unfair tactics, was 
coercive or dishonest, or in some way tainted the process of coming to agreement. 
A third set of advantages comes from the transformation of the negotiation dyad 
into a triad (see Figure 2.1); that is, the notion of mediator as a third bargainer. It has 
already been discussed how the expanded relationship and communication 
opportunities of mediation can move the parties towards agreement by the threat of 
coalitions, the careful manipulation of communication, and the use of bias and 
impartiality (see sections 2.3, 2.4, and 3.2). These are considerable advantages, and 
overall, they serve to expand the number of available solutions. 
Apart from the advantages inherent in the mere presence of a mediator, other 
potential advantages flow from the many roles and strategies that mediators can 
employ to break deadlocks, overcome impasses, and create momentum towards 
agreement. For example, a few of the role possibilities of mediators include: informal 
versus formal roles; individual versus representative roles; impartial versus partial 
roles; face-saving roles; advisory or directive roles; and conflict resolution-oriented 
versus conflict management-oriented roles (Rubin et al, 1994: 199-202; Rubin and 
Brown, 1975: 60-61). Similarly, mediators can employ strategies aimed at enhancing 
the communication process, controlling the conflict management procedures, 
formulating solutions, or gaining concessions through the manipulation of leverage 
(see Bercovitch and Wells, 1993). Applied skillfully, mediator roles and strategies can 
prove a powerful advantage for securing agreements between parties in conflict. 
Lastly, mediators, no matter who they represent, bring with them added resources 
to the conflict management. Simply by providing a fresh perspective, they can expand 
the outcome options away from undesirable eventualities. The more resources a 
mediator brings, the greater the degree of leverage that can be applied, and often, a 
greater sense of legitimacy can be accorded to the conflict management in general. 
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2. The Disadvantages of Negotiation and Mediation 
The main disadvantage of negotiation is that it can become deadlocked or even 
fail to get under way, if the level ofhostility between the parties is too high, there is a 
serious power imbalance between them, one side fails to recognise the legitimacy of 
the other, or if the negotiation process is tainted by misperception or 
miscommunication. Mediation on the other hand, is designed specifically to overcome 
these problems, and mediators can employ a variety of strategies, or take on a variety 
of roles, to overcome them. 
Related to this, negotiation can be hampered by relationship blockages, such as 
ongoing rivalries, historical enmity, the lack of effective communication channels, or 
re-occurring misperceptions. Again, mediation can often be the key to overcoming 
these obstacles through conciliation, teaching the parties how to relate more 
effectively, or acting as channels of communication. 
Lastly, as has already been mentioned, in international politics war or acute 
conflict is usually associated with the breaking off of diplomatic relations, making 
bilateral negotiations difficult (Frankel, 1969: 146). Further, the failure of negotiations 
in the lead-up to a confrontation can encourage the use of force by seeming to 
eliminate other alternatives (Merrills, 1991: 22-26). In other words, in acute 
international conflict, negotiation often breaks down and ceases to be effective. In 
these cases, mediators acting as a neutral go-between can often provide a useful 
alternative communication channel. 
In contrast to negotiation, the main disadvantage of mediation stems from its 
relationship transforming effect, and is the flip-side to the advantages of mediators as 
bargainers. That is, mediators not only expand relationship and communication 
possibilities, they also complicate them and introduce an element of instability. In this 
sense, mediators can actually interfere with the conflict management process, 
especially if the parties are already communicating effectively and have no real need 
of a mediator. Mediators also bring their own interests and constituencies with them 
to a negotiation, and thus, they expand and complicate the number of interested 
parties, and the number of issues. As was already discussed in an earlier section, 
mediators who are too biased or who act too much as a negotiator, can become 
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parties to the conflict and simply make it worse. Syria's involvement in Lebanon in 
the 1980s, and Nigeria's intervention in Liberia in the 1990s are clear examples of 
this. 
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In international politics, the injection of a mediator can also complicate the 
conflict by giving legitimacy to parties otherwise considered illegitimate. This 
perception of newly acquired legitimacy can then embolden the party to be more 
demanding than it otherwise might have been. Such criticism was leveled at both 
Jimmy Carter's mediation in Bosnia in December 1994, which was seen to give 
legitimacy to the Bosnian Serbs, and Robert Oakley's mediation in Somalia in late 
1993, which legitimised Somali warring factions (see Patman, 1997). In both cases, 
the long-term prospects of peace were harmed by the mediation. 
A second disadvantage of mediation is that acceptance of the mediator by the 
parties is not automatic. Parties may be reluctant to accept a mediator if they fear that 
such intervention may infringe on their sovereignty (see Kriesberg, 1982: 267-270), if 
the mediator is seen to be overly biased, or if their legitimacy is questioned. In other 
words, mediation is contingent on disputant acceptance, both initially and throughout 
the mediation. 
Related to this is the obvious point that all mediation success is contingent on the 
mediator's skillful application of their strategies and roles to the conflict situation. 
Success is not automatic. This means that often, the greatest disadvantage a mediator 
faces is their own inadequacies, lack of experience, or inabilities. Especially in 
international politics, mediators require high levels of intelligence, insight, tact, and 
sensitivity in the application of their strategies. 
Lastly, as has already been mentioned, mediation can suffer from outcome 
adherence problems. This is especially true if one or both of the parties question the 
tactics of the mediator during the process of reaching agreement. The ongoing border 
dispute between Ecuador and Peru, although supposedly settled in the 1942 Protocol 
of Rio de Janeiro, continues partly because Ecuador claims that it was coerced into 
signing by the original mediating states. The application of strategies of influence can 
often appear as strategies of coercion in international politics, leading to 
dissatisfaction by the parties and hence, undermining any agreement reached. 
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Evaluation 
To summanse this section, apart from the obvious fact that negotiation and 
mediation are conceptually different and cannot simply be considered as aspects of the 
same process, several important points emerge. First, theoretically at least, negotiation 
has advantages over mediation when conflicts can be dealt with through channels of 
normal diplomacy in institutionalised ways. That is, where the conflict is less than 
acute and occurs between states that are friendly (or at least, not antagonistic), 
negotiation is probably the best alternative. In fact, in these cases, mediation may 
actually harm the conflict management process. Related to this, in theory, negotiation 
outcomes would seem to enjoy greater adherence and legitimacy, adding to their 
greater durability. In short, negotiation is the primary, simplest, and most 
straightforward form of conflict management in international politics. The vast 
majority of conflicts between states are minor and non-violent, and are usually dealt 
with successfully by negotiation through diplomatic channels. 
Second, in theory, mediation has advantages over negotiation in acute conflict 
characterised by hostility, commtmication breakdowns, power disparities between the 
parties, and the like. In other words, in situations where negotiation is impossible or 
difficult, mediators have the tools to restart and advance the conflict management 
process. However, the strengths of mediation in acute conflicts are also its primary 
weaknesses. In the first instance, it can be argued that the very factors which make 
mediation necessary ( eg, hostility, power imbalances, communication breakdown, 
etc), also make mediation that much more difficult and less likely to succeed. If 
mediation is eschewed in favour of negotiation, then the likelihood is that the 
conditions are more conducive to a settlement. Added to this is the fact that mediation 
is further contingent on mediator resources, the skillful application of strategies, and 
ongoing acceptability and legitimacy. This means that in mediation there is always 
greater room for error. In short, from a theoretical viewpoint, mediation tends to 
operate in the most difficult circumstances, and is rarely used, except in acute 
conflicts. 
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3.4 Initial Propositions Generated by the Contingency Model 
Research on the effect of contextual and process variables, together with the logic 
of the Contingency Model and the comparative dimensions of negotiation and 
mediation, suggests a number of initial propositions for an empirical comparison of 
the two methods. However, some caveats are in order first. As has already been 
discussed in chapter one, there are few studies which attempt to compare these two 
forms of conflict management. Most research is conducted within either the 
Psychology paradigm, which has no logical reason to compare them, or the Third 
Party Intervention paradigm, which tends to concentrate solely on intermediary 
conflict management. The lack of research which could suggest the type and direction 
of research propositions to pursue poses some considerable, though not 
insurmountable, problems for this study. This is especially relevant for the 
comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation, where there are virh1ally no 
studies which might suggest areas of difference between them. 
Two strategies have been employed to overcome this difficulty. The first involves 
creatively and logically extending existing research findings on either negotiation or 
mediation. The second involves applying the comparative theoretical dimensions 
outlined in section 3.3 in particular, so that where propositions are not directly taken 
from existing research, they are theoretically derived nonetheless. Lastly, it should be 
kept in mind that the propositions are primarily exploratory and meant to illuminate 
avenues of further investigation, rather than provide iron-cast support for any full-
blown theory. The findings from the propositions presented here will form the basis of 
a more in-depth investigation in chapter five. For this reason, most of the propositions 
will not be stated in comparative tenns. It will be left to the initial run of results to 
highlight the differences between them and suggest further comparative aspects. In 
other words, while this research starts from the premise that negotiation and mediation 
outcomes are the result of different explanatory factors, the dearth of both theoretical 
and empirical studies from which to derive comparatively-based research propositions 
means that we have to look primarily to the data itself for clues about their 
differences. 
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I Primary Propositions 
A review of the conflict management literature reveals few suggestions as to which 
conflict management will be most successful overall. Studies by Holsti found that 
negotiation was more successful than all the other methods of conflict management 
examined, including mediation (see Holsti, 1966, 1968, 1988). From the theoretical 
discussion in section 3.3, it can be argued that negotiation will be more successful 
overall, simply because mediation occurs largely in the most difficult conflicts, and 
because mediation is contingent on a variety of unpredictable and difficult factors. 
Negotiation by diplomacy is the normal form of conflict management in international 
politics, and mediators are usually only called in when the conflict is complex, long, 
drawn-out, and costly, and the parties have reached a deadlock in their own conflict 
management efforts (Bercovitch, 1984: 13). In this sense, the Contingency Model 
coincides with the Psychology Paradigm discussed in chapter two, although for 
different reasons. This proposition is stated more formally in Table 3.7. 
PRIMARY PROPOSITIONS:· 
1. N('jgotiation will be more. successful overall ' than mediation in international coi1flict. (OUTCOME) · 
. ~- . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. Successftllnegotiati<m-produc~d outcomes will be more durable than suCCf;!Ssful.mediation- · · . 
pi·oducedtiutcomes:;(OUTCOME DURABILITY) . . 
Table 3.7 Summary ofPrimary Propositions 
In regards to outcomes, there is some suggestion in the literature that outcomes 
produced by negotiation will be more durable than outcomes produced by mediation 
(see Pruitt 1981: 220-221). This is because the parties to a negotiation come to the 
agreement wholly on their own, while in mediation they do not. This fits with the 
theoretical discussion in section 3.3, and thus, the Contingency Model predicts that 
successful negotiation outcomes will be more durable than successful mediation 
outcomes (see Table 3.7). 
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II Contextual Variables 
A first set of contextual variables relates to the nature of the dispute. At the heart 
of any conflict are the issues in dispute. The effect of the issues relates to both their 
substance, and their number and complexity. It is an often articulated proposition in 
mediation research that tangible issues ( eg, concrete, measurable issues such as 
money, resources, territory, etc) are more amenable to successful mediation than 
intangible issues involving beliefs, principles, ideologies, legitimacy, and image (see 
Bercovitch, 1984; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Ott, 1972; Lall, 1966; Northedge 
and Donelan, 1971; Klieboer, 1996; Kressel and Pruitt, 1989). In fact, numerous 
studies have confirmed that intangible issues are the most difficult to mediate and 
depress success rates (Bingham, 1986; Hiltrop, 1989; Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Pruitt 
et al, 1989). Similarly, it is also argued that the greater the number and complexity of 
the issues, the less likely that mediation will be successful (see Bercovitch and 
Langley, 1993; Kolb, 1983; Moore, 1986). There is no theoretical reason why 
negotiation should be any different, so it is suggested that both negotiation and 
mediation will be more successful when the type of issues are tangible rather than 
intangible, and when issue complexity is low rather than high. 
An important caveat needs to be retained for this proposition however. It has also 
been suggested that greater complexity creates greater opportunities for trade~offs, 
sequencing, and packaging, thus enhancing the chances of successful conflict 
management (see Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Raiffa, 1982; Bercovitch and Langley, 
1993). Only the empirical results themselves will suggest the direction and nature of 
this particular relationship. 
In terms of the primary issues in dispute, it is predicted that conflicts over 
sovereignty, security, self-determination, and resources will be more successfully 
resolved by both negotiation and mediation than conflicts over ideology and ethnicity. 
See Table 3.8 for more formal statements of these propositions. 
In their behavioural dimension, conflicts are focused on the actions of the parties. 
Conflicts may be pursued with varying degrees of intensity. There are two 
contradictory points of view in the literature. On the one hand, it is argued that the 
greater the intensity of the conflict, the better the chances of successful conflict 
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management (as a way of cutting losses, for example). On the other hand, some argue 
that greater intensity leads to entrenchment and polarisation, making conflict 
management more difficult (see Bercovitch, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; 
Klieboer, 1996). The Contingency Model would concur with the latter view, and 
suggest that both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the less intense 
the conflict is. Thus, if we use fatalities, fatalities per month of fighting (intensity), 
and duration of the fighting as measures of overall intensity of the conflict, then we 
would predict that the lower the fatalities, the lower the fighting intensity, and the 
shorter the duration ( eg, assuming that the longer the conflict, the more fatalities, the 
greater the hostility between the parties, issue proliferation, etc), the more successful 
negotiation and mediation will be. See Table 3.8 for more formal statements of these 
propositions. 
However, while this appears relatively straightforward, the question of how 
intensity affects negotiation and mediation in a comparative sense is slightly more 
complex. There is some suggestion in the literature that the less intense the conflict, 
the more likely the parties will want to resolve it themselves and will resist mediation 
(Rubin et al, 1994: 214). Furthermore, it has been argued that mediation is likely to be 
more successful than negotiation in international conflict for a number of reasons. 
First, it is argued that mediation will be more successful than negotiation because 
hostility is generally higher in international politics, especially when force has been 
used (Rubin et al, 1994: 203-204; see also Keashly and Fisher, 1996: 244-245). 
Greater levels of hostility impedes negotiation by causing deadlocks, entrenchment, 
broken communication, etc. Second, at the level of international politics, negotiation 
functions best under conditions of "normal diplomacy", and not the "one-off' 
situation of armed conflict (Princen, 1992: 7-8). In this sense, mediation serves as a 
regime surrogate, because in one-off disputes institutionalisation is impractical. 
Lastly, mediation is more likely to be successful in international politics because it 
retains the flexibility and control over the conflict management process, while adding 
extra resources and creativity (Princen, 1992: 44; Rubin and Brown, 1975: 60; Rubin 
et al, 1994: 203-204). That is, mediation can break negotiation deadlocks, re-open 
channels of communication, provide face-saving for concessions, propose creative 
solutions, etc. 
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It could be inferred from this that negotiation is unsuited to international conflict, 
especially those with high levels of hostility or actual military hostilities; further, that 
mediation is better able to deal with these factors. Following this logic, while 
negotiation and mediation will both be more successful the lower the levels of 
intensity and hostility, it could be expected that mediation will be more successful in 
conflicts with high levels of fatalities and intensity. However, in light of the 
theoretical comparison in section 3.3, where we noted that mediation tends to occur in 
situations which make conflict management difficult to begin with, and where success 
is contingent on mediator behaviour, it would be, on the balance, imprudent to make 
any firm predictions. The results themselves will determine the validity of these 
contrasting viewpoints. 
A second set of contextual variables relates to the nature of the parties and their 
ongoing relationship. It is generally agreed that when the parties to a conflict are very 
different in tenns of their identity and their power (capabilities), this impedes conflict 
management (see Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; Carnevale and 
Pruitt, 1993). Specifically, when parties to a conflict do not share the same political 
system or have a basic adherence to the same set of cultural norms and values ( eg, 
asymmetric conflict), conflict management becomes more difficult. This is because 
"shared norms and sociopolitical similarity minimise misperception and facilitate a 
successful conclusion to the conflict" (Bercovitch and Houston, 1996: 21). Similarly, 
many analysts argue that successful conflict management requires a (rough) power 
parity between the parties, because disparity will dispose the stronger party to reject 
mediation in the first place (see Young, 1967; Zartman, 1981; Kriesberg, 1982; 
Touval, 1982; Klieboer, 1996). Others argue that power parity endangers successful 
conflict management because it stimulates competition and attempts to upset the 
power balance (see Organsld, 1960; Wright, 1965; Klieboer, 1996). In other words, 
we can expect that both negotiation and mediation will be more effective when the 
parties to the conflict share cultural norms and values, and have sociopolitical 
similarities. Specifically, they will be more successful when both parties share similar 
political systems, are relatively equal in power, and are aligned in the same bloc or 
regional collective organization. 
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Related to the cultural norms and values of a party is the degree of cultural 
fragmentation, or, homogeneity. It has been claimed that the greater the degree of 
fractionation within a state, the greater the chances of conflict management failure 
(see Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Klieboer, 1996). This is because representatives 
(eg, negotiators), find it difficult to make concessions without losing face vis-a-vis 
different constituencies, and greater levels of intra-party bargaining are required first. 
Thus, it also seems logical to suggest that the greater the degree of homogeneity 
within parties, the more successful both negotiation and mediation will be. 
Tuming to the comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation, once again the 
waters are far from clear. It could be argued that conflicts characterised by divergent 
cultural norms and values, sociopolitical dissimilarities, and high fractionation are 
more likely to result in negotiation impasse and require mediation, which is ideally 
suited to such situations. Specifically, it has been suggested that high power 
differences between the parties makes negotiation more difficult (see Camevale and 
Pmitt, 1992: 550). As mediators can counter-act the affect of power discrepancies by 
forming allia;nces, or favouring the weaker party's suggestions, mediation should be 
more successful than negotiation under these conditions. 
Conversely, conflicts characterised by cultural similarity, sociopolitical 
similarity, and high levels of homogeneity, it is argued, will not need mediation, as 
negotiation will most likely proceed smoothly. These arguments suggest that 
mediation will be more successful than negotiation when dissimilarity is high, while 
negotiation would be more successful than mediation when similarity is high. 
However, in the light of our earlier theoretical observations (see section 3.3), this 
would be stretching the logic of the framework too far. Again, it will suffice to let the 
first run of results determine which view is correct. 
The ongoing relationship between the parties would intuitively, also seem to be 
important. The literature supports the notion that parties in an ongoing relationship are 
more willing to preserve it than those in a short-term relationship, and that parties 
with a history of friendship will approach conflicts more cooperatively (see 
Bercovitch, 1989; Bercovitch and Houston, 1996; Rubin, 1981; Deutsch, 1973; 
Klieboer, 1996). This suggests that parties with a friendly, ongoing relationship will 
be more willing to negotiate cooperatively, and will have less need of a mediator. In 
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fact, as was discussed in section 3.3, the intervention of a mediator in such a situation 
may actually harm the conflict management process. In short, the Contingency Model 
suggests that both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the less hostility, 
or, the better the previous relationship between the parties. Comparatively, we would 
expect negotiation to be more successful than mediation when the previous 
relationship between the parties was friendly (see Table 3.8). 
CONTEXTUAL FACTOR PROPOSITIONS: 
Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in tangible issue conflicts than in 
intangible issue conflicts. (ISSUE TYPE) 
2 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in single issue conflicts ( eg, simple 
conflicts) than in multiple issue conflicts (eg, complex conflicts) (ISSUE COMPLEXITY) 
3 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in conflicts over sovereignty, security, 
self-determination, and resources, than conflicts over ideology and ethnicity. (PRIMARY 
ISSUE) 
4 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the lower the fatalities in the conflict. 
(FATALITIES) 
5 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the lower the conflict intensity. 
(INTENSITY) 
6 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the shorter the conflict duration. 
(DURATION) 
7 Both negotiation and mediation wiii be more successful ·if they share similar political systems. 
(PARTY IDENTITY) 
8 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the power differential between 
the parties , is low. (POWER) 
9 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the pmiies share alignment in the 
same bloc or security organization. (ALIGNMENT) 
10. Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the parties are relatively 
homogenous. (HOMOGENEITY) 
11. (a) Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the parties have had a 
previously friendly relationship than when they have had a history of conflict. (PREVIOUS 
RELATIONS) 
(b) Negotiation will be more successful than mediation when the pmiies have had a friendly 
previous relationship. 
12. Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful the less additional parties intervene in 
the conflict. (ADDITIONAL PARTIES) 
Table 3.8 Summary of Contextual Factor Propositions 
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However, it is also possible to view this factor from the perspective of"learning" 
in conflict management (see Bar-Siman-Tov, 1994; Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991; 
Haas, 1991; Lebow, 1985). Here, it could be argued that states with a history of 
conflict may have, in fact, learned to deal with their conflicts through institutionalised 
forms of bargaining, or a tacit agreement to invite in a mediator whenever conflicts 
get out of hand. In this case, the path to agreement may be easier than in cases where 
conflict is unexpected and unanticipated. 
A final contextual variable relates to the number of extra parties who intervene in 
the conflict on one side or the other. Such intervention clearly complicates the conflict 
management process by increasing the number of parties that have to be consulted, the 
number of interests and issues, and the complexity of the relationship structure. It is 
suggested then, that the less the conflict is complicated by intervening parties, the 
more successful both negotiation and mediation will be. 
III Process Variables 
Process variables relate to the conflict management itself - the way it is initiated 
and conducted, and the behaviour of the participants. One of the most important 
process variables is the timing of the conflict management; that is, the stage of the 
conflict. As with some of the contextual variables, there are two contradictory 
hypotheses on timing in the literature. Some analysts have suggested that conflict 
management is more successful early on in the conflict before the adversaries have 
crossed the threshold of violence, inflicted losses on each other, and become 
entrenched in their positions (see Edmead, 1971; Bercovitch et al, 1991; Bercovitch 
and Houston, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; Klieboer and t'Hart, 1995). 
Others argue that later stages of a conflict provide the "ripe" moment for conflict 
management because the parties have reached a "hurting stalemate", and may be 
willing to moderate their intransigence and revise their expectations (see N orthedge 
and Donelan, 1971; Ott, 1972; Pruitt, 1981; Zartman, 1983, 1985; Klieboer, 1996). 
Evidence from Bercovitch and associates suggests that the former position is more 
indicative of what occurs in international conflict. Thus, the Contingency Model 
suggests that both negotiation and mediation will be more successful in the early 
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stages of the conflict before positions have hardened. Comparatively, mediation will 
be more successful than negotiation in the later stages of a conflict. This is because 
once the parties become entrenched, negotiation is more difficult. However, due to the 
declining alternatives facing the parties later in the conflict, mediators will possess 
more bargaining power (Princen, 1992: 54). See Table 3.9 for a more formal 
statement of this hypothesis. 
A second important process variable relates to the site, or the environment in 
which the conflict management takes place. A neutral environment, free from external 
pressures and influences of constituencies and media, can create a level playing field 
and allow the parties to concentrate on the more substantive issues (Bercovitch and 
Houston, 1996: 29). A non-neutral environment however, can appear to favour the 
party whose territory it is in and in tum, make the opposing party harden their position 
in order to compensate. This suggests that both negotiation and mediation will benefit 
from a neutral enviromnent. Turning to the comparative aspects of negotiation and 
mediation, it is argued that because a mediator can counter-act the negative impact of 
a non-neutral environment by guaranteeing each party free and equal access to 
information and resources, can act as a neutral communication conduit, and can 
balance perceived power differences, then mediation will be more successful than 
negotiation in non-neutral environments. However, given our earlier observations that 
mediation usually occurs in the most difficult circumstances, and is contingent on the 
skills and resources of the mediator, it would be stretching the credibility ofthe model 
to predict this. 
When both parties to a conflict are willing to deal with it constructively and take 
the step of initiating conflict management, this represents a propitious condition for 
success (see Hiltrop, 1985; Rubin, 1981; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993). Initiation of 
conflict management indicates a willingness to commit to the conflict management 
process. In other words, both negotiation and mediation are likely to be more 
successful when they are initiated willingly by both parties. It can be argued 
that mediators can overcome indifference and intransigence of parties by offering 
incentives, persuasion, coercion, and threats. Furthermore, when both sides are willing 
to settle, they may not need a mediator at all. Although this suggests that negotiation 
may be more successful than mediation when both sides initiate the conflict 
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management, while mediation would be more successful when only one side is 
willing, it would be imprudent to predict that this will be the case, given our earlier 
discussion. 
PROCESS' FACTOR PROPOSlTIONS: · 
1 · (a) Both negotiation an~ .mediation will be more successful in the earlier s;ages of the . 
confliCt compared to the later stages. (TIMING) . . . 
(b )Mediation will be more successful than negotiation in the later stages of the conflict 
2 }36th negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the conflict manageh1ent 
. cicctirs· iri a neuh:al ~etiing. (ENVIRONMENT) . . . 
• 3 ·· Both hegotiatiOn;and m'ediation wilfl:i~ in ore successfuLwhen. both parties' iilltiate • the · 
donffictmarlagerne~~att~rript .• (IN1tiATOR) . · · ·. · · · · · · 
; 4 Bcith negotiation and :rriediation will-be mo1:e successful the higher the nink of: the 
prinCipal n~gotiators . (NEGOTi:ATOlt RANK} · - · 
5 Both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the.conflict management 
is not complicated by ongoing hostilities. (PRESENCE OF HOSTILITIES) 
Table 3.9 Summary of Process Factor Propositions 
There is some suggestion m the literature that the rank and identity of the 
negotiators in the conflict management also affects its success or failure. In a study on 
the Spanish-US military bases negotiations, Druckman found general support for the 
hypothesis that senior level officials can overcome an impasse and facilitate 
agreements (Druckman, 1986: 358). Similarly, it is widely held that mediators ofhigh 
rank, with great resources, legitimacy, and standing have a greater chance of success 
(see Bercovitch et al, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993; Frei, 1976; Pruitt and 
Johnson, 1970; Rubin and Brown, 1975; Ippolito and Pruitt, 1990). The Contingency 
Model predicts that both negotiation and mediation will benefit from having higher-
level principal negotiators. 
The last process variable discussed here is the presence or absence of hostilities 
during the conflict management. Conflict management which takes place while 
hostilities continue on the ground will be complicated by battlefield events, while 
conflict management which takes place in the window of peace brought about by a 
cessation of hostilities will be able to focus more directly on the underlying issues. In 
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short, both negotiation and mediation will be more successful when the conflict 
management is not complicated by ongoing hostilities (see Table 3.9). 
3.5 Contingent Conflict Management: Comparing Negotiation and Mediation 
At the beginning of this chapter we posed the question: Is there an approach which 
will facilitate a logically sound and meaningful comparison of negotiation and 
mediation? This chapter has outlined the dimensions of such an approach, and 
proposed the Contingency Model as a theoretical vehicle which can be used as the 
basis for an empirical comparison of negotiation and mediation. Developing an 
alternative framework to existing paradigms and proposing a useful comparative 
model have been the primary achievements of this chapter. An empirical study 
comparing negotiation and mediation would not be possible without a theoretical 
framework which specified what dimensions and factors are most important. 
Similarly, without a theoretical understanding of the nature of the similarities and 
differences between them, it would be difficult to evaluate any empirical results. 
Using the model and existing research which generally fits with the Contingency 
framework, a number of initial propositions have been suggested here. Although it has 
not been possible to predict precisely how negotiation and mediation will behave 
under different conditions, the results of the initial set of propositions will highlight 
those areas where they appear to contrast and those where they are generally the same. 
A summary of the variables under investigation is presented in Table 3.1 0. 
In the next chapter, I will outline the process of data collection and analysis used 
in the empirical study. This will be followed by the initial results and how they can be 
interpreted. Chapter five will focus more specifically on the comparative aspects of 
negotiation and mediation in the attempt to shed some light on explanations of 
success and failure. 
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ConflictManagementOutcome (Success or Failure) 
2 Outc:ome !Durability 
B SECONDARY:(INpEPENDENT) VARIABLES 
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4 Fatalities 
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<:~~I:::~~~~tit 
10 Homogeneity 
11. Prev~ousRelationship · 
' ' . 
12 Additiotiaf:p~~rhe~~;~ 
II Prqcess Variable~: .. 
~tr Timing of Conflict Mimagement 
;!~r:. Conflict Management Environment 
3 Conflict Management Initiator 
4 · Negotiator Rank · 
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. ·'· 
. 
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Table 3.10 Summary ofVariables for Empirical Investigation 
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Chapter 4 
COMPARING NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION EMPIRICALLY: INITIAL 
RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction: Negotiation and Mediation in Empirical Analysis 
In chapter three, a theoretical framework was outlined which could provide an 
exploratory foundation for a comparative study of negotiation and mediation in 
international politics. It was argued that the Contingency framework has a number of 
advantages over other approaches: it permits meaningful comparative research 
between types of conflict management, it encourages systematic empirical research, it 
identifies variables associated with successful conflict management, it offers an 
integrative framework for current conflict management research, and it facilitates 
theory development. 
In this chapter, the Contingency framework is applied to the real world of 
international politics, and utilised in a large-scale empirical research project. In other 
words, the purpose of this chapter is to tly and answer the third key question that was 
posed in chapter one: can a comparative approach to negotiation and mediation be 
applied to the real world of international conflict management? The findings 
presented in this chapter demonstrate the utility of using the Contingency approach in 
comparing negotiation and mediation, and answer the question firmly in the 
affirmative. 
However, the empirical study undertaken for this chapter is important for other 
reasons than confirming the Contingency approach as a useful comparative 
framework, or testing a number of theoretical notions. As has already been mentioned 
in chapter one, no researcher has followed the lead of Holsti (1966, 1968), and there 
exists no systematic, large-scale comparative data set on international conflict 
management. The data set developed for this study then, represents an important 
innovation in the field. Furthermore, no attempt has yet been made to study 
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international negotiation using quantitative data and methods, and the construction of 
such a body of data here is unique in the field of negotiation studies. 
Specifically, section 4.2 explains the methodology of the study, outlining how the 
variables under examination were operationalised, the data sources scanned, the 
research design, and the statistical tools utilised in the data analysis. Section 4.3 
briefly outlines the major findings of the study in terms of the propositions generated 
by the Contingency model. The purpose here is to discover whether the propositions 
have been confirmed or contradicted by the data. Section 4.4 undertakes the more 
difficult task of attempting to explain what the results mean for negotiation and 
mediation comparatively, while the final section summarises the findings of the 
chapter and outlines the next step in the empirical investigation. 
A small caveat is in order before we begin, however. In chapter 1 (section 1.5) 
we briefly discussed the sequential problem facing the empirical study. That is, there 
are inherent difficulties involved in treating negotiation and mediation as independent 
of each other, and assuming that outcomes are not the result of cumulative effects. 
This limitation needs to be kept in mind when evaluating the results of the study. This 
issue will be dealt with in more detail in chapter 6 (see section 6.2). 
4.2 Comparing Negotiation and Mediation Empirically: Methodology 
The overall aim and context of this empirical study was first, an attempt to extend 
an existing research project and create the first comparative data set of its kind. That 
is, I took Bercovitch's Correlates of Mediation data set (Bercovitch, 1997), and 
following its specified data collection procedures exactly, I coded a comparable 
number of negotiation cases. Second, it was aimed at developing the first large scale 
data set on international negotiation. 
The description of the methodological procedures used by Bercovitch and his 
associates therefore, is also an exact description of the procedures I utilised. Although 
Bercovitch's methodology has already been described in a number of publications 
(see Bercovitch, 1989, 1991; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993, 1996; Bercovitch and 
Langley, 1993; Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993; Bercovitch et al, 1991), a slightly more 
detailed explanation seems expedient here. Portions of the codebook: for the Correlates 
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of Mediation data set (Med97.Codebook) are reproduced in Appendixes 1-4, and will 
be referred to in the following discussion. 
The methodological approach taken by Bercovitch was predicated on a 
dissatisfaction with prevailing attempts to study conflict management. On the one 
hand, descriptive ideographic approaches assumed that all cases of mediation (or 
negotiation) were unique, and nothing meaningful could be said about types of 
mediation and dispute outcomes in general. On the other hand, nom1ative-based, 
experimental studies did little to advance our understanding of the relative importance 
of different variables on mediation outcomes, and furthermore, could not be easily 
extrapolated to the international arena (Bercovitch et al, 1991: 8-9; Bercovitch and 
Houston, 1993: 299). Neither approach, it was argued, stimulated much-needed 
empirical research. 
The weaknesses of these approaches prompted the adoption of the Contingency 
approach, which regards the outcomes of mediation (or negotiation) as being 
contingent upon a number of contextual and process variables (see Figure 3.2). The 
Contingency approach stimulates systematic empirical research because it stipulates 
variables and attributes with explicit operational criteria, as well as aiding in the 
identification of propositions about determinants of effective mediation. 
Empirical Research 
Empirical research should be verifiable (e.g., replicable), cumulative (e.g., build 
on existing research), self-correcting, value-free, and directed toward statistical 
generalisability (Jones, 1984; Ellis, 1994). Furthermore, it should be systematic and 
aimed at enumeration (Miller, 1995: 156). The Contingency approach is designed to 
fulfil these criteria. It is an inductive, descriptive-analytic approach which relies on 
quantitative methods which stipulate variables, attributes, and relationships in the 
search for factors which correlate with successful outcomes. 
Along with other analytical approaches, the Contingency approach proceeds along 
a series of well-established steps. The first step involves conceptualising the problem 
through theoretical investigation and reflection (see chapters one to three). Second, a 
comprehensive data set must be developed. This involves specifying, observing, and 
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measuring relevent data, after operationalising the central concepts (Jones, 1984: 4). 
Third, relationships between aspects of the data need to be tested. A variety of 
appropriate statistical tools are available for this (see Miller, 1995). Lastly, the initial 
conceptualisation needs to be confirmed or modified. This is the point where the "on-
going dialogue between theory and data" takes place (Ibid: 157). Even in an 
exploratory study such as this, these steps will guide the research design and data 
interpretations. 
Research Design 
Designing and conducting an empirical study can be conceived of as the process 
of surmounting a series of related problems. The first problem involves the definition 
and operationalisation of the variables under investigation. In order to gather data on 
negotiation and mediation in international conflict, the first task was to identify 
international disputes and the methods used to manage them. Although a large number 
of studies have addressed themselves to the problem of identifying and classifying 
international disputes1, none have specifically addressed themselves to the question of 
how disputes are managed or terminated. Furthermore, given that these studies 
exhibited marked differences with respect to the periods covered, their definition of 
what constitutes an international dispute, the number of disputes found, and the 
absence of a list of peacefully resolved disputes, it was felt expedient to develop a 
separate data set of international disputes, and to examine how many were mediated 
(Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993: 292-293). 
Initially, Bercovitch relied on the prior compilation of Singer and Small (1982), in 
which international disputes were defined as organised and continuous armed conflict 
involving one or more states which resulted in at least 1,000 fatalities. This threshold 
of fatalities was later lowered to 100, and initially, 97 international disputes from 
1945-1990 were identified (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 673). The study 
concentrated on the post-war period for a number of theoretical and practical reasons 
(see Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). 
1 Some of the best efforts are summarised in Singer and Small, 1982; Moaz, 1982; Cioffi-Revilla, 
1990; Miall, 1992; and Vasquez, 1993. 
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A growing realisation that the data set did not include important disputes such as 
the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, and the 1988 Sprately Islands take-over by China, 
simply because they did not reach the required threshold of fatalities, caused a further 
re-think. Consequently, in its current form, the data set includes conflicts if they 
conform to the following criteria: (1) the involvement of at least two states, although 
one of these states may be involved indirectly through significant intervention in a 
civil conflict; and (2) the significant use of force ( eg, open warfare, unopposed 
invasion of territory, large-scale and threatening military build-ups, etc), regardless of 
the number of fatalities (see section 3.2). In other words, the data set includes inter-
state conflicts, internationalised civil wars, and militarised disputes, but not political 
incidents (see section 3.2; Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). This widening of the 
operational definition has yielded a total of 295 conflicts for the period 1945-1995. A 
list of these conflicts can be seen in Appendix 2, and a description of each can be seen 
in Bercovitch and Jackson (1997). 
In the original project, each of these conflicts was then examined in detail to 
ascertain whether or not mediation had taken place. The intial examination yiedled 
1,666 discrete cases of mediation, and in the process, a number of negotiation cases. 
For this thesis, I examined each conflict a second time to ascertain whether or not 
negotiation had taken place, which yielded a total of 1,154 cases of negotiation. My 
own investigations contributed more than 600 cases of negotiation. Each was coded in 
terms of the 68 variables described in Appendix 1 and 2, creating a sizable data set. 
Although negotiation and mediation have already been defined theoretically (see 
sections 1.3, 3.2), for operational purposes mediation was taken to mean "the actual 
reporting of fotmal or institutionalised, non-coercive intervention by an outsider (a 
person, a state or organization) in order to help the parties settle their dispute" 
(Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993: 293). Similarly, negotiation was operationally defined 
as the reported formal, or sometimes relatively informal, attempts by the disputing 
parties to communicate with each other about substantive issues related to the cause 
and/or consequences of their conflict. Of the 295 conflicts, 225 involved either, or 
both, negotiation and mediation. 
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Data Collection 
The second main problem in conducting an empirical study involves data 
collection. The primary events data sources used to locate and collect information on 
negotiation and mediation were the New York Times, Keesings Archives (latterly 
Keesings Record of World Events), The Times (London), Reuters Online News 
Service, and a wide range of books and articles describing specific cases (see the 
bibliography in Bercovitch and Jackson, 1997). I consulted these same sources for 
information on instances of negotiation. Data on conflicts and state characteristics was 
taken from a wide range of authoritative sources2, such the Statesman's Year-book 
(various editions), Freedom in the World, World Military and Social Expenditures 
(various years), various UN publications, and numerous other sources summarising 
state and world-level quantitative data (see also Cook and Paxton, 1979; Sherman, 
1989). 
Compiling a list of all negotiation and mediation events in international conflict is 
a demanding task, especially considering that routine informal, institutional 
negotiations and mediations are carried out behind closed doors daily. The data 
collected here represents "non-routine" conflict management attempts that were 
described in public sources3• Initially, Bercovitch scanned the above mentioned· 
sources in search of mediation, although a few negotiations, referrals to international 
organisations, multilateral conferences, and arbitrations were also coded. However, 
because the project was primarily concerned with mediation, the vast majority of 
negotiation cases present in the record were missed. Consequently, Ire-scanned all the 
same sources looking specifically for instances of negotiation. All the information 
regarding the negotiation and mediation cases was recorded on codesheets, an 
example of which can be seen in Appendix 1. 
2 Conflict data was taken primarily from Singer and Small (1982); Tillema (1991); Day (1987); 
Butterworth (1976); Brecher, Wilkenfeld, and Moser (1988, 1989); Brogan (1992); as well as the 
above-mentionedjoumalistic sources. The conflicts themselves are described in Bercovitch and 
Jackson, 1997. 
3 It is recognised that by looking only at public sources, some covert attempts at negotiation or 
mediation may be missed. Obviously, as evidence of such negotiations or mediations come to light, 
they will be included in the data set. 
106 Chapter 4 
Operationalising the Variables 
A third problem to overcome was operationalising the variables specified by the 
Contingency approach. As was mentioned, the dependent variable, negotiation and 
mediation outcomes ( eg, success or failure), was coded in strictly behavioural terms 
which focused on the observed differences the conflict management had on the 
parties' behaviour (see Bar-Tal et al, 1989; Clarke, 1993; Coser, 1968, for further 
discussion on outcomes). Modifying Haas's success index (1986), the negotiation or 
mediation event was considered unsuccessful when no agreements were 
acknowledged, and there was no discernible or reported impact on the dispute or the 
parties' behaviour. It was considered to be of limited success when it achieved a 
cease-fire agreement, and/or an actual cessation ofhostilities. It was considered to be 
partially successful when it resulted in an agreement to initiate or continue dialogue 
between the parties, and/or resulted in agreement on side-issues or portions of the 
major issues. Lastly, the negotiation or mediation was considered fully successful 
when agreement was reached on the majority of the major issues in conflict. 
There are a number of important reasons for adopting this approach, not least 
because it helps to avoid many of the conceptual confusions and disagreements 
involved in evaluating conflict management outcomes (see discussion in chapter 1, 
section 1.3). Second, it is the only realistic alternative for a large-scale empirical study 
such as this. That is, it would be impractical to effectively operationalise and evaluate 
notions of fairness, justice, efficiency, legitimacy, satisfaction, or long-term success 
for such a large body of cases. Such approaches are more suited to qualitative 
research; strict behavioural criteria are the only realistic alternative here. 
Third, the behaviourally-based scale adopted here "explicitly recognises partial 
settlements as diplomatic achievements in which some issues, often the most 
contentious ones, may be deliberately and skillfully omitted from consideration in 
order to secure agreements"(Dixon, 1996: 657). Lastly, my approach has the 
advantage of effectively disentangling the act of successfully reaching an agreement 
from the conceptually distinct task of implementing its terms (Ibid). 
A further measure related to outcomes concerned the durability of the success of 
the conflict management. In other words, parties could fully settle all the primary 
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issues in conflict, as happened in 1992 in Angola, but then the agreement could break 
down and the patiies return to violent struggle, as occured in 1994 in Angola. 
Similarly, mediators were successful in obtaining agreement on more than 40 
ceasefires during the Yugoslavian conflict, but most of these were actually observed 
for less than one week, and some were broken within hours. Conflict outcomes then, 
were coded as being more or less durable. 
The 68 variables used to code each discrete case of negotiation and mediation, the 
format they are set up in, and descriptions of each variable can be found in Appendix 
3. Calculation criteria and codes for the more complex variables, such as the power 
indexes, homogeneity measures, political rights scales, and civil liberties scales, can 
be found in Appendix 4. Although many of the variables are relatively straightforward 
and self-explanatory, such as dispute dates, conflict duration (in months), the number 
of fatalities, system period, geographic region, type of conflict, UN involvement, 
conflict management environment, and so on, others require more explanation. 
An initial variable requiring explanation is the start and end dates of a negotiation 
or mediation. This is potentially problematic because at times, a conflict management 
episode may take place in a single two hour meeting. Alternately, it may take weeks, 
or even months of shuttling between capitals by a mediator before the mediation effort 
is considered to be ended. For the most part, start and end dates were determined in 
terms of two primary guiding descriptions in the data sources. In the first instance, 
negotiations or mediations are often conceived of as "rounds" of talks, which end 
when the negotiators return to their home governments for consultation, leave the 
talks for a number of days or weeks, or there is a major change in negotiator 
personnel. Second, mediations especially, are often described in terms of 
"initiatives", whereby a mediator may circulate a proposal between the parties until it 
becomes clear that it is not acceptable. A new initiative may be the circulation of a 
new proposal, or a new attempt by another mediator. Using these considerations, it 
soon becomes clear where one negotiation or mediation ends, and another begins. 
The duration variable refers to the actual number of months the fighting 
continued, rather than the time the issues remained in dispute. This means that 
negotiation and mediation may continue long after the conflict (in tetms of its violent 
physical manifestations) is over, because the underlying issues remain mrresolved. For 
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example, although the fighting between North and South Korea largely ended in 1953 
(apart from intermittent incidents along the DMZ), negotiations over security and 
reunification continue to the present day. 
Another variable requiring some explanation is the issues in conflict. Issues refer 
to what the conflict is all about, and in this sense, are the underlying cause of the 
dispute. Often determining exactly what the issues are is confusing, because there may 
be more than one, different parties may not agree on what constitutes a disputed issue, 
and there may be disagreement on the relative importance of the issues. To make 
sense of this somewhat confused picture, Bercovitch coded the possible issues into six 
categories to describe and reflect the tangible and intangible types of issues that may 
characterise international disputes: sovereignty, ideology, security, independence, 
resources, and a residual "other" category which included ethnicity. The coding also 
allows for each dispute to have a primary, secondary, and peripheral issue, thus 
indicating simple or complex issue stmctures. Also, it allows for the primary issue to 
be coded as being tangible (e.g., resources, sovereignty, independence), or intangible 
(e.g., ideology, security, ethnicity). 
Sovereignty disputes refer to incompatible claims to a specific piece of territory by 
the adversaries (e.g., Britain-Argentinian claims to the Falklands/Malvinas, China-
Vietnamese claims to the Sprately Islands, Eritrea-Y emenese claims to the Hunaysh 
islands). Ideological disputes are based on strong disagreements over the nature of a 
political system, basic values, or beliefs (e.g., Iran-Iraq, Korean, China-USSR, USA-
Panama conflicts). Security disputes refer to perceptions of threat or feelings of 
insecurity over borders, frontiers, or territories (e. g., Arab-Israeli conflicts, India-
China border incidents). Independence disputes are based on the desire by a territory 
to liberate itself from another state and determine its own national selfhood (e.g., 
African Territories-Portugal, Biafta-Nigeria, Lithuania-USSR disputes). Resource 
disputes refer to conflicts over the control of a particular resource, such as a water 
supply (e.g., Syria-Iraq Euphrates dispute, India-Bangladesh Ganges dispute). Lastly, 
ethnic disputes refer to conflicts involving high levels of inter-ethnic antipathy (e.g., 
Rwanda and Bunmdi conflicts, Yugoslavian civil war, Tuareg-Niger conflict). 
A few other variables requiring explanation include the final dispute outcome 
(v14 - see Appendix 3). Here conflicts are described as being ongoing, if at the data 
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set end-date (e.g., December 31, 1995), violent struggle continues. They are 
considered lapsed each side, or one side, unilaterally withdraws its claims and does 
not engage in any more conflict behaviour. In contrast, disputes are considered abated 
if the violent conflict behaviour ends, but each side continues to press its claims 
diplomatically and retains the option to use force. In this case, the dispute is seen to be 
in a state of continued tension (e.g., Ecuador-Peru, Arab-Israeli, India-Pakistan 
disputes). The other categories for this variable are self-explanatory. 
The alignment variable (v20- see Appendix 3) refers to the political alignment of 
states during the cold war period (1945-1989), and to the post-cold war alignment 
structure (e.g., 1990-1995). The number of parties variables (v28, v29- see Appendix 
3) refers to the number of intervening parties on each side, such as the Korean war, 
which also included the involvement of China, the USA, and several other Western-
aligned states. Other conflicts which involved multiple intervention include the 
Vietnam war, the Arab-Israeli conflicts, the Yemen conflicts, the Angolan and 
Mozambique conflicts, the Cambodian conflict, and a number of Latin American 
conflicts, such as the Nicaraguan conflict. 
The last variable requiring some discussion is mediator strategies (v50 - see 
Appendix 3). Conceptualising mediator behaviour is quite difficult, as there are more 
than 100 techniques mediators may apply in their relationship with the parties (Wall 
and Lynn, 1993). To facilitate operationalising this aspect requires first of all, a 
definition of mediator behaviour. Kolb divides mediator behaviour into strategy and 
tactics. Strategy refers to "an overall plan, approach, or method a mediator has for 
resolving a dispute ... It is the way the mediator intends to manage the case, the parties, 
and the issues (Kolb, 1983: 249). In contrast, tactics are "the behavioural 
manifestations for various strategies; the operational, and observable behaviours that 
characterise each strategy" (Ibid). 
There have been various attempts at categorising mediator behaviour into 
different types of strategies4• Bercovitch adopts the approach taken by Touval and 
Zartman (1985), who classify mediator behaviour along a continuum ranging from 
low to high intervention. They identify three primary types of strategies that 
4 See Bercovitch and Wells, 1993 for a discussion of the main typologies of mediator strategies. 
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encompass the spectrum of mediator behaviour, namely, communication-facilitation, 
procedural, and directive strategies. 
Communication-facilitation strategies describe mediator behaviour at the low end 
of the intervention spectmm, where a mediator typically adopts a fairly passive role. 
For example, they may channel inf01mation to the parties, facilitate cooperation, and 
shuttle between the parties, but exhibit little control over the process or substance of 
mediation. Procedural strategies entail a higher level of intervention, and enable a 
mediator to exert more formal control over the environment in which the conflict 
management takes place. For example, they may determine the number, type, place, 
and agenda of the meetings, as well as control constituency influences, media 
publicity, information distribution, resources, and communication channels. Directive 
strategies are the most active strategy, and entail the highest level of intervention. 
Here mediators attempt to deal with the issues in dispute and the behaviour of the 
parties by providing incentives to the parties, issuing ultimatums, suggesting 
solutions, and/or warnings about the consequences of non-agreement. 
Data Analysis 
The methodological approach used to analyse the data can be characterised as a 
descriptive-analytical approach (Bercovitch and Lamare, 1993: 292). It relies on 
quantitative methods which stipulate variables, attributes, and relationships in the 
search for factors which correlate with successful outcomes. Although statistical 
analysis of third party intermediary activity in international relations is not unknown 
(see Bercovitch and associates; Frei, 1976; Hosti, 1966; Levine, 1971; Raymond and 
Kegley, 1985; Dixon, 1996), few have attempted more than the most rudimentary 
bivariate analysis, and none have attempted to compare different methods of conflict 
management. 
In this chapter, I begin by assessing the impact of a number of factors or variables 
on the success or failure of the conflict management by using simple bivariate models, 
where the relationship between each variable and the conflict management outcome is 
examined singularly. In using the usual two-dimensional contingency tables, the 
objective is to determine if one or both variables have an effect on the distribution of 
111 Chapter 4 
values in the other, or, to establish that there is no such effect at all. Here I rely 
primarily on the Pearson chi-square statistic as a test of independence in two-
dimensional contingency table analysis, where a significant X2 (p<.OS) indicates 
disagreement between the data and the null hypothesis. The _x2 is the traditional test 
for analysis of a two-way table, and is a function of the discrepancy between the 
observed frequencies in the table cells, and the estimated expected frequencies under 
independence (Demaris, 1992: 3-4). It is also employed here for reasons of continuity 
with the format of the data, and a desire to extend the findings of previous studies 
which have employed both this data set and the methodological procedures being 
utilised here (see Bercovitch and associates; Houston, forthcoming; Langley, 1993). 
At this stage then, the aim is simply to establish that a relationship exists. The 
results of this bivariate relationship analysis will then be used as a guide for 
hypothesising and testing multivariate models. That 1s, significant bivariate 
associations uncovered here will form the basis of the multivariate models tested in 
chapter five. In chapter five, I will employ multidimensional table analysis, where the 
main objective is to identify both the impact of multiple independent variables on the 
success or faih.rre of negotiation and mediation, and the nature of the impact of the 
independent variables on each other. Loglinear and logit methods will be employed as 
the mode of analysis there. 
4.3 The Specific Propositions and Initial Results 
I Primary Propositions 
The primary proposition, namely, that negotiation will be more successful overall 
than mediation in international conflict, was supported by the data. As can be seen in 
Table 4.1, negotiation was successful in 47% of its cases, while mediation was 
successful in only 39.4% of its cases5 • With aX2 of 16.24 with one degree of freedom, 
this is highly significant (at the p<.OOl level), and suggests that the hypothesis of 
independence can be rejected. These results can also be expressed in terms of the 
5 This success/failure dichomised variable was created by collapsing the Full Settlement, Partial 
Settlement, and Ceaseflre categories into a single Successful category. The effects of collapsing 
variables will be addressed in chapter five. 
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likelihood of success. Thus, all things being equal, the average likelihood of 
successful negotiation would be 47%, while the average likelihood of successful 
mediation would be 39.4%. This should be kept in mind when the impact of different 
variables on negotiation arid mediation outcomes is assessed in the following 
discussion. It should also be noted that this relationship is being examined here in 
isolation from all other variables, and we cannot, at this stage, detetmine whether 
there are other forces at work that impact on this correlation. This caveat applies to all 
the bivariate analyses in this chapter. 
Interestingly, these results closely mirror results obtained by Holsti (1966, 1968). 
Holsti examined 77 conflicts for the period 1919-1965, and found that bilateral 
negotiations were successful in 47% of the 47 negotiation attempts examined. 
Mediation, both by international organisations and other international actors, was 
successful in 35% of the 57 mediation attempts. Along with the results discussed 
below, Holsti's results lend weight to the suggestion that negotiation is indeed more 
successful than mediation in international conflict, and for the reasons that have been 
proposed (see Section 3.4) . Primarily, negotiation is more successful than mediation 
because mediation tends to be employed primarily in those conflicts which are the 
most difficult to resolve (see section 4.4 below). 
Failure 611 (53.0%) 1010 (60.6%) 
Total 1153 (100%) 1666 (100%) 
Table 4.1 Negotiation and Mediation Success and Failure (n=2819) 
Furthermore, the success rate of 39.4% for mediation found here, fits with other 
research. Kressel and Pruitt (1989) have estimated that the median settlement rate 
across all mediation domains is about 60%, with a range between 20% and 80% (see 
also Wall and Lynn, 1993). The fact that mediation success in violent international 
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conflicts is well below the median rate is understandable, given the intensity, hostility, 
and complexity of such conflicts. 
If the conflict management outcomes are broken down into their specific 
categories, Table 4.2 shows that negotiation successes are comprised largely of partial 
settlements (37%). This is also true of mediation successes (22.2%). Interestingly, a 
larger proportion of mediation successes are comprised of ceasefires (13.2%) than for 
negotiation (6.7%). 
427 (37.0%) 370 (22.2%) 
··'-···-·-·· ---~----·-··-·-· ···· ·····- _ .. , _________ ·------- - ------.... - _______ .................. .... . 
77 (6.7%) 220 (13.2%) 
1010 (60.6%) 
Table 4.2 Negotiation and Mediation Outcomes 
This is suggestive of the types of situations that mediators most often find 
themselves in. Namely, mediation often occurs in highly volatile situations where 
fighting continues, while negotiation often takes place after the fighting has stopped 
(see section 4.4 below). 
A second proposition relating to outcomes concerned the durability of successful 
outcomes. Here it was predicted that successful negotiation-produced outcomes would 
be more durable than successful mediation-produced outcomes. The data clearly 
supported this proposition (see Table 4.3). Negotiation successes, in the vast majority 
of cases (82%) lasted eight weeks or more, whereas only slightly more than half 
(51.7%) of mediation successes were in this category. In fact, nearly a third of all 
mediation successes (29.8%) lasted less than one week, compared with only 9.5% of 
negotiation successes. If the first two categories are combined, we see that nearly half 
of all mediation successes (44.3%) lasted less than four weeks. With a X2 of 113.882 
with 3 degrees of freedom, these results are significant at the p<. 001 level. 
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In other words, the data seems to support the notion that successful negotiation 
outcomes will be more durable than mediation successful outcomes. The literature 
suggests that the theoretical explanation for this is because they are arrived at 
completely bilaterally (see Section 3.4). Another suggestion is that mediation is often 
too brief to alter the climate between the parties. The problems needed to be solved 
are too severe, and "mediation is a weak elixir for improving a dispute hostile enough 
to merit intervention by a third party" (Wall and Lynn, 1993: 177; Kresse! and Pruitt, 
1989). One further explanation is that mediation tends to occur, in most cases, in the 
most intense, intractable, and hostile conflicts where ingrained patterns of violence are 
extremely difficult to break. This notion is explored further in later sections. 
Table 4.3 Negotiation and Mediation Outcome Durability 
II Secondary Propositions: Contextual Factors 
The first set of contextual factors investigated was the number and type of issues 
in conflict. In terms of issue type, there was little support for the proposition that both 
negotiation and mediation would be more successful when the issues were tangible 
rather than intangible. In fact, there was almost no difference for mediation success 
when the issues were intangible (40.2%), than when they were tangible (37.3%). 
Furthermore, the X2 value of 1.2 with one degree of freedom means that the null 
hypothesis, or the mutual independence of these variables cannot be rejected. The 
results were similar for negotiation, where success varied not at all between tangible 
issues (47.0%) and intangible issues (46.9%). A partial explanation for these results 
could relate to the inherent difficulties involved in coding issues as tangible or 
intangible in international politics. For example, while it seems reasonable to view a 
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dispute over the control of territory as a tangible issue, the tremendous symbolic 
significance of territory to states (see Vasquez, 1993) often can only be explained in 
intangible terms. 
It was also predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more 
successful the less complex the conflict, in terms of the number of issues. There was 
some support for this prediction (see Table 4.4), in that both negotiation and 
mediation were more successful the fewer the number of issues. Mediation was 
·., 
Two ·· 
'' · Issues · 
244' 
·.· (42A%) 
Three 
Issues 
216 
(52.0%) 
; 332 ' '· ·.<<-19.9 ,: '. 
. ' (57.~%) (48:0%) ' 
· One 
Issue · 
···· two · .·· 
· Issues · ... ·. 
'67 . 285 
(47.9%) .. (39;0%) 
446 •. 
Table 4.4 Negotiation and Mediation Issue Complexity and Outcomes6 
·· Issues 
304 · 
(38:2%) 
491 . 
clearly more successful in simple, single issue conflicts (47.9%), than in complex 
multiple issue conflicts (38.2%). With a X2 of 4.69 with 2 degrees of freedom, this 
distribution did not reach statistical significance (p=.096). The picture for negotiation 
is even less clear. Negotiation is most successful in multiple issue conflicts (52.0%), 
where it was well above the average expected success rate, but least successful in 
dual issue conflicts (42.4%). With a X2 of 10.07 with 2 degrees of freedom, this 
distribution is highly significant (p=.006). 
6 Tables are presented here in a comparative format whenever possible for two simple reasons. First, 
the study is primarily comparative, and single tables are easier to interpret comparatively than separate 
tables. Second, the large number of tables that would result from separating negotiation and mediation 
would be impractical. 
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Comparatively, negotiation and mediation experience similar success rates for one 
and two issue conflicts, but exhibit contrasting effects in complex conflicts, where 
there is a 13.8% difference in success rates. This suggests that while greater 
complexity seems to decrease the success rates of mediation, as was suggested in 
Section 3.4, the competing notion regarding complexity applies to negotiation. 
Namely, the possibility that greater complexity creates opportunities for trade-offs, 
sequencing, and packaging may actually apply, but only in cases of negotiation. 
Interestingly, a large proportion of mediation cases (795, or 47.7%) occurred in the 
multiple (three) issues category, highlighting the fact that mediation tends to operate 
under the most difficult circumstances. 
Table 4.5 Negotiation Primary Issue and Outcomes 
Looking more specifically at the content of the issues in dispute, it was predicted 
that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful in conflicts over 
sovereignty, security, self-determination, and resources, than in conflicts over 
ideology and ethnicity. This proposition was not supported by the data, which 
revealed an unclear and somewhat skewed distribution (see Tables 4.5, 4.6). The 
explanation for this must lie partly in the fact that there are inherent problems 
involved in delineating issues operationally (see Klieboer, 1996; Diehl, 1992). The 
findings were also skewed somewhat by the predominance of cases clustering in 
sovereignty, self-determination, and ideology categories. In fact, both negotiation and 
mediation had greater success in issues involving ideology than in issues involving 
sovereignty, security, or self-determination. This contradicted the direction of the 
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original proposition. The only point of interest comparatively was that negotiation 
was significantly more successful than mediation in conflicts over both sovereignty 
and self-determination. Both negotiation and mediation were significant at the p<.05 
level. 
Table 4.6 Mediation Primary Issue and Outcomes 
As a related measure of issue complexity, negotiation and mediation were also 
tested against whether the conflict could be characterised as being primarily a civil 
conflict (intra-state), or an inter-state conflict. Although there was virtually no 
difference between success rates, and neither type reached statistical significance, 
there was one interesting finding. The table revealed that 1123 (67.4%) of the 
mediation cases occurred in conflicts that were primarily civil, while 735 (63.7%) of 
the negotiation cases occurred in interstate conflicts. This could go some way to 
explaining the higher success rates of negotiation, as mediation occurs primarily in 
conflicts characterised by less clear-cut issues, high fragmentation, multiple issues, 
and intensity of feeling - that is, civil conflicts. Negotiation, on the other hand, occurs 
largely in relatively clear-cut conflicts between well-defined actors who have 
established channels of communication. 
Behaviourally, it was predicted that both negotiation and mediation would be more 
successful the lower the level of fatalities. This prediction was generally upheld (see 
Table 4.7), as both negotiation and mediation showed tendencies towards higher rates 
of success at lower rates of fatalities. Furthermore, the results were statistically 
significant. TheX2 was 19.74 with 4 degrees of freedom for negotiation (p=.OOl), and 
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X2 was 37.16 with 4 degrees of freedom for mediation (p=.OOO). Recoding the 
categories in this table revealed results consistent with the original findings. 
Comparatively, negotiation was more successful at all levels of fatalities, except 
for the 0-500 level where the difference in success rates was marginal. However, the 
degree of success narrowed the higher the level of fatalities. Interestingly, a glance at 
the distribution of cases reveals that 1151 (69%) of mediation cases occurred in 
conflicts where there were more than 10,000 fatalities, while 612 (53%) of negotiation 
cases occurred in conflicts with less than 10,000 fatalities. This is further evidence of 
the fact that mediation occurs predominantly in the most difficult of circumstances. 
···-1'···•••-. ....... .. c ....... - ----- ... -.-. ,-~---··~-----.. -· .. --.:· ~----··c·:·::- -.::--::·:-.... ~ 
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(64.7%) (50.0%) (46.7%) (41.1 %) (56.1 %) (44.0%) (28.0%) (44.0%) (37.3%) . 
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(35.3%) . (50.0%) (53.3%) . (58.9%) (43.9%) (56.0%) (72.0%) (56.0%) (62 .7%) 
Table 4.7 Negotiation and Mediation Fatalities and Outcomes 
Related to fatalities is intensity. Here the Contingency Model predicted that both 
negotiation and mediation would be more successful the lower the level of conflict 
intensity. This prediction was largely upheld in the data (see Table 4.8), with a general 
tendency towards greater success the lower the level of intensity. Furthe1more, 
recoding the categories of intensit/, and re-testing this variable, confirmed strongly 
the original findings that both negotiation and mediation are more successful the 
lower the level of intensity. This suggests that the notion that greater intensity 
enhances the chances of successful conflict management as a way of cutting costs, for 
example, is most likely fallacious. In fact, it would seem that greater intensity makes 
conflict management more difficult, by leading to entrenchment and polarisation. 
7 Intensity was recoded into the following categories: 0-2500, 2501-10000, 10001-100000, 100000+. 
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Comparatively, the results do not support the argument that mediation will be 
more successful than negotiation at higher levels of intensity (see Section 3.4). In fact, 
negotiation can be seen to be more successful than mediation at all levels of intensity. 
There is again, some support for the notion that mediation tends to occur in the most 
difficult cases, as only 697 (41.9%) mediation cases occurred in the 0-500 intensity-
level category. Negotiation, on the other hand, was concentrated in the lower levels of 
intensity, with 621 (55.0%) cases in the 0-500 category. The results for Table 4.8 were 
statistically significant. Negotiation had a X2 of 19.37 with 3 degrees of freedom 
(p=.OOO), while mediation had aX2 of 18.94 with 3 degrees of freedom (p=.OOO). 
Table 4.8 Negotiation and Mediation Intensity and Outcomes 
The prediction that both negotiation and mediation would be more successful the 
shorter the conflict duration was unsupported in the data. Neither negotiation nor 
mediation reached statistical significance, and no clear pattern emerged from the data. 
Receding the duration variable confirmed these original results. Again, the only point 
of interest was that the majority of mediation cases tended to be concentrated in the 
conflicts which were longest running, with 1173 (70.4%) occurring in conflicts of a 
duration longer than 36 months. 
A second set of contextual variables examined related to the nature of the parties 
and their ongoing relationship. The first prediction here was that both negotiation and 
mediation would be more successful if the parties shared political systems. A 
dichotomous variable of cases where the parties shared the same type of political 
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system, versus cases where they had different political systems, was used to test this 
proposition. The data was unsupportive of this proposition, and neither negotiation 
nor mediation reached statistical significance. Comparatively, negotiation was 
consistently more successful than mediation in both categories, and mediation cases 
were concentrated in conflicts where the parties had dissimilar political systems 
(1012, or 60.7%). 
Another measure of party similarity, time in the international system as a 
recognised state, was also investigated here, but produced mixed and unclear results. 
It made no difference for mediation success rates, and did not reach statistical 
significance. In the case of negotiation however, it was found that when the parties in 
conflict had been in the international system different lengths of time, negotiation was 
more successful (50.1%) than in cases where the parties had been in the international 
system the same amount of time (42.4%). With a X2 of 6.74 with one degree of 
freedom, this distribution was significant at the p<.Ol level. Comparatively, the data 
revealed that the vast majority of mediation cases occurred in conflicts where the 
parties had been in the international system for differing amounts of time. 
A second prediction related to party characteristics variables stated that both 
negotiation and mediation would be more successful when the power differential 
between the parties was low. The findings were again mixed (see Table 4.9). The 
prediction was supported in the case of mediation, with a clear pattern of higher 
success rates the lower the power differential. With a X of 8.57 with 2 degrees of 
freedom (p=.014), the association between the two variables was statistically 
significant. In the case of negotiation however, the results were somewhat more 
confusing. Negotiation was most successful in the middle-range category of power 
disparity (52.6%), and less successful in the low power differential category ( 43.1 %) 
and the high power differential category (44.3%). With aX of7.86 with 2 degrees of 
freedom, these results were also significant at the p<.05 level. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that when two states have equal 
capabilities, neither is willing to make concessions in case it compromises their 
position relative to their opponent. When the power differential is high, on the other 
hand, the stronger party may feel unwilling to compromise because it feels confident 
that its superior position will allow it to 'win' over their opponent . Therefore, a 
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certain median level of power difference actually provides an incentive for both 
parties to negotiate in good faith. 
Comparatively, negotiation appeared to demonstrate a different effect to 
mediation in regards to this variable. When both negotiation and mediation occur in 
conflicts with low power disparity, they are equally successful. However, at high 
levels of power disparity, negotiation is far more successful (44.3%) than mediation 
(34.3%), even though it is below the expected average success rate (eg, 47%). This 
contradicts the viewpoint that mediation is better able to counter-act the effect of 
power discrepancies between the parties (see Section 3.4). Also, Table 4.9 reveals that 
the majority of mediation cases occurred in conflicts where power discrepancy was 
moderate to high (1071, or 66.6%). As will be demonstrated in later sections, these 
conflicts also tend to be primarily civil conflicts. 
187 
·.· .... cs5.7%) · 
Table 4.9 Negotiation and Mediation Power Differential and Outcomes 
A third prediction related to party identities and capabilities stated that both 
negotiation and mediation would be more successful when they shared alignment in 
the same bloc or security organization. The results for this variable were also mixed 
(see Table 4.1 0), with negotiation and mediation appearing to be affected in different 
ways. In general, negotiation conformed to the prediction and was more successful 
when alignment was similar. With a X2 of 25 .28 with 2 degrees of freedom, this 
association was highly significant at the p<.001 level. Mediation, on the other hand, 
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demonstrated an opposite effect, and was most successful when the parties belonged 
to opposing blocs or security organisations. However, with a X2 of 3.18 with 2 degrees 
of freedom (p=.203), the mutual independence of these variables is more likely. 
Comparatively, the table highlights the much greater level of success of 
negotiation (52.6%) over mediation (39.6%) when the parties share alignment. 
Similarly, it also highlights that mediation is more successful ( 42.3%) than 
negotiation (34.4%) when the parties belong to opposing blocs or regional 
organisations. This suggests that negotiation and mediation may be affected in 
different ways by the alignment of the disputing parties. Mediation is better able to 
deal with the complication of opposing loyalties, while negotiation is significantly 
enhanced when the parties share such loyalties. Membership in the same security 
organisations not only provides regular points of contact, but also indicates that the 
parties share an underlying bed of interests and views . 
. 181 
{47:1%) . 
Table 4.10 Negotiation and Mediation Party Alignment8 and Outcomes 
Related to the aforementioned aspects of party similarities is the notion of 
cultural fragmentation, or homogeneity. Here it was predicted that both negotiation 
and mediation would be more successful when the parties were relatively 
homogenous. Again, the results were mixed and somewhat confusing (see Table 
4.11). Predictably, negotiation was most successful (51.5%) when both parties were 
homogenous. However, negotiation was also marginally more successful when both 
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parties were fragmented (44.2%), compared to when one was homogenous and one 
was fragmented (41.6%). With a X2 of 9.72 with 2 degrees of freedom, these results 
were significant at the p<.01 level. Mediation, on the other hand, demonstrated a 
general trend towards greater success the less homogenous one or both parties were. 
When both parties were highly fragmented, mediation success was 42.1 %, compared 
to 37.1% when they were both homogenous. This variation in the data did not reach 
statistical significance, however ( X 2 = 2. 73, df=2, p=.254). 
Stron~g .· 
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Table 4.11 Negotiation and Mediation Party Homogeneity and Outcomes 
Comparatively, the only note of interest here was that negotiation was 
significantly more successful (51.5%) than mediation (37.1 %) when both parties were 
homogenous. Similar to previous findings, it is also noted that the majority of 
mediation cases occurred in conflicts where one or both of the parties were 
fragmented (1041, or 62.5%), whereas only 49.4% (570) of the negotiation cases 
occurred in similar circumstances. In this sense then, the majority of mediation cases 
occurred under much more difficult conditions than negotiation. 
There were two primary predictions regarding the previous relations of the parties. 
First, it was predicted that when the parties had had a previously friendly relationship, 
8 This variable was created by collapsing the categories of the original Alignment variable into the 
three categories seen in this table - "same alignment" included same bloc, same regional organization, 
etc. 
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this would be more conducive to success than when they had had a history of conflict. 
This was generally supported in the data, although as can be seen in Table 4.12, very 
few negotiations or mediations occurred in conflicts where the parties had had a 
previous relationship free from conflict. In the vast majority of cases, negotiation and 
mediation was preceded by antagonism or actual conflicts. With a X2 of 8.50 with 2 
degrees of freedom (p=.014), the association between previous relations and 
mediation outcomes was statistically significant. Negotiation, on the other hand, failed 
to reach statistical significance for this variable (X2=.222, df=2, p=.895). 
The second prediction regarding the previous relations of the parties was that 
negotiation would be more successful than mediation when the parties had a previous 
friendly relationship. This notion was completely unsupported by the data, which in 
fact, found that mediation was more successful than negotiation in such cases. 
However, the fact that this finding did not reach statistical significance for 
negotiation, and involved such low numbers of cases, trivialises this finding 
somewhat. Interestingly, negotiation was significantly more successful ( 4 7. 0%) than 
mediation (38.9%) when the relationship was characterised by previous episodes of 
conflict. This is suggestive of the notion that experiencing a number of disputes 
allows states to "learn" how to manage conflict (see section 4.4 for a more detailed 
discussion of this finding). 
No No Antagonism Previous 
Conflict' · Conflicts 
.. 
Conflict ·· Conflicts . 
143 378 33 334 289 
(46.3%~ (47.0%} (57,9%) (38 .5%) . (38.9%) 
.. ~-~- ...... ~.-.... 
. 166 424' 24 533 453 
(42~1 %) (6L5%) . (6l.l<Yo) 
Table 4.12 Negotiation and Mediation Party Previous Relations and Outcomes 
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A final party characteristics factor investigated here was the involvement of 
additional intervening parties in the conflict. Specifically, it was predicted that 
negotiation and mediation would be more successful the less additional parties 
intervened and thereby, complicated the conflict. The results differed for negotiation 
and mediation somewhat (see Table 4.13). 
In the first place, mediation contradicted the hypothesised relationship and 
appeared to be more successful the greater the number of intervening parties. 
This association was not statistically significant, however (X2=5 .18, df=3, p=.l59). On 
the other hand, the prediction did hold for negotiation, which showed a clear decline 
in success rates the greater the number of intervening parties. Fm'lhermore, this 
distribution in the data was statistically significant, with a Jf of 18 .78 with 3 degrees 
of freedom (p=.OOO). Comparatively, it seems important that the vast majority of 
negotiation cases involved conflicts with few intervening parties, whereas mediation 
cases tended, in most instances, to involve outside interventions. This finding 
reinforces the notion that mediation occurs under the most difficult circumstances. 
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~-~ ............ ..;..-_;.. _ ~·~-
88 318 166 84' --·-'2·ofr--------·--iii···-~· : .... 3r-------,~ 81 :-· 
' (49.9%) (51.6%) . (39.7<)/o) (35 .5%) . (34.4%} . (39.8%) ·(39.1%) . (44.9%) 
........ , , -._;.,, _____ -·--···---~--· .... ------·- .... , ______ ....... ............... , ........... , ........ -·· -., ....... ..... __ ... ., .. ____ ,. _____ . __ . __ ... ,,_ -- ----.-- ..... , .. :'":" .. ... , .. . 
208 47 .· .. 147 168 480 259 103 
. (48.4%) (60.3%) (64.5%) (65.6%) .· (60.2%) (60:9%) (55.1%) 
Table 4.13 Negotiation and Mediation Additional Parties and Outcomes 
II Secondary Propositions: Process Factors 
Process variables relate to the way the conflict management is initiated and 
conducted, and the behaviour of the participants. The first set of propositions here 
related to the timing of the intervention. Specifically, it was predicted that both 
negotiation and mediation would be more successful in the earlier stages of the 
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conflict than in the later stages when positions had hardened. The data did not support 
this notion, except in the most general sense. Negotiation success only varied 
marginally across each category, except for the period of 13-36 months, when success 
rates were above average (53.4%). For mediation, success declined with an increase in 
months up to 12 months since the outbreak of the conflict (see Table 4.14). However, 
after 13 months, success rates rose significantly, but then fell again after 36 months. 
While this distribution reached statistical significance for mediation with a X2 of 12.50 
with 3 degrees of freedom (p=.006), it was insignificant for negotiation (X2=4.93, 
df=3, p=.175). Furthermore, the pattern was maintained when the variable was 
receded. In other words, the data does not support the notion that there is any single 
"ripe" moment for conflict management. Rather, it appears that success rates are 
highest after an intetmediate time petiod has elapsed, perhaps at a time when high 
costs have been experienced, but before positions have completely polarised. 
Table 4.14 Negotiation and Mediation Timing and Outcomes 
A second proposition relating to the timing of the intervention predicted that 
mediation would be more successful than negotiation in the later stages of the 
conflict. The data, in fact, demonstrated the opposite principle. Mediation success 
(46.5%) and negotiation success (43.5%) varied little in the early stages of the 
conflict, but negotiation was more successful (46.8%) than mediation (36.6%) after 36 
months. In terms of the distribution of cases, the majority of mediation cases (986, or 
59.3%) occurred after 36 months, indicating that mediators are often only brought in 
after positions have hardened and all other avenues exhausted. 
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Another important factor in the process of conflict management is the 
environment in which it takes place. Here it was predicted that both negotiation and 
mediation would be more successful when the conflict management occurred in a 
neutral setting. This was supported in the case of mediation, but not for negotiation 
(see Table 4.15), which was most successful when the negotiation took place in the 
territory of either protagonist. What the data did reveal was that shuttling between the 
parties' territories was not a successful strategy for either negotiation or mediation 
(negotiation 38.7%, mediation 27.7%). In other words, when neither party is prepared 
to meet face to face and messages have to be relayed between them, this increases the 
chances of misperception and miscommunication. It is also indicative of a high level 
of hostility between the parties, or antipathy to the conflict management process, 
neither of which is conducive to success. The distribution across the data was 
statistically significant for both negotiation (X2=8.93, df=2, p=.Ol), and mediation 
(X2=58.19, df=2, p=.OOO). 
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Table 4.15 Negotiation and Mediation Environment and Outcomes 
Comparatively, negotiation was far more successful (50.6%) than mediation 
(41.4%) when the conflict management took place in one or other of the party's 
territory. This seems to cast initial doubt on the notion that mediators can counter-act 
the negative impact of a non-neutral environment. Also of interest here is the finding 
that mediation was moderately more successful (48.8%) than negotiation (42.5%) 
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when the conflict management occurs on a neutral site. In other words, a neutral site 
does not necessarily increase the success of negotiation, as would intuitively seem to 
be the case. 
One of the most important conditions for success is thought to be the willingness 
of the parties to settle their conflict peacefully. The Contingency Model predicted that 
both negotiation and mediation would be more successful when both parties initiated 
the conflict management. This prediction was supported by the data (see Table 4.16), 
especially for mediation, which was most successful (60.7%) when both parties 
initiated the mediation, compared to when one party initiated it (39.1 %), or the 
mediator initiated it (34.5%). Furthermore, with a X2 of 51.94 with 2 degrees of 
freedom (p=.OOO) indicated a strong association between these two variables. 
Similarly, negotiation was most successful (50.6%) when both parties initiated it, 
compared to when only one party initiated it (41.4%). With a X 2 of 9.29 with 2 
degrees of freedom, this relationship was also statistically significant (p=.01). 
•• > 
-~· .. ····-·--··· -~----~·--'·- ---~· - -------·-··-·----· -·-··-
Both One Both Third . 
Parties Party Parties Parties 
201 224 52 128 
(41.1%) {50.6%) (25.0%) (39.1 %) (60.7%} (34.5%) > 
·--------··;·-------~~ .. ..., ___ ,;,_ _______ ~·------- ......... --·-
' 285 219 ... 6 81 83 788 
(58.6%) (49.4%) (75.0%) (60.9%) (39.3%) (65.5%) 
Table 4.16 Negotiation and Mediation Initiator and Outcomes 
Comparatively, what is interesting here is that mediation is significantly more 
successful (60.7%) than negotiation (50.6%) when both parties initiate the conflict 
management. This suggests that conflict management initiation is not significant in 
itself, and parties may still require a mediator to facilitate a successful conclusion to 
their talks. Another point of interest here is that the vast majority of mediation cases 
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(1203, 77.8%) were initiated by the mediator and not the parties themselves, 
indicating that mediators, more often than not, have to work with some level of 
indifference and intransigence by the parties. 
A fourth prediction concerning process variables stated that both negotiation and 
mediation would be more successful the higher the rank of the principal negotiators. 
The results for this were also mixed (see Table 4.17). The prediction was upheld for 
negotiation, which was significantly more successful (60.5%) when the principal 
negotiators were both primary decision-makers, such as heads of state or rebel 
organisation leaders, than in any other category. With a X2 of 21.38 with 2 degrees of 
freedom, this variability in the data was highly significant at the p<.001 level. The 
prediction was not upheld for mediation, which was most successful ( 48.1%) in the 
both senior decision-maker category, and also experienced above-average success 
(45.1 %) in the both low-level decision-maker category. With a X2 of 14.47 with 2 
degrees of freedom, this distribution was also significant (p=.002). 
Table 4.17 Negotiation and Mediation Negotiator Rank and Outcomes 
Comparatively, the most interesting finding was that negotiation was significantly 
more successful (60.5%) than mediation (38.2%) when both negotiators were primary 
decision-makers. This suggests that when primary decision-makers meet in the 
presence of a mediator, they tend to be uncompromising in order to appear strong to 
their constituents. This tendency is probably even stronger when the conflict is 
intractable, primarily civil, and characterised by high levels of hostility between the 
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protagonists - the characteristics of most mediation cases (see section 4.4). On the 
other hand, mediation was slightly more successful (48.1 %) than negotiation (43.4%) 
when both decision-makers were senior, and when the decision-makers were low-
level (mediation 45.1 %, negotiation 39.2%). 
The final variable examined here was the presence or absence of hostilities during 
the conflict management episode. It was predicted that both negotiation and mediation 
would be more successful when the conflict management was not complicated by 
ongoing hostilities. The data did not confirm this prediction however, and the findings 
never reached statistical significance for either negotiation or mediation, suggesting 
that the mutual independence hypothesis cannot be rejected here. There was a less 
than 2% increase in success rates for both negotiation and mediation from the 
presence to the absence of hostilities, indicating that this variable had no impact on 
conflict management outcomes. 
4.4 Evaluating the Empirical Results 
At first glance, the results discussed in Section 4.3 appear to be somewhat 
confusing, random, and perhaps even contradictory. However, upon reflection a 
number of important initial conclusions can be drawn, general overall patterns 
discerned, and observations made. More specific conclusions will be given in chapter 
five after subjecting the data to far more stringent multivariate testing. However, one 
of the most important findings of the study is that negotiation and mediation tend to 
occur under different conditions. Specifically, mediation tends to occur in conflicts 
that are the most complicated, the most intense, and the most intractable. That is, it 
occurs in the type of conflicts that are by definition, the most difficult to resolve. 
From this perspective, it is not surprising that mediation has significantly lower 
success rates than negotiation, and produces less durable outcomes. This seems to be 
an important finding, as it has often been suggested (see Bercovitch and associates)) 
but never demonstrated empirically. 
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Table 4.18 summarises the difficult conditions under which mediation tends to 
occur>. First, it occurs primarily in long-running civil conflicts, between parties that 
are fragmented, have disparate political systems and capabilities, and have a history of 
antagonism and conflict. Second, it occurs in the most complicated and complex 
conflicts, with multiple issues, and multiple intervening outside pmties. Third, it 
occurs in the most intense, the most costly (in terms of lives), and the longest-running 
conflicts. Lastly, it occurs in conflicts where the parties' own conflict management 
efforts have failed, or there has been, and continues to be, little motivation or political 
will to settle on the part of the protagonists. 
· · ... ·.·,. JHECONDITIONS .. OFMEDIATION 
.. 
.. ,·. 
1 .. 79 5· m6'diatii:nis occurred :in mtiltiple issue conflicts 
.2. · 1123. m~diatio~s o~cuned in primarily dvil confliCts . 
3. llSl m~diatidti.s bcc~~re'dinhigh. fatality(! 0;000+) c;onflicts . 
4. 964 rriediatioils bccurred:in. high lnt~nsity (50 1 + fatalities per month} c(inflicts 
5. 1'173 inedjations:occtir1:ed in high' dtiratiim, (36+ mont11s) conflicts 
. 6. .1 012' rriediatiorts occmied.in confliCts where tlkimities clid not share similar p()litical systems 
7 . . 1071 I11ecli!itibns ocdtred 'in conflicts where there was. moderatechigh po~er disp~rity · betwee~ the 
parties . · .; ' · > ·. · •· .·. . . · . · · . ' · ·. · ·. ·. ' · ' ' ' 
· 8 . . · 1()LtFmediatio~s • ciccm1:e<Lin conflic~s \vhere ~ne or both•parties h<1d fh~mented states ···.· ' 
9. 7 42 mediatioils occurt:ed in confliCts charactedst<d by previous conflict . 
10. r4lo• triediation~ occun:ei:r:in conflict~ ' involving ~uitiple additioniil intervenil1g parties .. · 
11 : 986 ,mediati~ns occ~r~ed, more than tiu·ee years ·~fter the. conflict broke out . . 
.· 12;1203 mediations were initiated by the mediator . . . . . 
Table 4.18 The Conditions of Mediation 
Negotiation, by contrast, seems to occur in far more favourable conditions 
compared to mediation (see Table 4.19). First, negotiation generally takes place in 
relatively less intense and less costly conflicts. Second, it occurs in less complex 
conflicts, with comparatively simple issue structures and few intervening additional 
parties. Third, it usually involves homogenous parties who share political alignments. 
That is, the parties share a set of common values. Lastly, negotiation tends to be given 
9 Most of the tables in this section are simply summaries of general observations. No attempt is made 
here to imply any statistical associations or absolute tendencies in the data. More stringent testing is 
carried out in chapter five. 
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a high priority (in terms of the types of decision-makers involved), and IS often 
characterised by a mutual willingness to negotiate. 
· THE CONbiT!bNS OF NEGOTIATIC5N 
1. 73 8 negotiations OCCUlTed in conflicts involving tWO or less issue.s 
· 2 . . 665n~g~tiatiorts ocGu~·~edjn conflicts in~~lyi1ig sovereigntY or resom'ce 'issues · 
. 3 . . 6'12 negotiations qcdurt·ed: in confliCts involving less than 10;000 fatalities 
4'. 621 'negotiations occmtediriJowintensity (0-500 fatalities per month) confiicts · ·, 
5. 620. negqtiations occui.l:ed in· conflicts'where' the'parties ~hared the same alignment . 
.. . . .. . . ··,· .. . . . - . 
6 ~ · 5 83 negotiations occuned in conflicts where both ,the pa1ties were: homogenous states · 
. 7. A ~fnegoti~ti()ris' o~<ni*'d in conflicts uncmnplicated by int~i-v~ning ~additioi1~l p~1ties 
. 8 ~ A4j neg()tiatidns wet'e i¥ti~t~d by b6th paities 
9: ~4'2:riegoti~t!ons iri.vblved senior or.pdm~ry decision-makers· ori. both sicles as 'the principaf . 
neg6tia~cir~ · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
TotalNegqtiatio11s: 1154 
Table 4.19 The Conditions ofNegotiation 
These findings make intuitive sense, as the very fact that mediation is required at 
all, implies difficulties in the conflict management process. Furthermore, it provides a 
general explanatory reason why negotiation is more successful than mediation under 
most conditions, and suggests why some variables affect negotiation positively (in 
terms of greater outcome success), but do not affect mediation in the same way (see 
below). In short, the data supports the general thrust of the Contingency approach that 
negotiation will be more successful than mediation overall in international conflict. 
A second important finding which also confirms an underlying principle of the 
Contingency Model, is that negotiation and mediation not only occur under a different 
set of conditions, but they appear to be affected in different ways by different 
variables. First, as can be seen in Tables 4.20 and 4.21, there is a significant 
degree of difference in the conditions that are associated with negotiation success, and 
the conditions associated with mediation success10 • 
10 Of course, the statistical strength of these associations will be closely examined in the multivariate 
analysis of the next chapter. At this stage, it will suffice to make a number of general observations. 
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CONDITIONS ASSOCiATED WitH HIGHEST NEGOTIATiON SUCCESS 
1. Three issues (52.0%) and oi1e issue (50;6%)- Table 4.4 
2. Ideologl.cal issues (50.5%)and self-determination issues (47.6%)- Table 4.5 
3. 0~500 fatalities (52.0%) ~nd 501-JOOOJatalities (64.7%)- Table 4.7 
4. 0-500 intensity (50;7%) and 501-1000 intensity (53.6%) -Table 4.8 · 
5. Medium power differential(52.6%)- Table 4;9 . 
6. Same alignment{52.6%)and mi~ed alignment (47.1%)- Table 4.10 ·. 
7. Both stronghomog~neity (51.5'Yo)- Table 4.11 . 
8. No previous conflict (50.0%)- Table 4.12 
9. No ·additional parties ( 49.9%) and 1"2additional parties (51.6%) - Taqle 4.13 
·· 10. 13"36months intervention since confliCt start (53.4%) -Table 4.14 
11. One paiiy's territory as negotiation site (50.6%) -Table 4.15 
12. Both party initiation of negotiation (50.6%)- Table4.16 · 
l3. Both prirllary qecision-:rnakers as principal negotiators ( 60~5%) - Table 4.17 
Table 4.20 Conditions Associated With Highest Negotiation Success 
Negotiation for example, does not appear to require a simple issue structure, low 
power disparity, or a neutral site to produce high success rates, while mediation 
clearly does. Also, while negotiation success is associated with similar party 
alignment, strong homogeneity, few intervening additional parties, and primary 
decision-makers, mediation success is associated with almost opposite values. That is, 
mediation success is associated with opposing alignment, weak homogeneity, 
multiple intervening parties, and low-level decision-makers. 
In some cases, variables appear to have a negative impact on one type of conflict 
management, while having a positive impact on the other. For example, while having 
primary decision-makers as the principal negotiators seems to enhance the degree of 
success for negotiation, it seems to depress the degree of success for mediation. In 
short, the profile of variables associated with negotiation success is different to the 
profile of variables associated with mediation success. This suggests that negotiation 
and mediation are different conflict management methods with different determining 
factors. Specifically how these variables interact with each other and with the 
dependent variable (negotiation and mediation outcomes), will be examined in the 
following chapter. 
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CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH HIGHEST MEDIATION SUCCESS 
l. Singleissues (47:.9%)- Table 4.4 
· 2 .. Ideolt;>~ical' issu~·s (452%)- Table 4.6 _ 
3 . . 0~500 fatalities (56.1 %) and 501-1000 fatalities (44.0%) ~Table 4.7 
4. 0-500 int(msity (42.2%) and 501-1000 intensity (45.2%) -h'1b.ie:~t8 •• -
5 . . Lo:wipower <;iiffereritial(43A%)- Tabl~ 4.9. . . · i:' .. §~li(~ _, . 
. ·6. Opposi~g alignn;ent(423%) ~Tabk4.10 ·;,c:·-;,'i_"~-s 
:7; Both we~kho~ogenelty (42.1 %) - Table4. 11 
• 8. l'J:optevious:co~m~<c~y.9%}" T~pl~4.12 _.• - _ 
· 9. Multiple additiomiFint~rVening parties (44.9%) -Table A. 13 
10. 1 :;2 , ln6~ths (46:5%}-'and' i 3w36.months '( 46:3%) froni conflict start- Tab1e4, 14 
ll. N~ut!ai site for,~edia.tiori: (~8 .8,%)- Jiibl~ 4.15 · 
.. 12. Botll.party initiation,of.mediati~~ (60.7%),- Table 4>i6 -. . • · _ 
13~ -Both senior (48·:1% );and bothJow~ leveH 45.1%) decision-makers as principal negotiators·- Table 
4.17 .. ; ; 
Table 4.21 Conditions Associated With Highest Mediation Success 
However, having said this, it is interesting to note that negotiation and mediation 
are not totally dissimilar, and there are some variables that seem to be important for 
both negotiation and mediation success. The fact that negotiation and mediation share 
similarities is also part of the assumptions of our theoretical framework (the 
Contingency Model- see chapter three). For example, both negotiation and mediation 
experience higher rates of success the lower the level of fatalities and intensity, in 
conflicts where there has been no previous · conflict, and when the conflict 
management is initiated by both parties. In other words, these conditions seem to 
affect negotiation and mediation in similar ways. As such, they are relatively simple 
to explain. When both parties are eager to resolve their conflict, and they have no 
history of antagonism, and the costs and intensity are limited, any form of conflict 
management is likely to be more successful. 
A corollary to the conditions of highest negotiation and mediation success, is that 
they imply the conditions under which negotiation (see Table 4.22) and mediation 
(see Table 4.23) is least successful. Again, there are some conditions which depress 
success rates for both forms of conflict management, such as high fatalities, high 
intensity, high power differential, and lack ofboth party initiation (eg, lack of political 
will to settle). 
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'CONDITIONS ASSOCIATED WITH LOWEST NEGOTIATION SUCCESS 
·: .· .. . 
1. Two issues '(42.4%)- Table4.4 
2. Security issues (35.7%) ~Table 4.5 
3. , lO;OQO+ f<)talities(41'.t%) -TableA:7 
4. ro,oo,o+ int~nsicy:(32,1%) -Table 4.8 
.. ··.· ... .  : 
5. Low,pow.er differentia1(43 :1 %) and high power differential (443%) "Table 4.9 
6. Opp~sing: ~iig;n±nent(34.4%) -Table'4:iO , 
7. Mixed weak} strom~: homogeneity ( 4 1'.6%)- Table 4.11 
8~ '3-,5 09,7%) '~ild'5+, addftiohalpai:ties(35,5%),,- Table 4 . l3 , 
9. 3~12. rrio~ths intervelltion since c~nfli~t start (42.1%) ~Table 4:14 , 
10; Co~posite (shuttlirig};rtegotiatiori site (3~,7%) ~Table 4,15 , , 
11. One party initiatioiHifnegotiation' (4U%}-Table4:16 , ., .· .. · 
12. Both)oV,~leve) ciecisi!)n~rriakers as princip~lnegothitors (39.2%) ,_ Table,4.17 . 
Table 4.22 Conditions Associated With lowest Negotiation Success 
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On the other hand, there are also factors which are unique to negotiation, such as 
opposing alignment, dissimilar homogeneity, high numbers of additional intervening 
parties, and both parties sending low-level officials to the talks. These factors appear 
to depress the success rates of negotiation, but not mediation. The unique factors 
which lower mediation success rates include conflicts over sovereignty or ethnicity 
issues, mixed alignment, and mediator initiation of the talks. In other words, 
negotiation and mediation again demonstrate contrasting, but also comparable profiles 
of the conditions under which they are least successful. 
: ·' · CONDITIO:NS .ASSOCIA:TEl) WITH'L0WEST..f\4E])l{\T~ON'SUCCESS: . 
:. \ _i : • ··~ .. 
. · .. .. . 
' .· ' :' : . . . . . .. 
' ' 
1. Sovereignty issues{362%) :and:ethnicityissues (33 .3%)- Table4;6 
. :t tOOl~5,000 , fatalities (28.0%) and. 10,000+ (37.3%)- Table4.7 
, J, 1 0Ql~5:,Q'oo intensitY (35'.5%} and 1 O;OOo+ intensity (28J,o/o)' - 'fable ~+. 8 
'4, Highp6~erdiffereritial:(34.3o/~) ~ Table 4;9 ·· · · , · ·· 
5. · Mi~~daiigninerit~34;3o/o) ~ . Tabl~4 .. io .·· 
6, · No~dditi'onai'in.tet'venfug patties{34,:'1%)cTable 4.13 
7. Conip,osiJe(shuttlit1g}:enyirotilltent (2T7%)- Tabh~ 4.15 
8. Mediiltor i\:iitiation .(3Al5%) < Table 4.16 • · · 
Table 4.23 Conditions Associated With Lowest Mediation Success 
A third interesting finding related to the points discussed so far in this section, is 
that some variables are statistically significant for negotiation, but not for mediation, 
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and visa-versa. Table 4.24 indicates that while previous relations and timing are 
significant indicators for mediation, they are not significant for negotiation. In other 
words, these variables would seem to be independent of negotiation outcomes. 
Similarly, while issue complexity, alignment, homogeneity, and additional parties are 
statistically significant indicators for negotiation, they are not for mediation. Again 
this is simply another indication that, in some important respects, negotiation and 
mediation are affected by different variables, and in different ways (while at the same 
time sharing important similarities). 
A final important observation from the initial run of results described here, is that 
negotiation is significantly more successful than mediation under a relatively 
surprising set of conditions (see Table 4.25). For example, negotiation is significantly 
more successful than mediation when the conflict is characterised by complex issue 
structures, high power differentials between the parties, a history of antagonism and 
conflict, a massive time lapse between the conflict initiation and the conflict 
management (eg, indicating hardened positions), and when it takes place in one 
party's territory ( eg, a hostile environment for the other party). These were all 
conditions where it was expected that mediation would outperform negotiation. In 
.· Variable: 
· Issue Complexity 
Primary'lssue 
·. Fatalities :. 
· Intensity · 
Po;,ver:Differeritial .· 
Alignffierit 
Homogeneity , · 
Pi"evious:Relations ·.. · 
Additionhi'I~arties ·. ·. 
Tiri1ing; 
Enviiqnment ·· 
Initi~tb!i . 
' :Negotiator)tahk · · · 
.Negotiation (p) 
, 0:006 .·. 
·· <tOO! .. , 
o:oor ·. 
oi6oo 
· o;d2o .. · 
•o;ooo .. · 
... \. 
0.098 
o: s9s ~ : 
o:ocio . 
· · · · · · · 0o~tt .. 
0.oro': · 
· ·O:oo0 
· Mediation (p) 
;- ·. 
0:096* 
·,·;:· ~.;~~6 ·' 
. . 0.000 
..•. 0;8,1'4> ·. 
0:203* 
:·:. ..,. 0-.254* :~-
:, iw14:> 
· Ms9* 
.. o.oo6 ·. 
·o:ooo ·· · 
. ,. -: :~· . .-':0~600 ~-··. 
.·o:·oo2 
* Did not reach required level of statistical significance (p>O.OS) . Variables which did not reach 
statistical significance for either negotiation or mediation include: Issue Type, Duration, Party Identity, 
and Presence of Hostilities. 
Table 4.24 Statistically Significant Variables ofNegotiation and Mediation Outcomes 
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other words, a simple bivariate analysis of these variables does not reveal the whole 
picture, and the interactive effects of these and other variables needs to be uncovered 
before a clearer picture can emerge. Also, the Contingency model may need to be 
extended and adjusted to accommodate these findings. 
For example, it may be that a history of conflict actually improves the chances of 
negotiation success because the parties have had time to "learn" effective conflict 
management. That is, over time the parties learn how to handle their conflicts in ways 
which minimise the costs they experience (see Breslauer, 1991; Tetlock, 1991; 
Vasquez et al, 1995). Also, it may be that negotiation is unaffected by power 
differentials or the negotiation site, if the parties are willing to negotiate, or the issues 
are simple, or some other intervening variable is present. However, the other 
conditions shown in Table 4.25 were not so unexpected. For example, it was expected 
that negotiation would outperform mediation in cases of low intensity, similarity of 
alignment and homogeneity, the presence of few additional parties, and when 
primary-decision-makers were involved in the actual negotiations. 
Tuming to mediation, some of the conditions under which mediation was more 
successful than negotiation were also surprising (see Table 4.26). First, it was 
unexpected that mediation would be more successful than negotiation when the 
primary issue was security (eg, a tangible issue), there were low fatalities, and there 
was a low power differential between the parties. Intuitively, negotiation should have 
been more successful in each of these conditions. However, for these three conditions, 
the degree of difference between negotiation and mediation was extremely slight, and 
could be considered simply anomalous or insignificant. 
What is more surprising, is that mediation is more successful than negotiation 
when the parties have no previous history of conflict, the conflict management takes 
place on a neutral site, it is initiated by both parties, and the principal negotiators are 
senior or low-level decision-makers. In the first place, it is possible that parties with 
no history of conflict have not yet "learned" how to manage their disputes, and in this 
case, the presence of a mediator significantly enhances the chances of mediator 
success. In the case of site neutrality and both party initiation, these factors were 
expected to enhance conflict management efforts in general. Why exactly they should 
enhance mediation success significantly more than negotiation, remains unclear. 
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1. Complex Issue Conflicts ·-Table 4 A . .. . . . 
··2 . • So~ereigntY; and. Seif~determinationissue~ Conflicts -Table 4.5, '4.6 · 
. 3. Lowto Jv{ecliu:lll~ lev.el: Intensity Cot1tikts _.Table 4. 8 
. 4 ~ Mediu1Iltd' High: P~rty PowerDiffet:ential.- Table 4.9 
· 5 . Sam.e A ligrmient fcirboth:P(ll:ties- Table4Jo . 
6. Both·Pmiies Stibngly-Hoinogenous c Table4.ll 
7. Antagb~ism and Previolls .Conflkt Between the Paiiies ~ Table 4.12 
8. Low to Medium AdditionaUnterveriing Parties~- tabie.4.1-3 ·· · .. 
9. Lo~g Winiirig. of Intervention (36+ rrionths) since Start Date - Table 4.14 
. 10. Conflict nianag!'(ment 1n One Party's Territory- Table 4.15 · 
J 1 .. Primary and Mixed~level Decision-makers as PriricipalNegotiators -
. Table ·4:17. · · · · · · · 
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Table 4.25 Conditions Under Which Negotiation 1s Significantly More Successful 
Than Mediation 11 
Lastly, it was unexpected that low-level negotiators would prove so successful. 
Perhaps low-level decision-makers in negotiation lack authority and feel compelled to 
be seen as firm under the gaze of their superiors. In mediation, on the other hand, they 
have a clear mandate to negotiate and are willing to be flexible in order to secure the 
best possible solution for their constituencies. 
·1 .. SecurityJssues (slightly: mor~ successful) - Table 4.5, 4. 6 
2. Low,Fat<ilities (sligiitlY 'more successful)- Table.-4:7 
. 3. Low:powerDiffereritial'(slightly inore successful) " Table 4.9 
4: Oppos:lngi\lignrrient'-Table 4.10* · · 
s; No PreVious ' Conflict ~ Table 4.12 
6. HighAdditional ·Pmiies- Table.4.13* . 
7. Shdti lhter'le'nti~n Tiine: ( l-2 months) .from ConfliCt Sta~t­
Table4:14 
. . . 
8. Neriti'aFSite." Table-4•.15* ' • · 
· 9. Both'.PartyJniti~tion- Table 4.16* · 
:10: Both: Setii(}rofLow~leveLDecision"makers as. :principal · 
·· Negotjate>rs' -:Taoie 4':.17• · ·. ··. · 
Table 4.26 Conditions Under Which Mediation is More Successful Than 
Negotiation 12 
What was not surprising, on the other hand, was that mediation should cope 
better with opposing alignment, and the complication of multiple intervening 
additional parties. Also, the fact that mediation has greater success early on in the 
11 All these conditions are statistically significant at the p<. 05 level. 
12 Unlike negotiation, most of these conditions did not reach statsistical significance. Only those 
marked with a * were significant at the p<.05 level. A more rigorous multivariate analysis will be 
undertaken in chapter five. 
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conflict is not surprising, as parties often break off all diplomatic ties when fighting 
breaks out, or they negotiate strategically in case their military gambit fails to pay off. 
In this situation, mediators can play a vital role in acting as a channel of 
communication, and warning the parties about the consequences of pursuing their 
present actions. 
4.5 A first Glance at the Real World of Negotiation and Mediation 
A first glance at the real world of international negotiation and mediation suggests 
a number of important conclusions. First, the Contingency approach is correct in its 
primary assumption that negotiation and mediation are different forms of conflict 
management that operate in different ways, and are affected by different sets of 
factors. This is clearly shown in the data, even at the relatively simple bivariate leveL 
In other words, we are right to persist in attempting to explain conflict management 
from this theoretical perspective. Second, the results themselves suggest partially why 
this might be the case. It is the case because mediation tends to occur, in part by 
necessity, in those conflicts which are the most difficult to resolve. Any variable that 
would normally result in higher success rates for other forms of conflict management, 
is negated in its impact by a myriad of other factors which make the chances of 
success very low anyway. 
Thirdly, and most importantly for this study, the results indicate that the real world 
of international negotiation and mediation is not as straightforward or simple as our 
theoretical model suggests. This is not surprising, as the real world is almost never as 
simple as a modeL A number of differences between negotiation and mediation that 
were expected did not materialise, while differences we did not expect did occur. 
Also, negotiation was successful in conditions where we thought it would be less 
successful, and more successful than mediation where we thought it would be less 
successful. The picture was equally as complex for mediation13 • 
13 Of course, given the complexity of the phenomena we are investigating, and the relative bluntness of 
the empirical instruments at our disposal, it is possible that these results could be due to imperfections 
in the data collection and analysis process. 
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The most basic explanation for these results is that complex social phenomena 
such as negotiation and mediation can never be satisfactorily analysed using simple 
bivariate models. They are multi-causal phenomena, with a large number of possible 
explanatory variables which need to be considered simultaneously in order to explain 
any significant degree of their variance. Second, the explanation for the seemingly 
anomalous bivariate results is the simple fact that the explanatory variables do not just 
interact uni-directionally with the dependent variable (negotiation and mediation 
outcomes), but they also interact with each other. For example, logically, the 
antecedent variables in the Contingency model ( eg, issues, fatalities, power, 
homogeneity) will affect and interact with both concurrent (process) variables (eg, 
timing, environment, initiator, rank), and consequent (dependent) variables. In other 
words, until multivariate analysis uncovers the complex interrelationships between 
these variables, we cannot be sure whether or not they really are anomalous. 
In short, the results suggest that while the Contingency Model is a useful starting 
point, it needs to be re-worked in a number of crucial areas, and refined in its 
predictive orientations. However, this cannot be achieved until we have further 
examined the data, and begun to unravel in more detail how the different variables 
interact with negotiation and mediation outcomes. Then we can begin to suggest why 
negotiation and mediation have different success rates under different sets of 
conditions. This is the task of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
A MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATION 
AND MEDIATION 
5.1 Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis of Negotiation and Mediation 
In chapter four, the initial results of the empirical comparison of negotiation and 
mediation were presented. It was found that the profile of variables associated with 
negotiation success was different to the profile of variables associated with mediation 
success. For example, negotiation success was significantly associated with: issue 
complexity, primary issue, fatalities, intensity, power differential, alignment, 
homogeneity, additional parties, environment, initiator, and negotiator rank (see Table 
4.22). Mediation success, on the other hand, was significantly associated with: 
primary issue, fatalities, intensity, power differential, previous relations, timing, 
environment, initiator, and negotiator rank. In other words, negotiation success seems 
to be associated more closely, at this stage of the analysis, with party characteristic 
variables, or aspects of the parties most likely to affect their ongoing relationship. 
Mediation success, on the other hand, seems more closely associated with variables 
relating to the nature of the conflict and the actual process of conflict management. 
The primary methodological problem posed by the results of chapter four is that 
simple bivariate contingency table analysis reveals little surety about the direction or 
strength of relationships between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable. Furthermore, it cannot reveal whether the relationships are spurious ( eg, 
mediated through a third variable), or how much variance they account for in tandem. 
For example, it is possible that the strong association between alignment and 
negotiation outcomes will weaken when combined with a third variable, such as the 
power differential between the parties. Similarly, it is also possible that although there 
appears to be no direct association between issue complexity and mediation outcomes, 
when a third variable such as intensity is also taken into account, issue complexity 
could become quite important in determining the variability of mediation outcomes. 
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Logically, we could expect that antecedent variables such as the issues, fatalities 
and intensity, and the nature of the parties, would affect both the outcomes (dependent 
variable), and the concurrent variables such as the timing of the conflict management, 
the initiator, environment, and negotiator rank. For example, it seems logical that the 
previous relationship of the parties might affect the choice of environment in which to 
hold the negotiation or mediation. The extreme hostility between the parties in the 
Bosnian war, for example, precluded negotiations or mediations in each other's 
territory, and most talks were held in neutral settings such as Switzerland, or the UN-
controlled Sarajevo airport. Also, it seems fairly clear that the duration, intensity, and 
number of fatalities in the conflict will affect the timing and initiator of the conflict 
management. In many cases, the parties may not be willing to initiate talks until they 
have experienced a certain level of costs or realised that they cannot achieve their 
goals through unilateral military action. 
However, the conceptual problem goes deeper than this, in that antecedent 
variables may also affect each other. For example, it seems reasonable that the number 
of additional intervening parties will be determined to some large degree by the issues 
in conflict, the nature of the parties ( eg, large versus small parties), and the intensity 
of the conflict. Certainly, the intensity with which the parties pursue the conflict will 
be, in part, determined by the issues and the nature of their previous relationship. In 
other words, the problem is in determining both how the independent variables affect 
each other, and how they affect the negotiation and mediation outcomes. Clearly, 
simple bivariate analysis is incapable of determining these complex relationships, and 
more powerful multivariate testing is required. This then, is the task of this chapter, to 
test a number of multivariate models which will suggest a little more specifically the 
types of relationships between the variables. 
In other words, the purpose of employing multivariate statistical tests to the data is 
three-fold. In the first place, the aim of multivariate testing is to confirm or deny the 
findings of the bivariate analysis. For the reasons outlined above, we cannot be sure of 
the bivariate findings until they have thoroughly investigated using more rigorous 
(multivariate) tests. The multivariate tests then, will allow us to be more confident 
about the findings in chapter four. 
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Secondly, the multivariate analysis will enable us to isolate the most important 
variables from among the large cluster of potential explanatory factors we have so far 
identified. By examining how much variance in the dependent variable (negotiation 
and mediation outcomes) is explained by each independent variable, we will be able 
to detennine those few variables which have the most powerful effect on negotiation 
and mediation outcomes. 
Lastly, multivariate testing 1s aimed at uncovenng more specifically those 
conditions which enhance the chances of successful conflict management. For 
example, while the bivariate analysis allows us to suggest generally that the initiator 
of the negotiation or mediation is an important determining factor for explaining 
outcomes, the multivariate analysis allows us to say specifically that there is a strong 
relationship between both party initiation and negotiation and mediation success. 
Furthermore, it also allows us to say that there is a strong relationship between both 
party initiation, a neutral environment, and negotiation and mediation success. That is, 
it reveals relationships that are more complex that simple bivariate-level associations. 
In general, the multivariate analysis allows us to be far more specific, and somewhat 
more certain in our findings. 
In section 5.2, I will explain the reasons why loglinear and logit analysis is the 
most appropriate statistical method for the analysis of this data, and then give a brief, 
non-technical explanation of the approach. In section 5.3 I will present the main 
findings of the loglinear analysis for negotiation outcomes, while section 5.4 will the 
main findings related to mediation outcomes. Lastly, in section 5.5 I will discuss the 
main findings of the chapter, and draw some brief conclusions. 
A brief caveat is in order at this point. In spite of the importance of this study for 
conflict management theory and practice (see next chapter), the fact that it is the first 
large-scale comparative study of its kind, means that, by definition, it must be 
considered primarily exploratory and aimed at suggesting further areas of research. It 
cannot possibly be exhaustive. Given the number of variables used in this study (see 
section 4.2), there are a multitude of possible model combinations for both negotiation 
and mediation. Also, it would be feasible to examine negotiation and mediation 
outcomes under numerous conditions, such as by region ( eg, African conflicts versus 
Middle East conflicts), by issue-types (eg, territorial conflicts versus self-
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determination conflicts), or by the time-period (eg, pre-1990 versus post-1990). 
Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine all the potential ramifications, 
and others have already begun the task in mediation studies (see Bercovitch and 
Houston, 1993; Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Houston, forthcoming; Langley, 
1993). 
Rather this study will confine itself to the relatively simple task of testing a few 
explanatory models which identify some important variable combinations which help 
to explain negotiation and mediation outcomes. In the context of the overall thesis, 
therefore, the goal is twofold. First, this chapter seeks to uncover that main factors 
which might go some way towards accounting for negotiation and mediation success. 
Second, it will seek to determine simply whether negotiation and mediation success 
can be attributed to the same set of conditions, or variables. 
5.2 Analysing Relationships: A Multivariate Approach 
Qualitative Data and Multivariate Analysis 
Having identified those factors, or variables, with a significant impact on the 
success or failure of negotiation and mediation, it is now necessary to examine them 
simultaneously, to examine the interactions among them, and to assess their direct and 
indirect impact on negotiation and mediation outcomes. The dependent variable in this 
analysis, the success or failure of negotiation and mediation (outcomes), is inherently 
qualitative (or, categorical) as conceptualised here. Similarly, several of the 
independent variables, such as issue type (tangible versus intangible), conflict type 
(civil versus interstate), and previous relations (friendly versus conflictual), cannot, 
and should not, be measured in quantitative tetms1• 
In other words, in order to examine this data, we need a multivariate method that 
ts appropriate for data of this type. While the analysis of qualitative data has 
traditionally been limited to the use of two-dimensional contingency tables, the 
1 Although some might argue that this type of data can be 'redefmed' as continuous and subjected to 
multivariate techniques such as Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Multiple Regression (MR), I 
reject this practice on the grounds that it has been shown to result in measurement error, bias, and the 
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development of loglinear techniques in the past two decades means that this limitation 
is no longer applicable. Although little used in the field of political science, loglinear 
methodology has attained a much higher profile in psychology, sociology, and 
psychometrics, largely because of the advantages it offers in both theory and 
application over traditional multivariate techniques. 
For example, while it can be acknowledged that regression analysis and analysis 
of variance (ANOV A) are established parametric procedures, they both require 
interval or continuous level data where categories of variables have meaningful 
numerically assigned values (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 308; Kennedy, 1983: 2-
5). While in practice it is common to arbitrarily "redefine" qualitative variables as 
continuous, the resulting "measurement error, bias, and the loss of a significant 
amount of information" (King, 1989: 4) is sufficiently prohibitive to preclude such 
manipulations here (see also King, 1986; Langley, 1993). 
Furthermore, although both regression and ANOV A techniques can deal with 
dichotomous qualitative data by employing linear models, they can only do so if the 
values of cell proportions remain in the range of .25 to .75. Beyond this range, the 
models diverge as multiplicative linear models and are based on asymptotic 
distributions instead of normal distributions (Bercovitch and Houston, ibid; see also 
King, 1986: 681-683; Knoke, 1975). Also, using alternative methods of multivariate 
analysis would require transforming the values for each variable into "dummy 
variable" format (Bercovitch and Houston, ibid; Cohen and Cohen, 1983; Reynolds, 
1977). As mentioned, this practice has been shown to be prohibitively 
disadvantageous. 
Specifically then, loglinear methodology enables the researcher to examme 
multidimensional contingency tables containing qualitative (or categorical) data, such 
as in the data being examined here. Loglinear methods and logit techniques are 
adopted here because first, loglinear model estimation (which indicates the variance 
across all the variables in the model), tends to fit observed qualitative data. Also, it is 
based on the interaction parameters rather than only the main effects in the model, and 
it uses maximum likelihood procedures of estimation based on the geometric means of 
loss of important information (see King, 1989: 4; Langley, 1993: 36-37; King, 1986; O'Grady and 
Medhoff, 1988). 
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the contingency table cells, rather than the traditional least squares measures 
(Bercovitch and Houston, ibid; Agresti, 1990; King, 1986; Knoke, 1975). 
Second, logit analysis, a special form of loglinear model (also called 
asymmetrical models), allows for the testing of multiple hypotheses, the construction 
of causal models, and the ability to test theoretical assumptions (Marascuilo and Busk, 
1987: 452). 
Third, logit procedures also provide the researcher with a number of useful 
supplementary measures that can be utilised to test models and hypotheses 
systematically, and to fmmulate alternative ones where necessary. For example, the 
strength of specific interactions in the model can be measured and tested for statistical 
significance using parameter estimates, or Lambda effects (Bercovitch and Houston, 
1993: 308; Marascuilo and Busk, 1987: 452). This is especially useful for the research 
being conducted here, where numerous possible alternative explanations exist (Harris, 
1990: 302-3). 
In short, the strength and utility of the results, and the model-building and 
hypothesis-testing orientation of loglinear analysis, have considerable intuitive appeal 
(Zinnes, 1991). That is, although loglinear techniques are in many respects analogous 
to ANOV A, because they are more specifically designed to deal with qualitative (or, 
categorical) data, they tend to produce models that are more powerful, and results that 
are more robust in terms of both statistical theory, and the substantive hypotheses 
under investigation (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 678-9; Kennedy 1983: 229-234; 
Langley, 1993). 
Lastly, loglinear methods have been chosen here for reasons of relevance, 
continuity with the format of the data, and a desire to extend the findings of previous 
studies which have employed both this data set and the loglinear methodology (see 
Bercovitch and associates; Houston, forthcoming; Langley, 1993). 
Loglinear Methodology 
The loglinear methodology utilised in this study owes much to the pioneering work 
of Goodman (1970, 1971, 1973). This work was later refined by Kennedy (1983) in 
his introductory text on loglinear analysis for behavioural research. It is also 
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influenced by Agresti (1990), Christensen (1990), Gilbert (1981), Haberman (1978a, 
1978b), Knoke (1975), Knoke and Burke (1980), King (1986), Marascuilo and Busk 
(1987), and Reynolds (1977). The explanation of the method given here will be brief 
and non-technical for two simple reasons. First, more detailed and more technical 
explanations have been described elsewhere (see authors listed above; also, Demaris, 
1992; Langley, 1993). Second, the lack of a technical understanding of these methods 
is no longer a barrier to their use, given that all of the arithmetic procedures have been 
programmed into easy-to-use computer software packages (see Knoke, 1975: 433; 
Marascuilo and Busk, 1987: 454). What is more important is the ability to think 
conceptually, to understand the limitations and interpretations of the data using these 
particular statistical tools (see Zinnes, 1991). 
In the two-dimensional contingency table analysis undertaken in chapter four, the 
objective was to determine if one or both variables had an effect on the distribution of 
values in the other, or to establish that there was no effect at all. In multidimensional 
table analysis, on the other hand, the objectives are far more ambitious. Here the 
researcher is attempting to identify which variables are independent, which variables 
influence other variables, and which pairs or groups of variables have an interactive 
effect on others. In other words, multidimensional table analysis requires identifying 
which variables will make up the multidimensional table, and then identifying the 
interactive effects that have the strongest influence on the data. That is, we need to 
determine which relationships between variables are responsible for the observed 
distribution of the data within the cells of the table. More specifically, in terms of this 
chapter, we want to know which relationships and interactions will influence whether 
a negotiation case, or a mediation case will fall into the success or failure category. 
In general, the loglinear method involves positing causal models of those 
variables and relationships between variables thought to be influential, and then 
testing these models on the data to see how well they fit the actual cell frequencies in 
the table. This is the "goodness-of-fit" test (see below). A hypothetical example will 
help to illuminate the loglinear method2 • Assuming a table consisting of three 
dichotomous variables, A,B, and C, there are four different possible interactions 
2 Adapted from Langley, 1993: 39-42. 
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between the variables which may influence the spread of cases across the cells in the 
table: AB, AC, BC, and ABC (this also assumes that the variables are not mutually 
independent). These interactions can be thought of as sub-tables of the main ABC 
table, and in order to understand how the cases in the ABC table are distributed, we 
need to have all the pieces of information contained in the sub-tables. In loglinear 
analysis, the information contained in a sub-table like (AB) is referred to as a "term", 
an "effect", or an "interaction". 
If, in analysing the data, we came to believe that the linlc between A and B was so 
strong that it determined the distribution of cases across C, then we could posit a 
loglinear model that contained only one piece of information, or, one effect: (AB). If 
this effect was sufficient, then the (AB) model would produce estimated cell 
frequencies for the whole table that fitted the observed cell frequencies fairly well. In 
other words, to predict the values across the ABC table in this case, we would only 
need to know the value of (AB). 
It should be obvious at this stage, that the process just described would become far 
more complicated with the introduction of more variables. Thus, in complex tables 
where there may be forty or fifty possible interactions, it is necessary to identify a few 
important interactions that accurately reproduce cell frequencies across the whole 
table3• In terms of the study here, this means that we need to identify those few pieces 
of information that are necessary for predicting how cases will be distributed across 
all the combinations of antecedent, concurrent, and consequent variables in the 
Contingency model. More importantly, we need to identify which pieces of 
information are required to accurately predict whether a negotiation or mediation 
event will be a success. 
One of the central tasks in loglinear methodology then, is to estimate cell 
frequencies. In loglinear models, the marginal odds provide the basis for estimation, 
rather than the proportion of cases in the table margins. The likelihood of a case 
falling into a given category combination in multidimensional tables like we have 
been describing, is determined by calculating the conditional odds. Due to the nature 
3 An often used solution to the problem of complex tables is the practice of dichotomising, or 
simplifying variables (see Bercovitch and Langley, 1993, for a practical example). While there are 
diverging opinions on whether this practice aids interpretation (see Reynolds, 1977 versus Gillespie, 
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of the estimation procedure, the natural logarithm (log to base e) of the odds is 
preferred to the odds proper. For larger and more complex tables, an iterative 
proportional fitting algorithm is employed to obtain the expected frequencies. That is, 
"the procedure uses the marginal tables fitted by the model to ensure that expected 
cell frequencies sum across the other variables to equal the corresponding observed 
marginal totals" (Knoke and Burke, 1980: 22). In other words, each hypothesised 
interaction in a model, or effect (eg, AB in our example), gives the loglinear 
procedure a set of conditional odds with which to generate expected cell frequencies. 
It follows then, that a model which produces expected frequencies similar to the actual 
observed frequencies, but which contains only a few of the possible effects, or terms, 
must contain the effects which have an important impact across all the variables. 
Another important concept at this stage is the "saturated" model, which is a model 
which includes all the important possible interactive effects between the variables 
being investigated, including the null hypothesis (or, mutual independence). The 
saturated model will reproduce all the observed cell frequencies exactly, but is useless 
for research purposes because it does not identify the variables and interactive effects 
that are the most impmiant. The problem is that in complex tables, models that 
contain many interactive effects between several variables can stmi to produce results 
that are similar to the saturated model. Such models are eschewed in favour of simple 
models. 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is now possible to describe more 
specifically the methodology employed here. Basically, we will be employing two 
related types of models to test the variance in the data between the expected 
frequencies and the actual observed frequencies. First, we will use general loglinear 
models, which are employed to uncover how much of the total variance in the data is 
explained by the model. General loglinear models do not distinguish between 
dependent and independent variables. That is, they are used to explore the dynamics 
between all the variables in a cluster non-specifically. Second, we will employ logit 
models, a form of loglinear model (sometimes called asymmetric models), that are 
used to explore the relationships of a dichotomous dependent variable to one or more 
1978), in this study I take the more cautious approach and try to avoid arbitrarily dichotomising 
variables wherever possible. 
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independent variables. That is, logit models designate one variable as the dependent, 
or response variable, and then indicate how much of the variance in the dependent 
variable is explained by the explanatory variables in the model. In the sub~sections 
below I will first, briefly summarise the statistics used in loglinear analysis. Second, I 
will outline the main methodological procedures involved in each model~ type. 
Loglinear Test Statistics 
There are four test statistics used in loglinear analysis. The first is the Likelihood 
Ratio Chi Square statistic, or L2 (sometimes written G2), which is used to test the 
goodness of fit of both logit and general loglinear models. Goodness of fit is the 
overall agreement between the expected cell frequencies generated by a model, and 
the actual cell frequencies observed in the data4 (Kennedy, 1983: 89-91, 222). A 
model with a good fit will have a relatively small L 2, and a p-value greater than .05 
(Gilbert, 1981: 68; Agresti, 1990: 176). Under normal circumstances, chi-square 
statistics (J:"!) are used as a test of independence in two dimensional contingency table 
analysis, where a significant X2 has a p-value smaller than .05, indicating 
disagreement between the data and the null hypothesis. However, the opposite is the 
case in testing loglinear models, because here a non-significant statistic (p>.05) 
implies that the expected frequencies under the model of independence are reasonably 
close to those observed in the table (Demaris, 1992: 5). That is, becomes a 
"goodness-of-fit" test that indicates agreement between the given model and the data. 
Finally, as the L2 and the degrees of freedom of the model converge, the fit of the 
model can be said to improve. Thus, an ideal model would be one in which L2 equals 
the degrees of freedom, and the significance threshold has been reached (Kennedy, 
1983: 222). 
The second test statistic used in loglinear analysis is the Component L2, which is 
used in follow-up analysis to aid model selection. That is, if the fit of the model is 
poor, then we can revise the model by analysing the strength of individual interactive 
4 A full explanation of the calculation of this statistic, and a discussion of its relationship to the more 
common Pearson Chi Square can be found in Agresti, 1990; Kennedy, 1983; and Marascuilo and Busk, 
1987. 
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effects in our hypothesis, verifying or rejecting each effect until a better fitting model 
emerges. The statistic used in this process is the Component L 2• In other words, the L 2 
statistic, because of its additive properties in terms of the residual L2, can be divided 
into component parts, and as a result, the strength of an individual interactive effect 
can be found by calculating its component L2• Essentially, the Component L2 of an 
effect is the difference in general goodness of fit that results from adding that effect to 
a particular modeL An important effect will considerably improve the fit of the model 
and have a large Component L2 (Langley, 1993: 43-44), while unimportant effects will 
contribute little to the reduction of the residual L 2 (Kennedy, 1983: 91-94). 
In order to calculate the Component L 2 of each effect in the model, we calculate 
the change in residual L 2 (goodness of fit) by comparing a model containing the term 
in question, with the identical model not containing that term. To ensure that we are 
only testing the contribution of that specific term, we must also control for all the 
other terms (Goodman, 1971). Further, in order to test the individual contribution of 
each effect, we move through the model in a stepwise fashion, testing the various 
explanation-response relationships in series (see Kennedy, 1983: 211-223). Using the 
Component L2 in this manner5 offers considerable insights into the relative strength of 
individual interactive effects, but it should be remembered that this process is only a 
guide to revising the hypothesised model. 
The third statistic employed here is the parameter estimate (or A.), which is another 
test for analysing the strength of individual interactive effects within a given model. 
Parameter estimates discern the relative strength of influence of interactive effects, 
and their statistical significance, with important effects having relatively large 
parameter estimates and being significant at the p>.05 level. Via a simple formula, A. 
is transformed into the odds of a case falling into a given combination of categories6 • 
Parameter estimates are not multiplicative, as in traditional path analysis, because as 
has been mentioned, the data is qualitative and does not lend itself to such equations. 
In other words, we cannot multiply paths between variables to estimate the size of 
5 A full example of the calculation of a Component L2 can be seen in Langley, 1983: 63-66. 
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the interpretation ofloglinear A parameter estimates, see Alba, 
1987. Here we only compare the relative size and direction of AS and perform standard Z-tests of 
significance, where a significant A will have a Z-value greater than ±1.96 (Langley, 1993: 45). 
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indirect casual effects (Knoke and Burke, 1980: 45). Within the given model however, 
lambdas are excellent indicators of the relative strength of interactive effects and thus, 
aid in overall model selection. 
The final statistic used in this loglinear analysis is the loglinear R2 measure. 
Basically, this statistic measures the amount of variance explained beyond that which 
can be accounted for in the null hypothesis. That is, it measures the success of the 
model in predicting the probability of the distribution of the data, as compared with 
the mutual independence of the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis is usually written 
as Mo in loglinear analysis. It is analogous to the R2 in multiple regression, but not 
directly equivalenf. In terms of general loglinear models, the calculation of R2 
indicates how much of the total variance in the data has been explained by the model. 
When using a logit model however, which stipulates outcome as the dependent 
variable, the R2 indicates how much of the variance in the dependent variable is 
explained by the explanatory variables in the model. The R2 for model n (Mn) for 
example, is calculated as: 
R2 Mn = L2 (Mo)- L2 (Mn1 
Lz (Mo) 
(i) Procedural Steps for General Log linear Models 
Having outlined the main statistics used in loglinear analysis, it is now possible to 
outline briefly the main procedural steps involved in the analysis of the general 
loglinear model. Here we are attempting to uncover how much of the total variance in 
the data is explained by the model, and we are considering the whole cluster of 
variables without distinguishing between dependent or independent variables. 
While previous studies have employed what may be termed a confirmatory 
approach to model building (see Bercovitch and associates; Houston, forthcoming; 
Langley, 1993), this thesis will take a more exploratory, or, hypothesis-testing 
approach. In other words, rather than posit a single model on theoretical and/or 
empirical grounds and then try to confirm it through goodness-of-fit, Component L2, 
7 For an explanation of its calculation, and a fuller discussion, see Langley, 1993: 45-46; Christensen, 
1990: 150; Haberman, 1978a: 17; and Kennedy, 1983: 228. 
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and lambda tests, this thesis will posit a wide variety of models. Each model will be 
subjected to rigorous testing, and, if necessary, elimination, until a smaller number of 
the most robust models are found. The justification for taking this approach lies in the 
exploratory nature of the study, the dearth of previous research (especially for 
international negotiation) which could suggest a single model to test, and the 
multitude of possible interaction models (given the number of explanatory variables). 
The specific steps followed in this procedure are, first, a test of the null hypothesis 
of mutual independence for the cluster of variables being investigated. In other words, 
we will begin by testing the hypothesis that the variables in the cluster are not related 
and do not interact significantly with each other. 
Second, we will conduct a hiloglinear backward elimination model selection 
search, or, a hierarchicalloglinear analysis procedure. This procedure fits hierarchical 
loglinear models to multidimensional contingency tables using · an iterative 
proportional-fitting algorithm. The backward selection process starts with a saturated 
model containing all the possible interactions between the variables, and then removes 
those that do not satisfy the criterion for remaining in the model until the best-fitting 
and most parsimonious model is obtained. At the first step, for example, the effect 
whose removal results in the least significant change in the overall model's L2 is 
eliminated, provided that the observed significance level is larger than the criterion for 
remaining in the model. A wide variety of variable combinations are tested in this 
manner. 
The third step involves testing the individual terms, or, interactions between the 
variables, through an analysis of the Component L2 statistic, which tests the 
significance of the hypothesised terms and the non-significance of the null-
hypothesised terms. On the basis of this analysis, a number of hypothesised models 
containing the most significant terms are proposed, tested for their goodness of fit, 
revised, and re-tested. 
Fourth, every model generated by the hiloglinear procedure and the Component L 2 
process is rigorously assessed on the basis of its theoretical validity ( eg, many models 
reach statistical acceptability but make little sense theoretically), its goodness of fit, its 
Component L 2s, table analysis ( eg, many models have large numbers of missing cells 
or skewed cell count distributions, plus abnormal residuals), and its lambda parameter 
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estimates. Only those that pass the tests of theoretical validity, parsimony, and 
statistical rigour are retained. 
·1 . . Testoqhe n'ull hypotliesis (mtttual independence ofthe var~ables ) . 
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Table 5.1 Summary of Procedural Steps for General Loglinear Models 
The last step in generalloglinear model testing involves calculating the R2 for each 
of the final models. This statistic indicates the amount of variability in the data that is 
explained by the model. That is, the R2 will measure the success of the model in 
predicting the probability of the distlibution of the data, as compared with the mutual 
independence of the null hypothesis. A summary of these procedural steps is given in 
Table 5.1. 
(ii) Procedural Steps for Logit Models 
The preceding steps identify a small number of models which best explain the 
important interactions in the cluster as a whole. The next stage of the analysis 
involves evaluating the terms or interactions which relate specifically to outcomes. 
Specifically, this involves performing a logit analysis in which negotiation and 
mediation outcomes are specified as the dependent variable. 
The first procedural step in this process is testing the null hypothesis. This is 
achieved by testing the null logit model, where outcome is hypothesised to be 
independent of the other valiables in the cluster. 
155 Chapter 5 
The second step is positing a multivariate logit hypothesis, or logit model, for each 
finalloglinear model arrived at through the steps described above. In other words, we 
will posit a model with negotiation and mediation outcomes as the dependent variable. 
These logit models are then tested for their ability to reproduce the observed 
distribution of cases in the dependent variable, that is, their goodness of fit using the 
L 2 statistic. 
· 1 .. Te'st ; ofth~ :rtulllogii;.modeF(eg, outcom;e is iridep~n.dent ofthe other . 
· · vm}a1Jl~s )~ ; · · · ·· · . 
. ·2 .. Co'rtsthi~t l~git n\O:clels fortliebesLg~neralloglineatmo'dels. Te~t · each for 
''go{jailess :otfifusi~g zt · · · ·. · · · · · · ·· · ·· 
.. .. 
. • • . . . i. . 
. : . . 
. 3: Calculation of R2' for firiallogit models. 
Table 5.2 Summary of Procedural Steps for Logit Models 
Third, the R2 for each logit model is calculated to indicate the amount of 
variability in outcome, in relation to the independent variables, that is explained by 
the model. A summary of these steps is given in Table 5.2. 
The techniques described above allow us to compare and narrow down the range 
of potentially acceptable models. The final models we select must conform to a 
number of important criteria. First, they should be parsimonious. That is, each model 
should contain the smallest number of terms, or interactions, avoiding complex 
individual terms (higher-order interactions) where possible, to aid in interpretation. 
The principle of parsimony then, is based on "fitting the model containing the fewest 
terms which does not yield a statistically significant lack of fit" (Kotze, 1982: 196). 
Second, the final models should have acceptable goodness of fit. In other words, they 
should be models which produce expected cell frequencies that fit the observed data 
reasonably well. Lastly, the models should be plausible, able to stand up to 
substantive evaluation, and must not distort or sacrifice theoretical meaning. 
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Caveat 
A problem that emerges from the analysis of the data utilised here, is that due to 
the size of the data set, the nature of most of the variables being examined, and the 
complex interactions hypothesised in the models, large numbers of empty cells 
(observed and expected cases equal zero) were sometimes encountered. The 
implications of this are that the accuracy of some of the measures employed here may 
be impaired. The degrees of freedom and parameter estimates, for example, may be 
over or under-estimated in some cases, and the best indication for determining good 
models may in fact, be a comparison of the observed and expected frequencies and 
residuals. These are carefully considered in the table analysis of each model. As such, 
the final models suggested by the multivariate analysis can only ever be suggestive of 
the relative strength of interactions. 
Furthermore, due to the large number of models and variable clusters being tested 
here, the specific details of the independent measures, such as parameter effects, will 
only be given where they highlight an essential observation. However, it can be 
assumed that all these measures were evaluated in the analysis, and in the cluster 
models presented. 
The size of the data set, and the number and complexity of explanatory variables, 
also meant that the memory of the computer being used was put under strain8• In other 
words, both the number of variables being tested and the complexity of the inter-
variable interactions were, by necessity, restricted in the models tested. An often 
employed tactic for overcoming this problem is dichotomising the independent 
variables (see Bercovitch and Langley, 1993), but this would have meant running the 
risk of compromising their meaning and value as explanatory variables. In any case, 
many variables have already been collapsed (on the basis of logic determined by 
theoretical indicators and numbers of cases present) to facilitate a clear analysis. 
Finally, the loglinear analysis was rendered more manageable by dividing the 
variables into cluster sets, and considering each separately. The most significant 
8 For this reason, and because larger tables would have been overly cumbersome in any case, the 
maximum number of variables tested in any single model was five. 
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variables from each cluster were then combined in an overall model9 • Specifically, the 
variables were considered in terms of the Contingency Model (see section 3.2), which 
clustered them as: (i) dispute characteristics variables; (ii) party characteristics 
variables; and (iii) process characteristics variables. Methodologically then, there is an 
inherent trade-off in empirical analysis where the analyst has to be conscious not to 
randomly manipulate variables simply to achieve a statistically stronger model (see 
Houston, forthcoming). 
5.3 Model Building and Testing: Negotiation 
In this section, I present the results of the multivariate analysis of negotiation 
outcomes. Each cluster of variables is considered in turn, as specified in the 
Contingency Model (see section 3.2), before a combined cluster analysis is described. 
Although the multivariate analysis is guided by the results of the bivariate analysis in 
chapter four, initially all the variables in the original cluster will be examined, for the 
reasons outlined in section 5.1. Namely, bivariate contingency tables may obscure 
effects which are only obvious in multidimensional contingency table analysis. If 
some variables were to be excluded, for example, important three-way interactions 
might remain undiscovered, and important models weakened. 
I Dispute Variables Cluster 
The dispute variables under investigation here and their notation are summarised 
in Table 5.3. The bivariate analysis in chapter four revealed that fatalities (F), 
intensity (I), and issue complexity (C) were particularly important predictors in 
explaining negotiation outcomes (0). As explained in section 5.2, I begin the analysis 
by conducting a test of the null hypothesis, or model of mutual independence. In other 
words, we are examining the hypothesis that the variables in Table 5.3 are not related. 
The null hypothesis will be named DMo (for Dispute Model o), and is expressed 
using the loglinear notation: 
9 As a check against any possible bias, numerous models involving variables across cluster sets were 
also tested. Furthermore, numerous combined cluster models involving non-significant variables were 
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DMo = (D, F, I, Y, C, 0) 
There are no interactive terms in the null hypothesis model, and if the estimated cell 
frequencies produced by DMo fit the observed data well, we would have to accept 
the conclusion that these variables are completely independent of each other. 
Variable: *: 
· -: . : .'-: ·.' 
buratio:ri 
Fatalities · 
n~t~n,siw 
issu~ · 'I'ype . 
Iss11e '.CZ<:>rtiP~E:xity: 
· Notation: :. 
{D) 
(F). 
(I) 
(Y) 
ccn 
*Primary issue was excluded from the multivariate analysis because of doubts over its statistical utility - see chapter four, 
section 4.3. 
Table 5.3 Dispute Characteristics Variables Used in Negotiation Multivariate 
Analysis 
It is useful to reiterate exactly what a loglinear test of model DMo entails. The 
procedure first constructs a multidimensional contingency table by cross-tabulating 
the vatiables in the cluster (see Table 5.3). The first model tested against this table, 
model DMo, contains only the following pieces of information: (D, F, I, Y, C, 0). At 
this stage it contains no interactive terms, such as (DO), for example. The loglinear 
procedure uses these pieces of information, essentially the marginal distribution of the 
individual variables, to estimate frequencies for all the cells in the table. The degree to 
which model DMo accurately reproduces the actual observed cell fi·equencies is 
called the goodness of fit of that model, and loglinear goodness of fit is measured by 
the L2 statistic. 
A loglinear test of the hypothesised model DMo gives a goodness of fit of: 
L 2DMo = 1625.5720 DF = 11 p = .0000 
Remembering that the criteria for acceptable goodness of fit are a relatively small L2 
approaching the degrees of freedom (df), and a p-value greater than .05, it is obvious 
that the null hypothesis does not fit the data well. In other words, we can reject the 
hypothesis that these variables are unrelated. 
also tested as a check. None of the results gave any reason to alter the established procedure. 
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Table 5.4 Component L2s for Dispute Variables Cluster (Negotiation) 
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The next step involves testing a series of interactive models which hypothesise 
relationships between the variables. First, we conduct a hiloglinear search of the 
numerous possible variable combinations10, producing dozens of potential explanatory 
models. Each model is then examined for its theoretical rigor, its goodness of fit, the 
strength of its individual interactions, and its lambda coefficients. The tables produced 
by each model are also examined for missing cells, heavily skewed cell distributions, 
and large standardised residuals. 
In an adjunct process, the Component L2s of terms between the variables are also 
examined'' (see Table 5.4), and models including the most significant terms are 
hypothesised and then tested for their goodness of fit. These models are in tum, 
carefully examined for their theoretical acceptability, lambda coefficients, cell 
distributions, and their residuals. Models which make it through this rigorous 
examination process are then tested for their R2, before being subjected to a logit 
analysis. The best models from the dispute variables cluster are shown in Table 5.5. 
All the models presented here are useful for explaining the amount of variance in the 
10 All variable combinations included the dependent variable, negotiation outcomes (0). Furthermore, 
for reasons of parsimony and computer memory, the number of variables considered in any one 
combination did not exceed five. Also, variable combinations which did not make intuitive theoretical 
sense were not tested. 
11 Calculating Component L 2s entails performing a sequence oflogit analyses. A logit analysis is a 
specialised loglinear analysis in which one variable is designated as the dependent variable. 
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data, as can be seen in the high R2 scores. For example, the (FO), (CFI), and (CIO) 
terms in M2 explain 99% of the variance across the model compared to the null 
hypothesis. 
An examination of Tables 5.4 and 5.5 confilms the importance of issue 
complexity, and to a lesser extent, the number of fatalities, as explanatory variables in 
predicting negotiation outcomes. Issue complexity in particular, has a high 
Component L2 combined with a p-value smaller than .05. It also appears in numerous 
terms in the best models shown in Table 5.5. This is interesting, but not necessarily 
surprising, as the bivariate analysis in chapter four revealed that most negotiations 
occur in low intensity conflicts between relatively similar and friendly states. It is 
logical then, that one ofthe most important determinants,ofthe negotiation outcome is 
not just intensity, fatalities, or duration, but rather the level of complication of the 
issues being discussed. As the level of intensity rises to extreme levels, negotiation 
usually breaks down and third parties have to intervene in any case. In short, dispute 
complexity, which in any event is associated with lengthy, protracted conflicts and 
high fatalities, appears to be incompatible with negotiation success. 
· Madel 
. Drvro, · 
0, Di F;J;.Y;.C 
Ml . .. 
, .DI, IF, J?F; H); ' 
·no 
·· .. · 
M2 
. FO CFICIO 
. , . . i " -· . 
M3 ,·· .... ·. 
·m,pp,:¢IO ' 
. '., . 
Goodness of 
·· ·FitL2 · 
. 16f~.5720 •. 
. :21.4)299 
10.22524 
. 25'.39845> 
, ~~,Fb,, CIJF ' .•.. ·. • Z~.l0540 
MS 
CO, CIO, :PIO 24.2158 
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. R2 . 
313 
. 30' 
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Table 5.5 A Test of the Goodness ofFit ofDispute Variables Models in Explaining 
Negotiation Outcomes 
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Table 5.5 also reveals that there are a number of interactions which do not 
include the dependent variable, negotiation outcomes (0). That is, there are a number 
of important terms among the independent variables. For example, there is a clearly 
demonstrated, and theoretically understandable, relationship between duration and 
intensity (DI), duration and fatalities (DF), and intensity and fatalities (IF). As a 
conflict drags on, there likely to be a mounting fatality count, and the intensity of the 
fighting may increase as positions harden and the likelihood of an early settlement 
recedes. There is also an important association between issue complexity, fatalities, 
and intensity (CFI). It is logical that conflicts characterised by numerous grievances 
by the parties will be the most intensely fought. 
Interestingly, although intensity is not a significant term on its own (see the IO 
term in Table 5.4), it emerges as an important term in conjunction with issue 
complexity. The (CIO) interaction has a strong Component L2 and is present in M2, 
M3, and MS. When both issue complexity and intensity are low, the chances for 
successful negotiation rise. Conversely, as both issue complexity and intensity rise, 
the chances of successful negotiation decreases. What emerges from this analysis is 
that as the conflict intensity rises, this encourages further hostility and contentious 
behaviour, which diminishes the likelihood of negotiation agreement (see Pruitt, 
1981). The model M5 contains both the (CO) and (CIO) terms. It is relatively 
parsimonious, and the interactions contained ih it explain 87% of the variance 
compared to the null hypothesis for this cluster. In other words, M5 is a good 
explanatory model of the dynamics of the dispute variables with negotiation 
outcomes. Unfortunately, the computer was unable to calculate logit models for these 
loglinear models, because some combinations of the independent variables produced 
cell counts that amounted to zero. 
II Party Characteristics Variable Cluster 
The party characteristics variables being investigated here are summarised in 
Table 5.6. It will be remembered that the bivariate analysis highlighted the power 
differential (P) between the parties, alignment (L), homogeneity (M), and the 
intervention of additional parties (A), as being the most important predictors of 
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negotiation outcomes. As before, we begin by testing the hypothesis that all these 
variables are unrelated. The null hypothesis model (PMo - Parties Model) for this 
cluster gives a goodness of fit of: 
DF = 636 p = .0000 
The ability of the null hypothesis to reproduce the observed cell frequencies shows a 
particularly poor fit. Thus, we can proceed with a hiloglinear search for appropriate 
models, and the model building and testing procedure based on Component L 2s . 
. Variable:: .··· 
·- . .. - . 
• Povi6tJJifferentiaL . . .. · · ·. 
·· Politi~~rs·y~teni ~Simharity, .•. 
Homogeneity · · · ·· 
Addttiol1~1.Parties .·· ·· 
Alignment 
• Previous .Relations 
···· .(P} 
(S) 
(I\1) 
(A) 
(L). 
(R) 
Table 5.6 Party Characteristics Variables Used in Negotiation Multivariate Analysis 
The breakdown of Component L 2s for party characteristics variables can be seen 
in Table 5.7. The most important interactions to emerge are the power differential 
(PO) between the parties, and alignment (LO). Both of these terms have relatively 
high L2 values, and are significant at the p<.05 level. Similarly, nearly all of the three-
way interactions are significant, and are included in hypothesised models for testing. 
The finalloglinear models which survived the examination process can be seen in 
Table 5.8. All of the models show excellent goodness of fit, are parsimonious, and the 
high R2s indicate how useful they are for explaining the variance in each model. While 
logit models could not be computed for Ml and M4 for statistical reasons, M3 and M4 
show excellent goodness of fit. For M2, the logit R2 of .05 indicates that the (LO) and 
(ASO) terms explain 50% of the variance within this model. For M3, the (PO) and 
(PRO) terms explain 33% of the variance compared to the null hypothesis. 
As in the dispute characteristics cluster, this cluster reveals a number of important 
interactions between the independent variables. The (LPA) term in Ml, the (LSA) 
term in M2, the (PRA) term in M3, and the (PRS) term in M4 suggest that the number 
of intervening additional parties does depend on the alignment, power differential, and 
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previous relations of the disputing parties. Also, they suggest that political system 
similarity is often related to shared alignment and friendly previous relations. 
Component Effect · 
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Table 5.7 Component L 2s for Party Variables Cluster (Negotiation) 
An examination of both Table 5.7 and 5.8, and the lambda parameter estimates 
for the terms in the models, reveals how important the power disparity between the 
parties is for explaining negotiation outcomes. In particular, negotiation success and 
low power disparity are closely associated. This makes intuitive and theoretical sense, 
because in situations of high power disparity, the· stronger party will be disinclined to 
give in to demands from the weaker party. Either that, or the stronger party will be 
unwilling to enter into talks at all, preferring to pursue its claims unilaterally. 
Another important variable in this cluster is alignment (L). The Component L2 for 
alignment is very high, and it shows up strongly in the (LSO) and (LAO) terms. An 
analysis of the (LO) lambda parameter coefficients reveals that there is a strong 
association between negotiation success and the parties sharing alignment (A-=.24484, 
Z=2. 72640). Parties that share alignment obviously share a number of interests and 
orientations towards international affairs. Furthermore, participation in shared 
intergovernmental organisation, such as collective defence organisations, provides 
important contacts. Conflicts between Greece and Turkey have often been mediated 
through NATO offices, an organisation that both states participate in. An underlying 
164 Chapter 5 
bed of common interests, plus regular contacts for communication, are vital for 
effective conflict management. 
:Go.odness of P~value % Explanatoiy 
.Fit L2 R2 
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':P; s,M;A,L,.R, 2846.7298 636 
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Table 5.8 A Test of the Goodness ofFit ofParty Variables Models in Explaining 
Negotiation Outcomes 
III Process Variables Cluster 
. J3% 
The process variables being examined in this section are summarised in Table 5.9. 
The bivariate analysis in chapter four revealed a significant association between 
environment (E), initiator (N), and negotiator rank (K), and negotiation outcomes (0). 
We begin in the usual fashion with a test of the null hypothesis, or model of 
independence. The null model (RMO - pRocess Model) for this cluster shows a 
goodness of fit of: 
L 2RMQ = 614.8549 DF = 277 p = .0000 
This is a particularly poor fit, and indicates that we can reject the hypothesis that the 
variables are unrelated. Thus, we continue in the usual fashion with a hiloglinear 
search for suitable explanatory models, and a model-building and testing procedure 
based on an analysis of Component L 2s. 
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Tiniillg 
•, Initiator , , 
: Ehvirdtm:lent 
Hostilities 
Negod;ator Rank 
~ Notation: 
(T} 
(N) 
(E) , 
(H) 
(K) 
Chapter 5 
Table 5.9 Process Characteristics Variables Used in Negotiation Multivariate 
Analysis 
The breakdown of Component L2s for process variables can be seen in Table 5.10. 
In keeping with the previous bivariate analysis, the table reveals that both timing and 
the presence of hostilities remain as insignificant explanatory factors. Both have very 
low Component L 2 scores, and neither comes close to a statistically significant p-
value. Initiator, environment, and negotiator rank remain important explanatory 
variables, and there are numerous three-way interactions which show significant 
Component L 2 scores. 
The most important models to emerge from the analysis of process variables are 
shown in Table 5.11. Each model shows excellent goodness of fit and has a high R2, 
indicating that the interactions within each model explain a great deal of the variance. 
Furthermore, the strong logit R2s for models M2-4, indicate that the terms which 
specify the dependent variable, negotiation outcomes, explain most of the variance in 
the model. For example, the (NEO) term in model M4 explains 67% of the variance in 
the model over and beyond that explained by the null hypothesis. 
Tables 5.10 and 5.11 show that nearly all the variables and their terms in this 
cluster are significant for negotiation outcomes. As already noted, both timing and the 
presence of hostilities remain largely insignificant in terms of their Component L 2 
scores, although timing is significant in the (TKO) term, and hostilities is marginally 
significant in the (EHO) term. Initiator, environment, and negotiator rank, on the other 
hand, are consistently significant variables. This reinforces the findings of the 
bivariate analysis. The presence of the tenns (EO), (TKO), and (NEO) in the models 
in Table 5.11 reinforce how important these variables are for explaining negotiation 
outcomes. Interestingly, while timing (T) is not significant in terms of its individual 
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Component L2, it emerges as an important variable in tandem with other factors in the 
models (see Table 5.11 - M1, M2, and M4). 
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Table 5.10 ComponentL2s for Process Variables Cluster (Negotiation) 
.. 
The strength ofprocess variables comes as no surprise, as it is what occurs during 
the negotiation that has the most direct impact on the outcome. While background 
factors such as the nature of the dispute, or the characteristics of the parties, can 
predispose the attitudes of the negotiators before they arrive, what occurs during the 
actual talks will have the most direct effect on their outcome. Clearly, the initiator of 
the talks ( eg, as an indication of the overall willingness to bargain peacefully), the 
environment in which it takes place ( eg, a secure and neutral setting versus a 
potentially dangerous one), and the comparative rank of the actual negotiators (eg, 
similar versus dissimilar officials) will be vital. The models indicate that a neutral 
environment and shared high-ranking negotiators are conducive to successful 
negotiations. Perhaps the most important variable however, is conflict management 
initiation. When both parties are eager to settle their differences through talks, there is 
a strong association with negotiation success and one party's territory as the 
negotiation environment (A-=.16326, Z=2.22194). It seems the political will to settle 
conflicts peacefully can overcome a multitude of obstacles. 
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Table 5.11 A Test ofthe Goodness ofFit ofProcess Variables Models in Explaining 
Negotiation Outcomes 
IV Combined Variables Cluster 
In this section, the variables with the strongest effects from each individual cluster 
are combined in a final overall cluster, and then examined for their effects on 
negotiation outcomes. Variables are chosen primarily on the basis of their significant 
Component L2 scores, but are also evaluated on the basis of their contribution to 
significant three-way Component L2s and explanatory models. From the first cluster, 
dispute characteristics, only issue complexity (C) emerged as a consistently strong 
variable12 • The second cluster, party characteristics, revealed that the power difference 
(P) between the parties and their alignment (L) were the most significant variables. 
The third cluster, process factors, produced three significant variables which will be 
used in the combined cluster analysis: conflict management initiator (N), environment 
(E), and negotiator rank (K). The combined variables cluster is summarised in Table 
5.12. 
12 In keeping with the necessity of checking that this variable was indeed the most important variable 
from the dispute characteristics cluster, the fatalities (F) variable was also tested in the initial combined 
cluster because it had a marginally significant Component L2 score (p=.0778). It was found to be 
unimportant. A similar procedure was followed for each cluster of variables. 
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Because all these variables were statistically robust in their association with 
negotiation outcomes, an analysis of the Component L 2s for all the two-way and three-
way interactions revealed that they were all highly significant at the p<.05 level. For 
this reason, there was no value in presenting a Component L2 table. Furthermore, a 
large number of useful models were found which explained the dynamics of the 
variables in this cluster. Some of the most satisfactory models are summarised in 
Table 5.13. They all show excellent goodness of fit, high explanatory R2s, and most 
have significant logit R2s. In other words, all these variables and their interactions are 
extremely useful in explaining negotiation outcomes . 
V .. ·, .,:'.'' .. b. l''· ·,· '· ana ,.e: . 
. ·: ' ., ··.: , . . ,, 
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Table 5.12 Combined Variables Used in Negotiation Multivariate Analysis 
An analysis of Table 5.13 confirms how important process variables, such as 
initiator and environment, are for explaining negotiation outcomes. The (NEO) term 
in particular, is consistently strong. An analysis of the lambda parameter estimates for 
this interaction reveals a significant association between negotiation success, a neutral 
environment, and one party initiation (A-=.16772, Z=2.12740). There is also a strong 
association between negotiation success, both party initiation, and one party's tenitory 
as the negotiation environment (A-=.16326, Z=2.22194). Finally, negotiation success is 
strongly associated with both parties having primary decision-makers at the talks 
(A-=.23749, Z=2.96062). In other words, these findings confirm what was learnt in the 
process cluster analysis, namely, that the actual face-to-face phase of the negotiation is 
the most significant, and factors at this stage have the most direct influence on the 
overall outcome on the talks. 
However, the combined cluster analysis also demonstrates the importance of non-
process, or contextual variables. There is a strong association between successful 
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negotiation, shared alignment, and a low power differential (A-=.35431, 2=2.51406). 
Shared alignment, as already discussed in the party cluster analysis, can mean shared 
views and opportunities for discussions. This provides an underlying bed of common 
interests which can form the basis for initiating talks, as well as multiple forums in 
which to hold them. In terms of the capabilities of the primary disputants, low or 
medium power disparity has two distinct advantages. First, it means that neither side 
can dominate the other, thus removing one potential obstacle to the talks. Second, 
states with similar power or capabilities normally share interests and outlooks on a 
variety of issues. 
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Table 5.13 A Test of the Goodness of Fit of Combined Variables Models in 
Explaining Negotiation Outcomes 
The other contextual variable which is important for negotiation IS Issue 
complexity. The data indicates that negotiation success is strongly associated with 
low-medium issue complexity (A-=-.22693, Z=-2.92176). Obviously, the simpler the 
overall issue package, the easier an overall agreement can be reached. This is 
especially true in situations where some of the other success-enhancing factors are 
present, such as low power differential, similar alignment, and willingness to 
negotiate peacefully. 
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As a whole, the combined variables cluster analysis allows us to describe the most 
ideal conditions under which negotiation is likely to be successful. Negotiation will 
most likely be successful in conflicts where the issues are fairly straightforward and 
clear-cut, and where the parties share alignment and there is no great power disparity 
between them. If this is combined with talks that are entered into willingly by both 
sides, and which are held in a neutral environment between high-ranking officials, 
they constitute the greatest chance of success between the variables investigated in 
this thesis. 
5.4 Model Building and Testing: Mediation 
In this section, I describe the results of the multivariate analysis of mediation 
outcomes. As before, each cluster of variables is considered in tum, as specified in the 
Contingency Model, before a combined cluster analysis of the most significant 
variables is presented. Again, while the multivariate analysis is guided by the results 
of the bivariate analysis in chapter four, all variables are initially included. 
I Dispute Variables Cluster 
The dispute variables being investigated here~ and their notation, are summarised 
in Table 5.14. In the bivariate analysis, fatalities (F) and intensity (I) were found to be 
significantly associated with mediation outcomes. In this section, we will test whether 
that association remains strong in the presence of other dispute variables. Following 
established procedure, we begin by testing the hypothesis that none of the variables in 
this cluster are related. The independence model, DMo, gives a goodness of fit of: 
L 2 DMo == 247.3337 DF 46 p .0000 
As the L2 does not nearly approach the degrees of freedom, and the p-value is smaller 
than .05, it is clear that the null hypothesis does not fit the data well and we can 
proceed with our analysis of various hypothesised models. 
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Variable: * . · 
-<:-.",,:;--· 
· Durati()n . 
·Fatalities 
'·'·· . .... 
' Inte11sity •· 
Issue Type 
· Issue Cdrr,iplexity 
. . . ... .. 
Notation: 
(D) 
(F) 
(I} 
·(Y) 
(C) 
Chapter 5 
*Primary issue was excluded from the multivariate analysis because of doubts over its statistical utility - see chapter four, 
section 4.3. 
Table 5.14 Dispute Characteristics Variables Used in Mediation Multivariate 
Analysis 
The next step involves a hiloglinear search of numerous variable combinations, 
plus a simultaneous analysis of Component L2s and some resulting models. Each 
model and its tables are examined for their theoretical consistency, goodness of fit, 
lambda coefficients, cell distributions, and standardised residuals. The Component L 2s 
of the most important interactions within the dispute variables cluster can be seen in 
Table 5.15 . The final models which best describe and explain the variance within the 
dispute characteristics cluster can be seen in Table 5 .16. These models have excellent 
goodness of fit, and the interactions within each model explain a great deal of the 
variance. For example, in M3 and M4 the (CYO) and (IYO) terms respectively, 
explain 88% and 90% ofthe variance. 
Component Effect 
DO 
FO• 
·. ro · 
YO 
co . 
CDO 
ocF6 . 
· •·· ·:>:Crb. 
·· b~q· 
··: g~~ : .. 
';py() : .. ; 
.. jyQ'• 
ComgonentL2 
h7273 
31.2354 
16.5459 
.4291 
4j439 
8.9389 
56:3420 . 
29':6084 ·. 
J2.6424 ' 
.J7:7256 
3;3290 · 
45.9540 
40.5046 . 
·DF · P~vahie 
2 .4216 
2 :oo·oo 
2 ~ 0003 . 
1 .5121 · 
2 .1140 
8 .3475 
' 8. .opoo > 
8. :.0002 
8 .0000 
8 ~0234 
5 
.. 
.64~4 
5 .oooo. 
.0000 
Table 5.15 Component L2s for Dispute Variables Cluster (Mediation) 
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A careful examination of Tables 5.15 and 5.16 confirms what was learned in the 
bivariate analysis in chapter four, namely, that fatalities and intensity are the most 
important variables for explaining mediation success within this cluster. This is not 
surprising, as the number of fatalities and the intensity of a conflict usually reflects the 
level ofhostility between the parties (Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 688). Often there 
is a direct relationship between hostility and intensity, whereby a rise in one ( eg, 
hostility) wiil result in a rise in the other (eg, fatalities and intensity). We have already 
discussed how hostility can lead to a breakdown in talks, or the inability to reach 
agreement (see chapter four). Where hostility is low, mediation is often unnecessary. 
Where hostility is high, on the other hand, mediators have to work extremely hard to 
facilitate communication and engender agreement. 
Another important observation from these tables is that while issue complexity is 
not a significant variable on its own, it gains in significance in tandem with other 
variables. For example, the (CIO) term is significant in terms of its Component L2 (see 
Table 5.15), and emerges as a strong explanatory interaction in Ml and M2. This 
again, is not surprising, as the level of issue complication will be highly relevant to 
the outcome, especially if the conflict is also characterised by high intensity. 
Model 
DM() 
D; F, I, Y, C, 0. 
Ml . 
· ro, po; rn, cro; 
.DIO 
M2· . 
. TO; CIO,DIO 
··M3 
· cD; CYQ. 
. M4 .. . 
. ·ID;JYO'' 
Goodness of .DF P-value 
< . ·. 2 
· · , .,Frt L. 
;2473337 .46 
·.' ·. 
16:7329 20 ·.670 
.716 . 
. ·.· .779 . 
390 . 
Table 5.16 A Test ofthe Goodness ofFit ofDispute Variables Models in 
Explaining Mediation Outcomes 
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II Party Characteristics Variables Cluster 
The party characteristics vmiables examined in this section are summarised in 
Table 5.17. It will be remembered that only power differential (P) and previous 
relations (R) were significantly associated with mediation outcomes in the bivariate 
analysis. We begin with a test of the null hypothesis, which gives a goodness of fit of: 
DF = 636 p = .0000 
This is a particularly poor fit, indicating the inability of the null hypothesis to 
reproduce the observed cell frequencies. Thus, we can reject the notion that these 
variables are unrelated, and confidently proceed with a hiloglinear search for 
appropriate models, and the model-building and testing procedure based on 
Component L2s. 
.· Power Differential . . . . 
· Politlcal';System Sin#larity 
·· Hornog~neity • ·•· · · 
• AdditiohatParties 
Alignn;eht . . . . . . 
Previous<Relations · · 
.Notation: 
(P) 
(S) 
.(M) . 
(A) 
(L) 
(R) 
Table 5.17 Party Characteristics Variables Used in Mediation Multivariate Analysis 
The breakdown of Component L 1s for the party characteristics cluster can be seen 
in Table 5 .18, while the most theoretically and statistically rigorous models to emerge 
from the evaluation process can be seen in Table 5.19. Both of these tables reveal that 
power differential (P) and previous relations (R) remain, as in the bivariate analysis, 
extremely significant in explaining mediation outcomes. 
Furthermore, there are numerous three-way terms that include these variables 
which are also significant. It is not surprising that these variables emerge as important. 
In the first case, we have already mentioned how managing the parties' relationship is 
one of the mediator's primary tasks (see chapter three). A large power differential 
between the parties can prove an almost insurmountable obstacle to successful 
mediation, while similarity of capabilities may provide an overlapping set of interests. 
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Furthermore, the data underlines how important the parties' previous relationship is to 
the success of mediation. There is a strong correlation between mediation success and 
friendly relations (A-=.275109, Z=-"1.91136). 
.· PO 
.so 
HO 
AO 
·Lo.·, .. ·. 
'• RSd 
' ·RAO 
}?AO 
.MAO 
Component L2 
: 
10.6452 
l.l862 
.5626 
3.4453 
:2.7052 
9.5409 
· 21 :1191 
'5,9413 
21.9596 
14A72S 
153557 
15.1702 
29.7804 
10.3691 
DF F'-value 
.2 .0049 
1 .2761 
2 .7548 
1 ··.0634 
2 :,2586· 
2 .0085 
8 .0085 · 
5 .3120 • 
. 0005 
.. 
5 : 
... 
8 .0019 
5 .0089 
5 .0097 
5 .0000 
5 .0654 
Table 5.18 Component L2s for Party Variables Cluster (Mediation) 
Interestingly, while alignment is not statistically significant in the bivariate 
context, in the presence of other variables, it becomes an important indicator. For 
example, there is a strong association between mediation success, shared alignment, 
and no additional intervening parties (A.=-.28348, Z=-2.38149), and a moderate 
association between mediation success, shared alignment, and low power differential 
(A-=.214150, Z=l.81255). Clearly, shared alignment also provides an overlapping set 
of interests which the mediator can exploit. Lastly, there is also an association 
between mediation success, no additional intervening parties, and both parties being 
ethnically homogenous (A.=- .14015, z=-2.17737). In other words, complicating 
factors, such as multiple warring parties, and highly fragmented disputants, decreases 
the likelihood of successful conflict management. 
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ModeL 
PMQ' 
' I\ S; M;:A;.L, R, 
· 0 
Ml 
Goodness of 
. FitL2 . 
LPA; LAO, PAO . . 12'.00035 
.. :, 
, M2 ... ·.· , 
RO; LAO,:LRA 13.49554 . 
.10.96382 
. ·:: , ... 
. ">:; -_ 
. . . . 
:M4 ··· _: . __ :·: ___ ·· -, 
.. . . 
MAO,MSA . '10:56035 
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DF P-value % Explanatory . 
Rz . 
.0000 
..151 . 95% • 
. .. 10 . 
.197 .95% 
99% 
. 94% 
Table 5.19 A Test of the Goodness ofFit of Party Variables Models in 
Explaining Mediation Outcomes 
III Process Variables Cluster 
The variables under investigation in this cluster are summarised in Table 5.20. In 
the bivariate analysis, all of these variables were statistically significant, except for the 
presence or absence ofhostilities (H). Procedurally, we begin with a test of the mutual 
independence hypothesis. A test of the goodness of fit of the null hypothesis model 
gives a reading of: 
L 2RMQ = 962.6077 DF = 420 p = .0000 
In other words, we can reject the notion that these variables are unrelated, and proceed 
with a hiloglinear search, and a Component L2 analysis. A breakdown of the 
Component L 2s for process variables, and a summary of the best models to emerge 
from the analysis, can be seen in Tables 5.21 and 5.22 respectively. 
Upon examining these two tables, it quickly becomes obvious just how important 
process variables are in determining mediation outcomes. As with the bivariate 
analysis, every term except for the (HO) term is highly significant and shows a strong 
Component L2 • This is not surprising, given that mediation is essentially a contingent 
behaviour (see chapter three). Also, process factors refer to those aspects and activities 
in the conflict management which are sequentially closest to the outcome. It is 
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reasonable that what occurs during the actual talks will significantly affect how the 
talks end . 
. Variable:>* 
Tilning , .· 
Initiator: ·· 
Envir<)rtment 
H~stilities . . . . ·· 
Neg(>tiatot'Rank . 
: ,· 
Notation: 
c (f) 
. '(l'J) 
·. (E) 
(H) 
·(K) ' 
*Mediation strategies were excluded from the analysis in order to retain a set of variables that were directly comparable with 
negotiation outcomes. 
Table 5.20 Process Characteristics Variables Used in Mediation Multivariate Analysis 
First, there is a clear association between mediation success and early 
intervention in the conflict (A-=.21693, Z=l.99331). If mediation takes place before 
hostility has reached extreme levels and positions have become entrenched, it stands a 
much greater chance of success than if it is allowed to become intractable. 
Compop.enfEffect 
tO • 
NO . 
·Eo- • 
HO 
,KQ' 
TIO '·· 
TEO .. 
.· THO 
TKO 
NEO . 
NHO 
NKO 
,EHO 
0-EKO 
:RKO 
Componehtl} 
10.0738 
46.4935 
58.4359 ' 
3.9850 
J4·:9559 
.. 
64.6333 
71.9097 
14.0116 
24.0257 
85,5641 
50)489 
·' 52.3870 
' 61.9835 ' 
66.0370!·': 
23.4H9 
DF· P-value 
2 .0065 
2 .0000 
2 .0000 
l. .9950 
3' .OQI9 
8, .0000 
8 JiOOO 
5 .0155 
11 .0126 
; 8 .0000 
5 . . 0000 
li .ooob 
.oppp . 
' .0000· . 
. . 0014 · 
Table 5.21 Component L2s for Process Variables Cluster (Mediation) 
Second, there is a very strong association between mediation success and both 
parties' willingness to settle their differences peacefully (A-=.43903, Z=3.91845). The 
willingness of both parties to work with a mediator for a non-violent outcome is 
perhaps the most important factor in achieving success, while indifference and 
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intransigence can be the greatest obstacle. In many intractable conflicts, such as 
during the Bosnian conflict, the primary obstacle to successful mediation was a lack 
of political will by one or both parties. 
Third, the fact that mediation is necessary at all means that the level of hostility 
between the parties is probably quite high. In such a situation, the environment or site 
of the talks can become crucial. Neither party may feel at ease being in the territory of 
the other. The data indicates that there is indeed, a strong association between 
successful mediation and holding the talks in a neutral environment (A.=.20446, 
2=4.12245). A neutral setting provides the minimum level of security required to 
engage in the mediation process. 
Lastly, the data reveals a moderate association between mediation success and the 
negotiators from each party having an equal, senior ranking (A.=.l8249, Z= 1. 79234). 
Clearly, different ranking negotiators pose an obstacle to successful mediation, as one 
party will no doubt feel it is not being accorded equal respect, or that it is dealing with 
someone incapable of making genuine concessions or commitments. 
. Model 
·• :RMo 
Goodriess of .· . 
'Fit L2 
T, N, E,,:fi;,K;.O · .· .. .962 .6077 .·· 
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.. ·' ) .·.,· ' 
TNE . f: 
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Table 5.22 A Test ofthe Goodness ofFit ofProcess Variables Models in 
Explaining Mediation Outcomes 
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IV Combined Variables Cluster 
In this section, the variables which demonstrated the strongest effects in each 
cluster are combined in a final overall cluster, and then examined for their effects on 
mediation outcomes. That is, as with the combined cluster for negotiation, variables 
are chosen on the basis of Component L 2 scores, contribution to models, and 
importance in significant three-way terms. Furthermore, as a comparative test, other 
marginally significant variables were initially included in the combined cluster, but 
were discarded after they failed to show significant effects or add to the explanatory 
power of the models. 
From the dispute characteristics cluster, both fatalities (F) and intensity (I) 
emerged as significant variables. The second cluster, party characteristics, revealed 
that the power differential (P) and previous relations (R) of the parties were the most 
important factors. Almost all of the variables from the process cluster were 
significant, namely, timing (T), initiator (N), environment (E), and negotiator rank 
(K). The combined variables cluster analysed here is summarised in Table 5.23. 
A component L 2 analysis of all these variables and their two-way and three-way 
interactions with mediation outcomes revealed that they were all highly significant at 
the p<.05 level. For this reason, there was no value in presenting the table here. A 
large number of useful and statistically robust models were also found which 
explained the dynamics of this cluster. Some of the best models are summarised in 
Table 5.24. They all show excellent goodness of fit, and have high explanatory R2s. 
Variable: 
· Fatalities .· · 
Irtdnsity · · 
Power Differential· 
Previous Reiatioils ' 
,Timing 
Initi~tbf 
' Envitol11TI.ent . 
Negotiator Rank 
Notatioti: 
,(F) 
(I)' 
(P.) 
(R)" 
('I)' 
. (N) , 
,(E) 
(K) 
Table 5.23 Combined Variables Used in Mediation Multivariate Analysis 
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The multivariate analysis of the combined variables cluster confirms the most 
important findings from the individual cluster analysis. First, mediation success is 
strongly associated with low fatalities (A-=.30349, Z=3.10530), and a low power 
differential between the parties (A-=.17313, Z=l.90945). Second, process variables 
emerge as extremely important determinants of mediation outcomes. Successful 
mediation is highly correlated with both pmiy initiation (A-=.39582, Z=4.17658), and a 
neutral environment (A-=.30938, Z=3.49609). Further, it is moderately con·elated with 
both parties sending senior ranking officials to the talks (A-=.26054, Z=l.94890). In 
models M1-M4 (see Table 5.24), process variables are present in every term except 
for the FO, PO, and IO terms. 
However, these valiables interact in more complex ways than simply at the two-
way term level. There were also numerous significant three-way interactions. For 
example, the (TRO) interaction prominent in models M2 and M4 revealed a strong 
association between mediation success, a friendly previous relationship, and early 
intervention in the conflict (A.=-.45542, Z=-2.16390). Similarly, mediation success is 
also associated with friendly previous relations and low conflict intensity (A.=-.37755, 
Z=-1.88278). 
Model . 
Ml 
· FONOKO FN · 
. ·' .. · =' : ' -··' ' FK,NK , · 
M2 
PO· KOTRO . 
:' .. -.- .: ' :·· -' .. TRPO .· · · 
M4 · .... 
io TROTRI , _ . . -- ~ . . 
·· Goodness of .. DF P-va'lue 
Fit L~ ' 
52.23664 .093 
. . 103 
. ~736 
% Explanatory · 
R2 
75% . 
87% 
90% . 
. 96% 
Table 5.24 A Test ofthe Goodness ofFit of Combined Variables Models in 
Explaining Mediation Outcomes 
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In short, the combined variables cluster analysis suggests a general profile of 
situations in which mediation will most likely be successful. That is, mediation has a 
greater chance of being successful in conflict characterised by low fatalities and low 
intensity, where the parties have a low power differential and friendly previous 
relations. At the same time, if the mediation takes place early on in the conflict, after 
being requested by both parties, and is held in a neutral environment between equally-
ranked senior officials, it is likely to be successful. 
5.5 Negotiation and Mediation in Multivariate Analysis: Some Conclusions 
At the beginning of this chapter, it was suggested that the primary tasks of 
multivariate analysis are to confirm or deny the bivariate findings, isolate the most 
important explanatory variables, and identify more specifically those conditions which 
are strongly associated with negotiation and mediation success (see section 5.1 ). The 
analyses in sections 5.3 and 5.4 have done just this. Firstly, the multivariate analysis 
confirmed that negotiation success was significantly associated with: issue 
complexity, fatalities, intensity, power differential, alignment, homogeneity, 
additional parties, environment, initiator, and negotiator rank. On the other hand, it 
also confirmed that mediation success was significantly associated with fatalities, 
intensity, power difference, previous relations, timing, environment, initiator, and 
negotiator rank. In short, the multivariate analysis allows us to be more certain that the 
findings of chapter four are not spurious, and these factors are important predictors in 
explaining negotiation and mediation outcomes. 
However, the multivariate analysis takes us much further than this, in that it 
indicates that out of all these factors, only some play a significant role in explaining 
the variance in negotiation outcomes. For example, the most important variables for 
negotiation are: issue complexity, power difference, alignment, initiator, environment, 
and negotiator rank. The multivariate analysis revealed that fatalities, intensity, 
homogeneity, and additional parties explained little variance overall, even though at 
the bivariate level they appeared to be important. Interestingly, in the case of 
mediation, all of the variables identified by the bivariate analysis remained significant 
in the multivariate context. 
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Perhaps most importantly, the multivariate analysis revealed more specifically, as 
well as more emphatically, those conditions which are significantly associated with 
negotiation and mediation success. For example, negotiation and mediation success 
was significantly associated with: low issue complexity (negotiation); low fatalities 
and intensity (mediation); low power difference between the parties (both); shared 
alignment (negotiation); friendly previous relations (mediation); both party initiation 
(both); a neutral site (both); shared senior ranking negotiators (both); and early 
intervention into the conflict (mediation). These results are detailed in sections 5.3 and 
5.4. In other words, the multivariate analysis allows us to gain a clearer picture of the 
specific conditions and circumstances under which international conflict management 
is likely to be more successful. 
In view of this, a few important theoretical conclusions and observations can be 
drawn from the multivariate analysis, especially in regard to the central question of 
the thesis; the comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation. The first is that, 
in keeping with the central theoretical conceptualisations of negotiation and mediation 
in chapters one and three, there are a number of factors that seem to affect both of 
these methods of conflict management similarly. The most significant variables from 
each cluster for negotiation and mediation are summarised comparatively in Table 
5.25 13 • 
The table, and the empirical analysis in this chapter, highlights four variables that 
seem to strongly affect both negotiation and mediation: (i) the power differential 
between the parties; (ii) the conflict management initiator; (iii) the environment in 
which the conflict management takes place; and (iv) the rank of the negotiators at the 
conflict management. Furthermore, these variables appear to affect negotiation and 
mediation in similar ways. For example, negotiation and mediation are both more 
successful when the power differential between the parties is low. This is not 
surprising, as a large power difference makes bargaining difficult. The stronger party 
may be unwilling to negotiate seriously with a party it sees as inherently inferior. 
Also, both negotiation and mediation are more successful when both parties initiate 
13 As mentioned in each combined cluster analysis, more variables than are mentioned in this table 
were actually tested for negotiation and mediation. For example, fatalities, intensity, and previous 
relations were also tested in the case of negotiation, while issue complexity and alignment were also 
tested for mediation. TI1is provided an important test of the differences between them. 
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the conflict management, indicating a mutual willingness to settle peacefully. Holding 
the negotiation or mediation in a neutral, non-threatening environment is also 
conducive to success for both forms of conflict management, as is sending equally-
ranked, senior officials. 
In fact, it could be argued that these conditions would be conducive to all forms 
of conflict management, and in this sense, it is not surprising that low power 
difference, mutual conflict management initiation, a neutral setting, and equally-
ranked senior negotiators, affect negotiation and mediation in similar ways. What is 
important here, is that we have demonstrated it empirically in a comparative study. 
Previous studies have validated these axioms in regards to mediation singularly (see 
Bercovitch and associates; Klieboer, 1996), but the fact that this study has found them 
to be true for both negotiation and mediation, means that we can say something about 
conflict management in general. 
. . 
1. Dispu'te Clustei· 
2. Partj ,Cli.1ster 
3. Proeess Cluster 
·. Negotiation 
Issue Complexity 
·· i Power Difference · 
· Alignrrient 
·Initiator 
lirt~irdnment . ' .. 
Negotiator• Rank 
Mediation 
Fatalities 
Intensity 
Power Difference · 
Previbus Relations .· ·· 
Initiator· · 
· Envirohm~rit . 
Negotiator Rat'lk ·. 
Timing . · 
Table 5.25 The Most Significant Variable Profiles ofNegotiation and Mediation 
Following on from this, it is pertinent to note that apart from the power 
differential, all these variables are process variables. Process variables are all highly 
correlated with negotiation and mediation success (see sections 5.3, 5.4), and are the 
most numerous factors summarised in Table 5.25. While again, it would seem 
axiomatic to suggest that what actually occurs during the negotiation or mediation is 
the most important part of the conflict management process, little attention has been 
paid to demonstrating this empirically at the international level. This is especially true 
of negotiation, which for the most part, has yet to go beyond the confines of the case 
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study approach. In other words, the importance of this observation lies in the fact that 
it is demonstrated here in a comparative study involving large numbers of cases. 
Therefore} we can attempt to say something about international conflict management 
in general. While antecedent factors, such as the nature of the conflict and the nature 
of the parties, can exert powerful influences on the attitudes, predispositions, or 
negotiating positions which the parties take with them into the talks, it can be argued 
from this study that what transpires once they begin to bargain will have the most 
immediate effect on the eventual outcome of the conflict management. The 
importance of this finding for conflict management practice is discussed in chapter 
SlX. 
However, while negotiation and mediation are both affected in similar ways by a 
particular set of variables, and while both depend ultimately on the actual process of 
bargaining, there are also some important differences in the factors that they are 
influenced by. This confirms the theoretical conceptualisations of negotiation and 
mediation as specified in the Contingency Model, and the findings of the bivariate 
analysis in chapter four (see section 4.4). While these differences cannot be measured 
or quantified as such, they are extremely important in the sense that they provide 
empirical evidence of a theoretical notion. As was discussed in chapters two and three, 
the theoretical notion of the differences between negotiation and mediation is crncial 
in current conflict management research. The fact that this study provides some 
evidence of differences in behaviour between negotiation and mediation then, is vital 
to the debate. 
The main differences between negotiation and mediation uncovered by the 
multivariate analysis include the following variables. In terms of the dispute 
characteristics cluster, the most significant variable for negotiation was issue 
complexity. For mediation, it was fatalities and intensity (see Table 5.25). This makes 
intuitive and theoretical sense, as most negotiations occur in low intensity conflicts 
(see chapter four). When the conflict becomes extremely intense, negotiations tend to 
break down anyway. In other words, because in negotiation the parties are already in 
dialogue, the most significant factor in terms of the dispute characteristics is the 
nature of the issues under discussion. At that point, other factors like fatalities, and 
intensity, become somewhat secondary. 
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However, in the case of mediation, the level of fatalities (and consequently, the 
level of intensity), determines most of what occurs during the talks. For example, the 
level of intensity may determine whether the parties can even meet face-to-face, or 
whether they have to be kept apart. It may determine whether they discuss the actual 
issues in dispute, or whether they simply try to find a way to stop the fighting. And it 
will undoubtedly determine the kind of strategies the mediator employs (see 
Bercovitch and Wells, 1993; Houston, forthcoming). 
Turning to the nature of the parties, here we see that both negotiation and 
mediation are affected by the power difference between the parties. We have already 
iterated why this is most likely the case. For negotiation, alignment is also a 
significant factor (see Table 5.25), while for mediation, it is the previous relations of 
the parties. Chapter four demonstrated that the majority of negotiation cases occur in 
interstate conflicts between relatively similar types of states. It makes complete sense 
that the alignment of the states, which reflects their interests, orientations, and 
participation in intergovernmental structures, should impact on the way they manage 
their conflicts. Similarly, it is not surprising that mediation is most affected by the 
parties' previous relations, as the very need for mediation implies a broken 
relationship. Mediators in effect, have to repair the relationship to the point where 
communication can resume and compromises can be reciprocated. Clearly, a history 
of friendship will aid this task immensely, while a history of antagonism and violence 
will make it all the more difficult. 
In short, what these findings suggest is that even though both negotiation and 
mediation benefit from being held in a neutral environment between parties with a low 
power differential, for example, there are some conditions which are unique to one or 
the other. For example, while it is important to have low issue complexity for 
negotiation, regardless of the level of fatalities or intensity, mediation is more likely to 
be successful if the intensity of the conflict is low, even if the issue complexity is 
high. In other words, the multivariate analysis demonstrates that negotiation and 
mediation do exhibit important differences, and cannot be treated theoretically as 
essentially the same process. 
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Chapter 6 
NEGOTIATION VERSUS MEDIATION: 
DECIDING HOW TO MANAGE VIOLENT INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 
6.1 A Return to the Twin Problems of Managing Complex International 
Conflicts 
The overall context of this thesis has been the ongoing attempt to make 
international conflict management more effective in order to lessen the destructive 
effects of violent confrontations between nations. Such a task implies the need for 
generalisable knowledge, which for the most part, is not being produced in sufficient 
quantities in the current conflict research milieu. Furthermore, it implies generating 
knowledge about the comparative effectiveness of different methods of conflict 
management in actual conflicts. In reality, cunent conflict management research is 
divided into separate areas of focus: those concerned with improving international 
negotiations, and those interested in the work of intermediaries, or third parties. This 
thesis has been an attempt to bridge the gap between the different foci of cunent 
conflict management research, and to provide the context for further generalisable 
comparative studies into the effectiveness of different methods. 
Specifically, I have attempted to address two central problems of cunent conflict 
management theory and practice. The comparative problem deals with assessing the 
application of different methods of conflict management to a disparate array of 
conflict situations. In other words, we need to know what kinds of conflicts there are, 
and whether different methods of conflict management are best suited to different 
kinds of conflict. Or, is there one single generic method which can be prescribed 
indiscriminately to all fmms of conflict? Furthermore, the comparative problem forces 
us to ask: Is there any way of knowing which methods of conflict management would 
go with which kinds of conflict? What specific factors would we expect to impact on 
the effectiveness of different methods, and why? And, are there any theories or 
theoretical frameworks for studying conflict management comparatively? 
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The empirical problem, on the other hand, deals with the limitations of our 
knowledge about the application of different types of conflict management in the real 
world of international politics. The challenge here is to expose what we really lmow 
regarding what works best in international conflicts, especially violent ones. In other 
words, here we need to ask the following questions: What comparative studies have 
been undertaken, and what have been the major findings? Do different methods of 
conflict management perform better or worse in different conflict settings? And, what 
factors affect the success rates of conflict management methods, and how exactly? 
Dealing with these twin problems has taken us into the realm of the theoretical 
debates surrounding the nature of international conflict management. In particular, it 
galvanises the debate over the nature of negotiation and mediation, whether they are 
essentially the same (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 165), or fundamentally different (see 
Bercovitch, 1985, 1986). Neither of these notions has stimulated much needed 
comparative research. Furthermore, tackling the empirical problem has brought us 
face to face with the paucity of current research approaches, and the dearth of 
generalisable studies, especially in regards to international negotiation. Too often, 
negotiation and mediation have been studied both in isolation from each other, and in 
a singular, case-study mode. Consequently, scholars and practitioners have had no 
empirical basis for choosing between conflict management methods in any given 
conflict situation. 
For example, the decision by former President Carter to mediate in the Bosnian 
conflict in December 1994 was not based on any lmowledge that this was the best way 
to resolve the conflict between the Serbs, the Croats, and the Bosnians. In actual fact, 
other options may have proved more effective (see section 6.4 below). The lack of 
generalisable, comparative research then, precluded the possibility of any useful 
prescriptions to this very real, and very destructive conflict. 
Specifically, four key questions have guided the inquiry into the twin problems of 
conflict management in international politics: (1) To what extent does current conflict 
management theory enable us to systematically evaluate, analyse, and compare 
negotiation and mediation in international politics?; (2) Is there an approach which 
can facilitate a logically sound and meaningful comparison of negotiation and 
mediation?; (3) Can such an approach be applied to the real world of international 
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conflict management?; and (4) What can this approach add to current conflict 
management theory, and what are its implications for conflict management practice? 
The first three questions have been the central topic throughout the previous 
chapters, and questions one and two will be reflected upon below. Questions three and 
four will be dealt with in later sections. 
Question 1: The Limits of Current Conflict Management Research 
Since they are both obvious and cmcial to international politics, one would 
expect that the comparative and empirical problems we have been discussing would 
have been examined in great detail by previous analysts of international conflict 
management. As was noted in chapter one, with a handful of exceptions (see Holsti, 
1966, 1968; Northedge and Donelan, 1971; Butterworth, 1976; Dixon, 1996; 
Raymond, 1994), this remains, sadly, untme. For the most part, negotiation and 
mediation have been studied under the mbric of two alternative paradigms, and the 
issue of their comparison has mostly been avoided altogether. In chapter two, I 
examined both of these paradigms for their potential as appropriate comparative 
:fi:ameworks. 
The first of these paradigms, the Psychology paradigm, begins with the 
assumption that conflict is generic, and asserts that the essential problem relates to the 
cognitions and perceptions of the conflicting parties. If perceptions could be 
realigned, underlying needs met, communication improved, and relationships 
restored, conflict at any level of the social stratum could be successfully resolved. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that negotiation is the primary method for achieving this. 
Here mediation is conceived of simply as "assisted negotiation" (see Pmitt and 
Carnevale, 1993; Carnevale and Pmitt, 1992; Touval, 1982; Princen, 1992a). By this 
conceptual slight of hand, the comparative issue is avoided altogether; negotiation is 
the appropriate form of conflict management for all levels of social conflict, and 
mediation is a kind of negotiation. In short, this approach to studying conflict 
management seems to preclude the possibility of theoretically grounded, systematic 
research into the comparative dimensions of negotiation and mediation in 
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international politics, most simply because it conceives of them as having too few 
differences to warrant comparison. 
The second primary paradigm, termed here the Third Party Intervention paradigm, 
IS a vast improvement on the Psychology approach. Here international conflict is 
conceived of as a unique form of social conflict, defined by its level of organised 
collective violence, its complexity, and its resistance to traditional forms of conflict 
management. Furthermore, not only are there important differences between bilateral 
and third party methods of conflict management, but mediation is seen to be 
especially suited to international politics (see Bercovitch, 1985, 1986, 1989). 
Mediation has the advantages of being extremely flexible, voluntary and non-binding 
(a trait especially treasured by sovereign states), and powerful mediators can bring 
extra resources to the bargaining table. 
However, the comparative aspects of negotiation and mediation are again largely 
ignored, as their differences are over-emphasised, and studies tend to focus solely on 
aspects of third party intervention (see Bercovitch and associates; Brown, 1990; 
Dixon, 1996; Frei, 1976; Hume, 1994; Touval, 1975; Touval and Zartman, 1985). 
Again, the opportunity to examine the comparative aspects of different types of 
conflict management in systematic empirical analysis has not been realised within this 
approach. 
The limitations of current conflict management research· go deeper than the lack 
of comparative theoretical and empirical studies, however. For the most part, current 
research relies on two primary methodologies, generally corresponding to the two 
main paradigms. The Psychology paradigm relies primarily on laboratory research, 
where participants, usually undergraduate psychology students, are examined for a 
limited range of responses in carefully controlled bargaining simulations. The 
problem of applying research from the inter-personal to international levels, and the 
general limitations of this methodology are welllmown (see Bercovitch and Wells, 
1993; Carnevale, 1986; Wall and Lynn, 1993), and pose obvious difficulties for the 
task set in this thesis. 
The second main research methodology, which is the primary method utilised 
within the Third Party Intervention paradigm, is the historical case study (see Touval, 
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1982 for an example). In fact, the vast majority of research to date on negotiation and 
mediation in international politics falls within the case study approach. 
The over-reliance on historical case studies with little or no generalising power, 
and the widespread use of laboratory studies, has hampered the quest for knowledge 
which could be applied prescriptively by practitioners at the international level. 
Furthermore, the disparate methodologies and theoretical underpinnings of the 
primary paradigms within current conflict management research has meant that each 
approach has remained largely compartmentalised from the other, with virtually no 
cross-fertilisation of theory and data. This in tum, has set back the project for 
generalisable knowledge about conflict management methods and their application. 
In summary, this thesis makes an important theoretical contribution to cunent 
conflict management research in highlighting some of its limitations. Only through 
constant and rigorous evaluation and self-correction can progress be achieved in any 
field. By highlighting some of the gaps and weaknesses in current research, this thesis 
represents an opportunity for self-correction. Methods and approaches should be 
developed, tested, and then re-evaluated. Comparative studies should be initiated, and 
new data sets created. Until more is known about, not only how conflict management 
actually works in international politics, but also how best to study it, the quest to 
improve it will be stultified. 
Question 2: The Appeal of the Contingency Framework 
The limitations of current approaches for studying negotiation and mediation 
comparatively in international politics, meant that an alternative framework had to be 
developed. The Contingency approach was reconstituted into a comparative 
framework in chapter three. This was achieved through a synthesis of aspects of the 
Third Party Intervention paradigm, and the as yet, untested contingency model of 
conflict management. This particular model attempts to co-ordinate "Track Two 
Diplomacy" with traditional forms of intermediary assistance (see Fisher, 1995; 
Fisher and Keashly, 19988, 1991, 1996; Webb et al, 1996). Assuming that conflict, as 
a social phenomenon, can be differentiated along various dimensions, the 
Contingency approach also differentiates between types of conflict management 
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methods. It suggests that different methods may be applicable to different types of 
conflict. Furthermore, by specifying the most important contextual and process factors 
in conflict management, as well as their measurement, the researcher is able to 
systematically collect data on a large universe of cases. Aspects of conflict 
management can then be compared within or across types using either a qualitative 
(case study) approach, or a quantitative (large-scale) approach. 
In other words, the Contingency framework developed here demonstrates a 
number of specific advantages over the other current approaches discussed in this 
thesis. In the first case, the Contingency framework systematises a general typology of 
conflict from which a comparative study of conflict management can proceed. That is, 
it articulates a rudimentary themy of conflict management, thus facilitating much 
needed theory development. Second, it provides a useful model for studying conflict 
management comparatively by specifying the most important dimensions along which 
they can be compared. Furthermore, by articulating the similarities and differences 
between negotiation and mediation more carefully than has been attempted in the past, 
the Contingency model provides a theoretical basis for interpreting the empirical 
differences and similarities observed in the data. As well, the Contingency model 
provides the beginnings of a comparative and integrated theory of negotiation and 
mediation. 
Other advantages of the Contingency approach are that it encourages systematic 
empirical research, because it stipulates variables and attributes with explicit 
operational criteria. That is, it encourages data collection. Also, the Contingency 
approach helps to identify variables which have been observed as associated with 
successful outcomes. Thus, it permits meaningful comparison between types of 
conflict management, and offers a useful framework for organising and integrating 
much of the research on conflict management. Lastly, the Contingency framework is 
flexible, allowing the researcher to focus on either detailed studies of single cases, or 
the utilisation oflarge data sets. 
In short, one of the major achievements of this thesis has been to suggest a 
theoretical approach and framework from which comparative studies can proceed. The 
lack of such a framework has been a major impediment to both theory development 
and data collection. The Contingency framework could (and should) be used, in 
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adapted forms if necessary, in further comparative studies at other levels of social 
conflict, and of other methods of conflict management. 
6.2 What Have We Learned About the Real World of International Conflict 
Management? 
In this section, I will reflect on the empirical contributions of this thesis. The 
empirical study was undertaken in chapters four and five. The results of the empirical 
study conducted here are important for a number of reasons. First, as has been 
mentioned consistently throughout earlier chapters, this is the first study of its kind. 
That is, it is the first large-scale, comparative study of negotiation and mediation that 
goes beyond merely comparing success rates, employing as it does, multivariate 
techniques. This provides a wealth of further statistical material not available in 
earlier studies, such as by Holsti (1966, 1968) and Frie (1976). 
Second, it is important because it utilises a unique and extensive data set. Based 
on 295 armed international conflicts in the post-war period, the data set comp1ises 
1,154 discrete cases of negotiation and 1,666 cases of mediation, each coded 
according to 68 variables related to the context, process, and outcomes of the conflict 
management This data set is important not only for its comparative aspects and its 
breadth, however. One of its main contributions is to the fieldofnegotiation studies. It 
is the first large-scale data set on negotiation in international armed conflicts, and as 
such, represents an important advance in the field. 
Third, the study is important for the notions it confirms from previous research. 
Independent confirmation is one of the most important steps in the scientific process, 
and in the following discussion I will highlight some of the important earlier findings 
that this thesis confirms. 
However, the empirical study conducted here is most important for its actual 
findings; that is, for what it tells us about the real world of international conflict 
management In the first instance, what this study tells us is that whether we are 
speaking about negotiation and mediation specifically, or conflict management in 
general, the reality is that these phenomena are extremely complex. International 
conflict management efforts are affected by multiple factors interacting in complex 
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ways. They cannot be reduced to any single factor causal models, or attributed to only 
one set of explanatory factors, such as the psychological characteristics of the 
negotiators. Furthermore, it is clear that a wide range of contextual and process factors 
are needed to explain their operation satisfactorily. 
In the second place, the results of the study allow us to say something about 
international conflict management in general. It was found that both negotiation and 
mediation success were negatively associated with a similar set of conditions. It 
would be axiomatic to argue that all forn1s of conflict management are negatively 
affected by these same conditions, but to date, there has been no large-scale empirical 
study which has confirmed it. For example, the study showed that lack of political 
will is perhaps the greatest obstacle to successful conflict management. Unless both 
parties to the conflict demonstrate a genuine commitment to pacific settlement, there 
is little chance that the negotiation or mediation will succeed. This confirms a number 
of previous findings that indicate that both party initiation increases mediation 
effectiveness (Carnevale and Pegnetter, 1985; Hiltrop, 1989; Klieboer, 1991; Brett 
and Goldberg, 1983; Slaatek, 1990). While the experience of mediators in the 
Bosnian conflict, or the current Middle East conflict, would seem to confirm this as a 
self evident fact, until now no empirical study has demonstrated it to be tme across a 
large number of cases. 
The empirical study also reveals that complicating factors such as a large 
difference in capabilities between the parties, high numbers of fatalities, high intensity 
in terms of the actual military hostilities, and a high level of issue complexity, also 
negatively impacts on success rates. Large differences in power capabilities depresses 
the chances of successful conflict management, most likely because the strongest 
party feels it can win-over its opponent and achieve its goals without having to 
compromise. The confitmation of this notion in the empirical study here compares 
favourably with other research which found that unequal power between the parties 
reduces the likelihood of a mediated settlement (Amy, 1983; Bercovitch, 1989; 
Dixon, 1996). Similarly, previous research has found that there is a strong relationship 
whereby as the level of intensity of the conflict increases, the likelihood of successful 
mediation decreases (Bercovitch, 1989; Carnevale and Pegnetter, 1985; Hiltrop, 1989; 
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Wall and Lynn, 1993). The study in this thesis found the same effect for both 
negotiation and mediation. 
Again, while it would seem little more than common sense to suggest that highly 
complicated conflicts between disparate actors, which also exhibit extreme levels of 
hostility, would be the most difficult to resolve, until now these axioms have 
remained largely unverified1 in the real world of international politics. This study 
allows us to be more confident then, in suggesting that there are some factors which 
diminish the likelihood of success for any form of conflict management in 
international politics, whether it be negotiation, mediation, conciliation, adjudication, 
or referral to an intergovernmental organisation. 
Another commonly held assumption that receives empirical verification from this 
study is the notion that what occurs during the actual process of the conflict 
management is most likely to have the greatest impact on the overall outcome of the 
talks. In other words, while contextual aspects such as the issues in dispute, the nature 
of the parties, their previous relationship, and the intensity with which the conflict is 
being pursued, are important considerations, once they sit down to bargain it is what 
goes on during the actual process of bargaining that is the most important. The good 
news about this is that these factors are the easiest to manipulate. That is, while the 
intensity of the conflict crumot be immediately altered, or the previous relations of the 
parties improved as such, the site of the talks and the rank of the negotiators is entirely 
up to the parties and the mediator. In short, this study demonstrates that all forms of 
conflict management benefit from a certain level of mutual willingness to settle 
peacefully, a neutral site for the talks, and a shared set of high ranking officials in 
attendance. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the empirical study is that its findings also 
allow us to say something specifically about negotiation and mediation. For exrunple, 
it is clear that negotiation is more successful than mediation. Overall, negotiation was 
found here to have a success rate of 47.0%, while the success rate for mediation was 
only 39.4%. Importantly, this generally confom1s to the findings from Holsti's 
seminal work (1966, 1968 - see chapter one for discussion). That negotiation would 
1 Bercovitch and Langley (1993) came to the same conclusions, but their study was limited to 
mediation cases only, and included a smaller set of explanatory variables and overall cases. 
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be more successful than mediation is entirely logical, and makes perfect sense 
theoretically. When two states can sort out their differences bilaterally, without 
interference from any outside parties, they normally will. It is only when the level of 
hostility between the parties is so high that they cannot negotiate face-to-face, or they 
believe they can win over their opponent, that mediation becomes necessary. 
In other words, "when a conflict is of low intensity or is nanow in scope the 
parties feel they can manage nicely by themselves and do not seek assistance from a 
mediator "(Wall and Lynn, 1993: 164; see also Rubin, 1980). In fact, in such 
circumstances many parties perceive third-party intervention as an unwanted 
intrusion. Furthermore, it has been suggested that "mediation is a weak elixir for 
improving a dispute hostile enough to merit intervention by a third party" (Wall and 
Lynn, 1993: 177). That is, the necessity for mediation in tum, implies the most 
difficult conditions for conflict management. It is, thus, logical that mediation would 
be less successful than negotiation, and the study here confirms it. 
Related to success rates is the notion of outcome durability, which refers to the 
effectiveness of the conflict management effort in changing the post-dispute climate. 
This study found that negotiation produced longer-lasting, much more durable 
outcomes than mediation did. This finding compares favourably with previous 
research, which found that mediation does not usually improve the post-dispute 
climate between the parties (Kressel and Pruitt, 1989; Touval and Zartman, 1989; 
Roehl and Cook, 1989; Pearson and Thoennes, 1984). It has been suggested that this 
is because mediation is often too brief to alter the climate, the problems addressed are 
too severe, and the mediation as well as the post-mediation process are so stressful 
and complex that they "swamp" the mediation benefits (Wall and Lynn, 1993: 177). 
As an aside, these findings also lend some support to the notion that parties in 
conflict often go through a sequence of conflict management procedures, turning to a 
new procedure when the old one proves ineffective. For states, such sequences almost 
invariably begin with negotiation, in the sense of normal diplomatic communications. 
If this fails, third party intermediary assistance may be called for (Pruitt and 
Carnevale, 1993: 190). For example, in November 1993, continuing unification talks 
between North and South Yemen began to break down and the possibility of full-scale 
war loomed. The failure of bilateral diplomacy led to mediation efforts by Middle 
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Eastern leaders which resulted in a temporary ceasefire and the beginnings of a 
settlement. 
The results of this study also suggest a little more clearly the comparative aspects 
of negotiation and mediation. While the Third Party Intervention paradigm implies 
that the two methods of conflict management are very different and should be treated 
as separate, autonomous topics (see Brett et al, 1986; Dixon, 1996; Klieboer, 1996; 
Klieboer and t'Hart, 1996), we have already described a number of conditions or 
factors, which affect negotiation and mediation similarly. On the other hand, the 
Psychology paradigm assumes that mediation is simply a "special case of negotiation" 
(Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993: 165), and there are few essential differences between 
them. One of the major findings of the empirical study in this thesis, is that there are a 
number of important differences between the occurrence and operation of negotiation 
and mediation in international politics. 
In the first place, they tend to occur under vastly different circumstances. 
Negotiation occurs primarily in interstate conflicts between states that share a similar 
level of capabilities, and a basic set of common characteristics. Also, negotiation 
occurs largely in those conflicts that arc at the lower end of the intensity scale. For 
example, Zaire and Zambia had a number ofborder-related conflicts in the mid-1980s, 
which although resulting in a few fatalities, never escalated to the point of all-out war. 
In each case, they solved the dispute through normal diplomatic bargaining. 
Typically, most of the negotiation cases found in this study occurred in such conflicts. 
Mediation, on the other hand, occurs under all the most difficult conditions: 
intractable intra-state conflicts, with high fatalities and intensity, high complexity, and 
a general unwillingness among the disputants to settle peacefully. There were more 
than 150 mediation attempts during the Bosnian conflict (1989-1995), for example. 
The importance of this finding is that it confirms empirically the oft repeated, but 
as yet, unverified notion that mediation tends to occur primarily when: 
(a) disputes are long, drawn out and complex; (b) the disputants' 
own conflict management efforts have reached an impasse; (c) 
neither side is prepared to countenance further costs or escalation of 
the dispute; and (d) when the disputants are prepared to break their 
stalemate by co-operating with each other and engaging in some 
contact and communication. (Bercovitch, 1991: 17). 
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Furthermore, it seems to indicate quite clearly why mediation is less successful than 
negotiation; namely, because mediation occurs under the most arduous circumstances, 
and any dispute requiring mediation is unlikely to be easily solved. 
Another important facet of the differences between negotiation and mediation is 
that they are associated with contrasting profiles of success and failure. In terms of 
success, for example, negotiation is closely associated with shared alignment, 
comparably homogenous societies, and few intervening additional parties in the 
conflict. Mediation success, on the other hand, is associated with opposing alignment, 
fragmented societies, and no history of conflict between the parties. In terms of the 
factors associated with failure, negotiation is least successful when the parties belong 
to opposing blocs, both have highly fragmented societies, and the conflict is 
characterised by large numbers of intervening additional parties. In contrast, 
mediation is least successful in conflicts over sovereignty or ethnicity issues, when 
the parties belong to different but not necessarily opposing security organisations, and 
when there are no additional intervening parties. In short, negotiation and mediation 
demonstrate clearly that they are affected by a different set of conditions. This is 
empirical confirmation of an important theoretical notion. 
A final important aspect of this study relates to the findings about negotiation. As 
has already been mentioned, it is the first study to examine international negotiation 
using a large number of cases. To date, the vast majority of studies on international 
negotiation have been made on single case studies (see Druckman, 1986; Hopmann 
and Smith, 1977; Koh, 1990). This makes these findings particularly interesting and 
important. The study here, which in this regard is largely exploratory, suggests that 
the most important contextual factors in international negotiation are issue 
complexity, the power difference between the parties, and the alignment of the parties. 
Importantly, this finding confirms the importance of contextual and relational aspects 
in international negotiations. Too often negotiation has been viewed as a stand-alone 
process, divorced from the ongoing relationship between the parties (Pruitt and 
Carnevale, 1993: 195). That is, we can tentatively suggest that international 
negotiation is more likely to be successful when issue complexity is low, the parties 
are fairly well balanced in terms of capabilities, and they share alignment. 
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However, in keeping with previous negotiation studies (Dupont and Faure, 1991; 
Cottman, 1985; Pruitt, 1991, 1995; Underdal, 1991; Zartman, 1994), this study also 
confirms the importance of process factors in successful international negotiations. A 
mutual willingness by the parties to bargain, a neutral environment, and sending 
equally-ranked, senior officials to the talks, all enhance the chances of success. These 
findings are important for both their generalisability, and for their applicability to 
armed international conflicts. The vast majority of negotiation studies tend to focus on 
non-armed international conflicts (see Druckman, 1986; Cottman, 1985; Mautner-
Markhof, 1989; Kremenyuk, 1991). The findings presented in this thesis should also 
provide an important foundation for future large-scale empirical studies on 
international negotiation. 
The results of the empirical analysis of negotiation and mediation conducted in 
chapter four and five should not be over-estimated, however. As has already been 
mentioned on numerous occasions, this study is primarily exploratory, and the 
findings are indications only. Statistical associations between variables can only ever 
be suggestive of relationships. We cannot make hard and fast behavioural rules or 
predictions, we can only suggest likely outcomes from a given set of conditions. What 
is required now is a whole new set of studies which investigate some of the same 
issues and notions set forth here. 
The Sequential Problem 
In chapter one I mentioned the limitations of the empirical study in terms of the 
sequential problem. That is, the problem that in the real world of international politics 
negotiations may take place at some stage, only to be complemented by mediation, 
and then back again to negotiations. This is suggestive of the interdependence of 
negotiation and mediation in some cases, and the possibility that the sequencing of 
different methods of conflict management may be as significant as the specific 
characteristics of each method. 
The effect of this factor on the statistical findings is that usmg individual 
negotiation and mediation attempts as the unit of analysis and then looking at their 
success of failure can lead to real problems. For example, it may be that negotiation or 
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mediation failure begets more negotiation or mediation attempts. Thus, the attempts 
are not independent of one another and will tend to "pile up" in problem cases. The 
statistical analysis will tend to be overwhelmed with these cases, and it may interfere 
with inferences made. The conditions for failure in 10 consecutive mediation attempts 
for example, will likely be similar to the conditions surrounding the success of the 11th 
attempt. A cross-sectional analysis will not be able to detect this. 
Although solutions are not easy, the following approach might in future prove 
useful in this regard. A different view can be gained and different questions asked if 
one uses the 295 conflicts as the unit of analysis, rather than the episodes of 
negotiation and mediation. Specifically, it will allow a sequential analysis in which 
one can understand how and when negotiation or mediation attempts follow each 
other. It is possible that failures prompt more attempts, and that low durability 
successes also prompt more attempts. This solution then, would permit an analysis of 
the question of whether successful negotiation and mediation build off each other in 
the same conflict, something not easily ascertained in a static, cross-sectional analysis. 
The purpose of raising the sequential problem is not to diminish the significance 
of the empirical findings of this thesis, but rather to place them in perspective. 
Awareness of potential problems allows for the development of creative solutions, and 
in this sense, we are suggesting future avenues of research which will enhance and 
add to the findings presented here. 
6.3 Implications for Conflict Management Theory and Practice 
The final question which has guided this inquiry is: What can this study add to 
current conflict management theory, and what are its implications for conflict 
management practice? In this section, I will reflect on the first part of this question, 
while section 6.4 will attempt to make a few policy recommendations. As was 
mentioned in chapter one, and detailed in chapter two, one of the important 
contributions of this thesis to current conflict management theory has been the 
identification of a serious gap in current research foci. While studies in the areas of 
international negotiation and intermediary assistance are laudable in their efforts to 
improve conflict management practice, they are nonetheless severely weakened by 
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their failure to examine alternative methods comparatively. This thesis highlights the 
comparative problem and provides an initial step in the process of redressing the 
imbalance. 
In terms of the current conflict management paradigms discussed in chapter two, 
another important contribution of this thesis has been to verify, albeit in a tentative, 
exploratory fashion, an important theoretical notion, namely, that negotiation and 
mediation are different methods of conflict management. The importance of this 
cannot be over-estimated, as in the vast literature of psychological research into 
conflict management, for example, mediation has been considered merely as an 
adjunct of negotiation for too long. This literature needs to accept that mediation, in 
one sense, is a completely different form of conflict management which is influenced 
by a different set of factors to negotiation. Its theoretical frameworks should 
incorporate this important distinction, and studies should be initiated which 
investigate the nature of the differences between them. 
Another important contribution to current conflict management theory has been 
the development of a theoretical framework that not only identifies the most important 
contextual, process, and outcome variables in international conflict management, but 
which can also be used as a comparative framework. That is, although the 
Contingency framework is a heuristic, exploratory theoretical framework, its 
successful application in a major study on international negotiation and mediation 
firmly establishes its credibility as a research tool and an appropriate theoretical 
model. Furthermore, the empirical results of this study allow us to improve the 
specificity and refinement of the Contingency model. This is the important interaction 
between theory and practice that is at the heati of all good research. 
For example, it now seems clear that the Contingency Model could specify more 
clearly the importance of process variables compared to contextual variables. That is, 
it could be suggested that those factors which are sequentially closest to the outcome 
in the model (eg, from antecedent to concurrent- see Figure 3.2) would have a greater 
impact on the consequent variables (eg, negotiation or mediation outcomes). The 
results also suggest that certain variables, such as the power differential between the 
patiies and the initiator of the conflict management, could be highlighted as being 
particularly important explanatory variables. 
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It also seems clear that the predictive abilities of the model have been improved by 
the results of the study. We can now suggest a number of general scenarios which will 
improve or diminish the chances of successful conflict management. For example, for 
conflict management in general, low power difference, low conflict intensity, both 
party initiation, neutral environment, and shared high-ranking officials, will greatly 
improve the chances of success. We have already discussed the profiles of success and 
failure for negotiation and mediation specifically (see section 6.2 above). 
As has been mentioned on numerous occasions, an area of theory sorely lacking in 
current conflict management research is an integrated theory of negotiation and 
mediation (Pruitt and Carnevale, 1993:196). This thesis contributes a unique and vital 
discussion of the differences and similarities between negotiation and mediation. 
Furthermore, the empirical analysis lends evidential weight to these differences and 
similarities. This thesis then, in its attempt to bridge the two foci of research, provides 
the beginnings of an integrated theory of negotiation and mediation. 
A broader theoretical contribution of this thesis has been the confirmation of a 
number of theoretical notions that until now were considered axiomatic, yet which 
remained unverified empirically. For example, the notion that mediation occurs in the 
most difficult conflicts (see Bercovitch, 1984, 1985, 1991) has until now, remained 
unexamined in the real world of international politics. This thesis clearly 
demonstrated that the vast majority of mediation attempts in the post-war period 
involved conflicts which were characterised by high numbers of fatalities, of long 
duration, highly complex, intractable, and resistant to traditional forms of conflict 
management. Similarly, the assertion that high intensity impedes conflict management 
has been oft-repeated, but never demonstrated empirically until now. The 
confirmation of these notions by a large-scale empirical study adds considerable 
weight to the general theory-building exercise which is at the heart of current conflict 
management research. These findings can now be more confidently incorporated into 
theoretical frameworks and approaches. 
Lastly, this thesis contributes a number of observations, notions, and findings 
which can form the basis of exploratory hypotheses for future research. All the results 
here will need to be independently re-examined and replicated in further studies, and 
this thesis provides a wealth of examinable hypotheses. This again, is a vital part of 
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the knowledge-gathering exercise which will Improve our efforts to strengthen 
international conflict management. 
Closely related to any theory construction is the data collection and examination 
process, and any study such as this always tells us as much about our data as our 
theory. The problems with empty cells and the inability to calculate logit models in a 
number of instances (see chapter five) indicates that the data could be improved 
greatly in terms of both the number of cases (largely for negotiation), and the coding 
of the variables. Specifically, as the data is most appropriately analysed using the 
loglinear methodology, variables need to be carefully coded with this in mind. This is 
not to say that the data should be randomly manipulated to improve the strength of the 
statistical models, but simply that the coding should more carefully reflect the 
categorical nature of the data. For example, where-ever possible, dichotomous 
categories should be employed and multiple categories avoided. 
Another aspect of the data collection and analysis process is simply the need for 
an expansion of the scope of the data to better approximate the complexities of 
international conflict management. In the first place, the previously discussed 
sequential problem needs to be examined. Some suggestions have already been made 
in this regard. Second, the number and type of variables needs to be expanded, 
especially in regards to process variables. Third, the scope of the study needs to be 
expanded so that negotiation and mediation· are examined under contrasting 
conditions, such as by issue type (eg, sovereignty conflicts versus ethnic conflicts), by 
region (eg, Middle East conflicts versus African conflicts), and by the level of 
violence (eg, low fatality conflicts versus high fatality conflicts). One of the most 
important needs in this regard, is the need to study negotiation and mediation across 
the various conflict modes identified in Table 3 .1. Tlus study has compared 
negotiation and mediation at the level of violent international conflict. Other studies 
should do the same across the non-violent modes (eg, non-violent international, intra-
national, inter-group, and intra-group conflicts), and the other violent modes (eg, 
violent intra-national, inter-group, and intra-group conflicts). Fourth, the study needs 
to be expanded to include other forms of conflict management, such as arbitration and 
adjudication, inquiry, conciliation, and referrals to intergovernmental organisations 
like the UN, the OAU, and the OSCE. Lastly, the study needs to consider non-armed 
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international conflicts. The present study only includes armed conflicts, and it remains 
tmclear exactly what effects the escalation to violence has on the negotiation or 
mediation process. 
6.4 Implications for Conflict Management Practice 
In this section, I will outline some of the implications for conflict management 
practice that have been raised by the study. This will answer the last of the questions 
which have guided the inquiry. In other words, does the study enhance our ability to 
make prescriptions for practitioners? The answer is clearly in the affirmative, and the 
following discussion will briefly sketch some policy recommendations. 
In the first instance, it is clear that direct negotiations should always be the 
preferred option by diplomats. Negotiation is not only more likely to be successful, 
but the agreements produced will be more durable and possess greater legitimacy, and 
the long-term relationships of the parties will be improved. Parties that can open a 
dialogue and sort out their differences bilaterally should always be encouraged to do 
so. 
We have already mentioned how common practice has been for states to break 
off all diplomatic contacts when serious conflict erupts (Frankel, 1969: 146). This 
practice needs to be eschewed in favour of mechanisms which will allow for 
continued, uninterrupted communication. It is particularly important that states with 
ongoing rivalries institutionalise negotiations so that dialogue can continue even when 
disputes escalate towards violence. The Muhuri River Commission between India and 
Bangladesh has been relatively effective in this regard (see Bercovitch and Jackson, 
1997), providing for regular ongoing contacts to monitor possible issues of conflict 
and settle disputes. Variations of such a mechanism might prove useful for the 
ongoing rivalries between India-Pakistan, India-China, Ecuador-Peru, Chile-
Argentina, and China-Vietnam. 
Related to this is the role that large states, especially superpowers, can play in 
inducing negotiations between their clients. In Southern Africa, the US and the Soviet 
Union employed considerable leverage to induce negotiations between their 
respective clients in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique (see Copson, 1994). Many 
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conflicts involving small states are sponsored to some degree by Great Powers. These 
large states can use their leverage to encourage negotiations. An example of a missed 
opportunity was the Central African Conflict in 1996-1997. At the height of the 
Zairean conflict in late 1996, Laurent Kabila, the leader of the rebel ADFL movement, 
was eager to open talks with the Mobutu regime on terms for Mobutu's secession 
from power (Reuter's Online Service, December 11, 1996). Such talks may have led 
to a peaceful transition. As it was, Mobutu refused and the US and France, who had 
been staunch allies of Zaire throughout the Cold War period, did nothing to encourage 
any negotiations to take place. Given the diplomatic pressure which could have been 
exerted on Mobutu by Western states, it was a missed opportunity. 
Another implication of the finding that negotiations are more successful than 
mediations, and that they produce more durable outcomes, is that mediation efforts 
should not be engaged in until it is clear that the pmiies' own efforts have failed and 
they are willing to accept outside assistance. That is, mediators should not be too 
eager to intervene in a conflict too early. As this study has suggested, mediation can, 
if it is unwanted, interfere with the parties' own conflict management efforts. 
Furthermore, ill-timed and ill-directed mediation can undermine future conflict 
management efforts by undermining the legitimacy of agreements, setting the parties 
up for failure, and so on (see section 3.3). 
Once negotiations have been initiated, this· study suggests a number of specific 
measures that will likely enhance the chances of a successful outcome. First, the 
negotiations should, if possible, be held in a neutral environment. The increasing 
number of multilateral contexts available to states, and even non-state actors, are ideal 
sites for talks. Regional organisations in particular, are well-suited to facilitating quiet 
negotiations. Similar to this, the negotiations should always involve senior and 
equally-ranked officials with the ability to make authoritative decisions. The analysis 
of this thesis shows a clear and strong relationship between success and negotiations 
between officials of the Foreign Ministerial level. Interestingly, there may be a 
cultural element involved here, in that research on conflict management in Africa 
shows a strong relationship between success and negotiations between actual Heads of 
State (see Jackson, 1998). 
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Other important steps which should be taken include simplifying the overall issue 
package. Attempting to deal with a large package of complex issues will most likely 
result in failure. The agenda of the talks should try and deal with a relatively simple 
issue package, perhaps dealing with the least contentious issues first in order to build 
momentum towards agreement on the most divisive issues. Related to this is the 
problem of large power differentials between the parties, a factor which this study 
clearly demonstrates is likely to engender failure in negotiations. Diplomats need to 
take concrete steps to try and overcome the negative effect of this. Suggestions here 
may include holding the talks on the weaker party's terms, or allowing observers at 
the talks to ensure the stronger party doesn not dominate proceedings. 
A final aspect of the findings of the thesis relates to the overall context of the 
parties' relationship. The study shows that shared attributes (eg, power capabilities, 
homogeniety) and shared activities ( eg, alignment in security arrangements) enhances 
the chances of successful negotiation. States, then, especially those in potentially 
conflictual or rivalrous relationships, need to take steps to participate in the same 
international organisations, and engage in cultural exchange activities. Building a 
shared base of common interests and activities in organisations will most likely 
improve the chances of successful negotiations should a violent conflict break out. 
Turkey and Greece, for example, have had a series of long-mnning territorial 
disputes, the most intractable of which has centred on Cypms: The Cypms problem in 
fact, has resulted in direct armed conflict between them on a number of occasions. 
However, their shared membership in the NATO alliance has provided opportunities 
for contact and on-going dialogue, and helped to avert a number of potentially 
dangerous confrontations. In the mid-1980s, a number of naval incidents and small-
scale exchanges of fire threatened to escalate into all-out war, and it was only 
negotiation facilitated through NATO offices that prevented it (Bercovitch and 
Jackson, 1997: 218). 
An important policy recommendation then, relates to the role of international 
organisations in improving international negotiations. Multilateralism encourages and 
facilitates successful negotiation in international relations by providing numerous 
channels of communications, a neutral environment for talks, opportunities for 
minimising power differences, observers, and if needed, mediators. In other words, 
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the growing global multilateralism is a positive development for international conflict 
management and should be encouraged and supported diplomatically. Furthermore, 
the conflict management capacities of international organisations need to be expanded 
and enhanced through the allocation of greater resources and foreign policy attention. 
A positive example of a deliberate enhancement of a regional organisation's 
conflict management capacities is that of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). In June 1996 SADC established a special Organ on Politics, 
Defence, and Security (see www.sadc-usa.net). The stated objectives of the Organ 
include the following: 
* Cooperate fully in regional security and defence through conflict 
prevention management and resolution; 
*Mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes and conflicts; 
* Use preventive diplomacy to pre-empt conflict in the region, both 
within and between states, through an early warning system; 
* Where conflict does occur, to seek to end this as quickly as possible 
through diplomatic means. Only where such means would fail would 
the Organ recommend that the summit should consider punitive 
measures. These responses would be agreed upon in a Protocol on 
Peace, Security and Conflict Resolution ... ; 
* Develop a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual 
Defence Pact for a responding to external threats, and a regional 
peacekeeping capacity within national armies that could be called upon 
within the region, or elsewhere on the continent. .. ; 
* Coordinate the participation of member states in international and 
regional peacekeeping operations; and 
* Address extra-regional conflict which impact on peace and security 
in southern Africa (Ibid). 
This is a highly significant development that should see the improvement of conflict 
management in a region too often plagued by intense and costly conflicts. Such 
improvements in the institutional capacity of regional organisations to manage 
conflicts should be encouraged, especially in areas where conflicts continue to pose 
serious threats to regional stability, such as the Indian sub-continent, the Middle East, 
Central America, West Africa, Central Africa, and the Hom of Africa. 
A problem facing conflict management practitioners however, is the changing 
nature of international conflict. In the 1990s, the predominant form of international. 
conflict has moved from interstate conflicts to internationalised, intra-state conflicts 
(see Midlarsky, 1992; Sood, 1992; Wallensteen and Sollenberg, 1997). These 
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primarily civil conflicts tend to be far more complex, intractable, intensely fought, and 
resistant to traditional forms of conflict management than the typical interstate 
conflicts that characterised intemational politics in the immediate post-war period. In 
other words, negotiation, which is best suited to interstate conflicts, is less likely to be 
effective in an increasing number of situations. 
Mediation then, also needs to be made more effective. Specifically, this study 
suggests a number of measures which mediators can take to improve the chances of 
success. In the first instance, mediation should be initiated as early in the conflict as 
possible, before positions have hardened and the parties have experienced high costs. 
A caveat to this of course, is that mediators should not intervene if the parties are 
attempting to resolve the conflict bilaterally. Only when it is clear that the parties' 
own efforts have failed should mediators intervene. 
Once mediation is under way, the chances of success can be enhanced if the 
mediator(s) make it a priority to reduce the intensity of the conflict and lower the 
number of fatalities. This study shows that there is a clear correlation between low 
fatalities and intensity and mediation success. Mediators should also try to carefully 
manage any large power differences between the parties, lest it lower the chances of 
success. Mediators can, for example, balance power differences by seeming to give 
more weight to the weaker party's suggestions. Further, mediators can enhance the 
likelihood of an agreement by reducing and repackaging the number of issues in 
dispute. This finding confirms other research on intemational mediation (see 
Bercovitch and Langley, 1993: 689). 
In terms of the physical and social structure of the conflict management, the 
mediation should always take place in a neutral environment away from each parties' 
territory. If possible, mediators should avoid agreeing to shuttle between the two 
parties' territories. If they are unwilling to talk directly to each other, then the minimal 
level of political will necessary for success is absent, and mediation will likely be 
unsuccessful in any case. Such shuttling results in very low success rates. Like 
negotiation, mediation also benefits greatly from having equally-ranked senior 
officials at the talks. Mediators should make it a priority to ensure that no side in the 
conflict sends low-level officials with little real concession-making power to the talks. 
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Other research suggests that the choice of mediator, that is, the identity of the 
mediator, also affects the chances of success. In particular, conflicts characterised by 
high degrees of hostility and complexity require high-ranking individuals with the 
ability to weild considerable resources (Bercovitch and Houston, 1993: 317). That is, 
high-level officials from powerful states such as the US, for example, are always 
likely to be more successful than UN officials who lack authority and resources. The 
belated efforts of the UN to send Mohammed Sahnoun to the Central African region 
in early 1997 clearly illustrates this point (see Jackson, 1998). High-ranking officials 
from France or the US would have had a greater chance of success. 
However, getting the right mediator is only part of the puzzle. Mediation is a 
contingent social behaviour, and it is extremely important what the mediator actually 
does during the process of conflict management. We have already mentioned the need 
to hold the mediation in a neutral environment, and to ensure that both parties are 
represented by equally-ranked senior officials. Furthermore, in a conflict such as this 
( eg, characterised by intangible issues, high fatalities, and high power difference), 
mediators greatly enhance their chances of success if they also employ forceful, 
directive strategies during the talks, such as making threats or promises, imposing 
deadlines, or suggesting a compromise solution (Langley, 1993: 167-168; see also 
Bercovitch and Langley, 1993; Bercovitch and Houston, 1993). 
In short, mediation in international conflict needs to be timely, carefully thought-
out, targeted at reducing hostility and repackaging the issues, based on a tme 
assessment of the parties' needs, and utilising powerful mediators who employ 
forceful tactics. Third party intervention attempted under these conditions will provide 
the maximum likelihood of success. 
A final caveat is in order. The study clearly shows that all conflict management is 
dependent on the political will of the parties to settle peacefully. That is, in the end, 
successful conflict management is dependent on the conflicting parties themselves. 
While outside parties can greatly enhance the chances of success through careful and 
pmdent manipulation of the site of the talks, the timing of the intervention, and the 
participating officials, ultimately, the success or failure of the conflict management 
depends on the willingness of the parties. This is not to suggest that the quest to 
improve international conflict management is a wasted exercise, only to say that its 
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limitations must be clearly recognised. In the complex world of international politics, 
there is no easy panacea for violent conflicts. Hard work and tireless enthusiasm must 
characterise the task of understanding, explaining, and improving methods of 
international conflict management. Although solving the puzzle of the pacific 
settlement of disputes does not automatically furnish the political will for such an 
outcome, the lack of intellectual solutions almost certainly precludes it. 
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APPENDIX 1: Coding sheet 
DISPUTE CHARACTERISTICS 
V1 DISPUTE NUMBER 
Each dispute has an individual code number. 
See Appendix A 
V2a DISPUTE START DATE (YEAR) 
Year the dispute started: 
From -45 to -95 
V2b DISPUTE START DATE (MONTH) 
Month the dispute started: 
From January = 01 to December = 12 
V3a DISPUTE END DATE (YEAR) 
Year the dispute ended: 
From -45 to -96 (ongoing) 
V3b DISPUTE END DATE (MONTH) 
Month the dispute ended: 
As for V2b. 
V4 DURATION (GROUPED) 
Total duration of the dispute In months 
(1} 0-1 months 
(2) 1-3 
(3) 4-6 
(4) 7-12 
(5)13-24 
(6) 25-36 
(7) 36+ 
(9) Unknown 
APPENDIX 1 
record 1 
Column number 1 
I I 
[I] 
[I] 
D 
column number 15 
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column number 16 
V5 DURATION (RAW) 
The actual number of months 
V6 FATALITIES (GROUPED) 
D 
(1) 0-500 
(2) 501-1000 
(3) 1001-5000 
(4) 5001-10000 
(5) 10000+ 
(9) Unknown 
V? FATLAITIES (RAW) 
The actual number of fatalities 
V8 DISPUTE INTENSITY 
D 
Fatalities per month 
(1) 0-500 
(2) 501-1000 
(3) 1001-1 0000 
(4) 10000+ 
(5) Unknown 
V9 SYSTEM PERIOD 
The system period in which the major part of the dispute occurred. 
(1) 1945-55 
(2) 1956-65 
(3) 1966-75 
(4) 1976-85 
(5) 1986-90 
(6) 1991-95 
column number 28 
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column number 29 
V10 GEOGRAPHIC REGION 
D 
The geographic region in which the dispute occurred 
(1} North America 
(2) Central and South America 
(3) Africa 
(4) South West Asia 
(5) East Asia and the Pacific 
(6) Middle East 
(7) Europe 
V11 ISSUE ONE 
D 
( 1) Territory 
(2) Ideology 
(3) Security 
(4) Independence 
(5) Resources 
(6) Ethnic 
V12 ISSUE TWO 
Coding as for V11. 
V13 ISSUE THREE 
Coding as for V11. 
V14 FINAL OUTCOME 
D 
The eventual outcome of the dispute. 
(1) Ongoing 
(2) Lapse 
(3) One party victory 
(4) Abated 
(5) Partial settlement 
(6) Full settlement 
column number 33 
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V15 DISPUTE INITIATOR 
Code number of the initiating party. 
PARTY CHARACTERISTICS 
V16 IDENTITY: PARTY A 
Party identity code. 
V17 IDENTITY:PARTY 8 
Party identity code. See Appendix B. 
V18 TIME IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM PARTY A 
length of time in the international system (IS), party A 
(0) Not applicable 
( 1 ) 0-5 years 
(2) 6-20 
(3) 21-50 
(4) 51-100 
(5) 100+ 
V19 TIME IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM PARTY B 
Length of time in the international system (IS), party B. 
Coding as for V18. 
V20 ALIGNMENT 
The political alignment of the disputing parties. 
( 1) Members of opposing blocs 
(2) Members of the same bloc 
(3) Bloc member vs. unaligned 
(4) Both unaligned 
(5) Different regional organisation 
(6) Same regional organisation 
(7) Regional organisation vs. unaligned 
APPENDIX 1 
column number 34 
D 
D 
D 
column number 48 
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column number 49 
V21 POWER PARTY A (RAW) 
Raw power score for party A See appendix 4. 
V22 POWER PARTY B (RAW) 
Raw power score for party B. See Appendix 4. 
V23 POWER PARTY A (GROUPED) 
D 
Power score for party A. See Appendix 4. 
( 1) Not applicable 
(2) 1-7 
(3) 8-13 
{4) 14-20 
(5) 21-26 
{6) 27-30 
(7) 30+ 
V24 POWER PARTY B (GROUPED) 
D 
Power score for party B. See Appendix 4. Coding as for V23. 
V25 PREVIOUS. RELATIONS 
D 
The nature of the parties relationship prior to the dispute. 
(1) Friendly 
(2) No previous relationship 
(3) Antagonism 
(4) Previous conflict, no (military) hostilities 
(5) 1 Previous dispute 
(6) More than 1 previous dispute 
V26 POLITICAL SYSTEM PARTY A 
D 
Nature of the political system in party A 
(1) Monarchy 
(2) Multi-party 
(3) One party 
(4) Military regime/junta 
(5) Other 
column number 56 
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column number 57 
V27 POLITICAL SYSTEM PARTY B 
D 
Nature of the political system in party B. 
Coding as for V26. 
V28 NUMBER OF. PARTIES A 
D 
Number of additional parties associated with party A 
(1) No other party involved 
(2) Additional1-2 parties involved 
(3) Additional 3-5 parties involved 
(4) More than 5 parties Involved 
V29 NUMBER OF PARTIES B 
D 
Number of additional parties associated with party B. 
Coding as for V28. 
V30 HOMOGENEITY PARTY A 
D 
Index of internal homogeneity for party A 
See Appendix 4. 
V31 HOMOGENEITY PARTY B 
D 
Index of internal homogeneity for party B. 
See Appendix 4. 
V32 POLITICAL RIGHTS PARTY A 
D 
The political rights score of party A See Appendix 4. 
V33 POLITICAL RIGHTS PARTY B 
D 
The political rights score of party B. See Appendix 4. 
column number 63 
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V34 CIVIL LIBERTIES PARTY A 
The civil liberties score of party A. See Appendix 4 
V35 CIVIL LIBERTIES PARTY B 
The civil liberties score of party B. See Appendix 4 
V36 TYPE OF CONFLICT 
The level of internationalisation of the conflict. 
(1) Civil/internal conflict which has been internationalised 
(2) Interstate 
V37 NUMBER OF MEDIATIONS 
The actual number of mediations attempted in this dispute 
V38 NUMBER OF NEGOTIATIONS 
The actual number of negotiations attempted in the dispute. 
V39 TOTAL NUMBER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. 
The actual number of conflict management attempts made in the 
dispute. 
V40 UNITED NATIONS INVOLEMENT 
(1) United Nations involvement in managing the dispute 
(2) No United Nations Involvement 
APPENDIX 1 
column number 64 
D 
D 
D 
D 
column number 75 
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V44 REPEATING DATA VARIABLE 
This Is the key ('occurs') variable in the repeating data format. 
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
V45 MEDIATION NUMBER 
A number allocated to the mediation: 
According to the actual order of the mediations in the dispute 
V46a CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (DAY) 
The actual day of the month of the conflict management attempt: 
V46b CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (MONTH) 
Month the conflict management attempt started: 
From January = 01 to December = 12 
V46c. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (YEAR) 
Year the conflict management attempt started: 
From -45 to -95 
V47 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TYPE 
(0) No conflict management activity 
(1) Mediation 
(2) Negotiation 
(3) Arbitration I Adjudication 
(4) Referral to international organisation 
(5) Multilateral conference 
APPENDIX 1 
Record number 2 
column number 1 
D 
column number 16 
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column number 17 
V48 THIRD PARTY IDENTITY 
Mediator/Third party code number. 
V49 MEDIATOR RANK 
(0) No mediation 
(1) Private Individual 
(2) Leader of a national organisation 
(3) Representative of a regional organisation 
(4) Leader of a regional organisation 
(5} Representative of an international organisation 
(6) Leader of an international organisation 
(7) Representative of a small government 
(8} Representative of a large government 
(9) Leader of a small government 
(10) Leader of a large government 
V50 STRATEGIES 
D 
The primary strategy employed by the mediator. 
(0) No mediation 
(1) Mediation offered only 
(2) Communication/Facilitation 
(3) Procedural 
(4) Directive 
(5) Supervisory 
(6) Unspecified 
V51 PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP 
D 
The previous relationship of the mediator with the parties. 
(0) No mediation 
(1) No previous relationship 
(2) Different bloc 
(3) Same bloc as one party 
(4) Same bloc as both parties 
(5) Mixed relationship 
column number 24 
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V52 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS 
The number of previous mediation attempts in this dispute. 
(0) 0 
(1) 1-2 
(2) 3-4 
(3) 5-6 
(4) 7-8 
(5) 9-10 
(6) 10+ 
(9) No mediation 
V53 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS THIS MEDIATOR. 
V54 
Number of previous attempts by this mediator. 
(0) 0 
(1) 1 
(2) 2 
(3) 3 
(4) 4 
(5) 5 
(6) 5+ 
(9) No mediation 
TIMING (GROUPED) 
The timing of the conflict management attempt. 
ie. the number of months elapsed at the time of 
intervention. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(9) 
1-2 
3-6 
7-12 
13-24 
25-36 
36+ 
No Management 
V55 TIMING (RAW) 
As for V54, but in this case the exact figure is given. 
APPENDIX 1 
column number 25 
D 
D 
D 
column number 30 
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V56 INITIATED BY 
Request for conflict management initiated by 
(0) No management 
( 1) One party 
(2) Both parties 
(3) Mediator 
(4) Regional organisation 
(5) International organisation 
(6) Unspecified 
V57 ENVIRONMENT 
The physical environment in which conftict management takes place. 
(1) Party A's territory 
(2) Party B's territory 
(3) Third Party territory 
(4) Neutral site 
(5) Composite 
(6) Offered only 
(7) Unspecified 
(9) No management 
V58 OUTCOME 
The outcome of the conflict management attempt. 
(0) No management 
( 1) Mediation offered only 
(2) Unsuccessful 
(3) Ceasefire 
(4) Partial settlement 
(5) Full settlement 
V59 HOSTILITIES 
Military hostilities during conflict management attempt 
(1) Yes 
(2) No 
(3) Unspecified 
(9) No Conflict Management 
APPENDIX 1 
column number 31 
D 
D 
D 
D 
column number 34 
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V60 
V61 
V62 
V63 
OUTCOME DURABILITY 
Number of weeks that the ceasefire or settlement has lasted 
(0) Less than 1 week 
(1) 1 week 
(2) 2 weeks 
(3) 3 weeks 
(4) 4 weeks 
(5) 5 weeks 
(6) 6 weeks 
(7) 7 weeks 
(8) 8 weeks or more 
(9) Unspecified/Not applicable 
NEGOTIATORS A 
Negotiators in the conflict management attempt Party A 
( 1) Primary Decision-Maker 
(2) Senior-Level Decision-Maker 
(3) Low-Level Representatives. 
(6) Unspecified 
(9) No Conftict managemenUNot Applicable 
NEGOTIATORS B 
Negotiators in the conflict management attempt Party B 
Same as for V61 
NUMBER OF MEDIATORS 
Identification of the number of mediators involved in the current 
mediation attempts and the interests they represent. 
(1) One mediator 
(2) Two mediators - representing same interests 
(3) Two mediators - representing different interests 
(4) Group mediator -members with same interests 
(5) Group mediator -members with different interests 
(9) no mediation/not applicable 
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D 
D 
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column number 39 
V64 FUNCTIONAL MEDIATOR IDENTITY 
D 
The nature of the group the mediator represents. 
(1) Individual 
(2) Regional Organisation 
(3) International Organisation 
(4) Functional Non-Governmental Organisation 
(5) State 
(6) Mixed 
(7) Unspecified 
(9) No mediation/not applicable 
D 
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V68 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DURATION 
The length of time that the conflict management attempt took to 
achieve an outcome. 
(1) 1 Day 
(2) 2-5 Days 
(3) 1 Week 
(4) 2-3 Weeks 
(5) 1 Month 
(6) 6-7 Weeks 
(7) 2 Months 
(8) 3+ Months 
(9) Unknown/not applicable 
APPENDIX 1 
column number 43 
column number 43 
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APPENDIX 2: DISPUTE LIST 
001 Chinese Civil War (1945-1949) 
002 Greek Civil War (1945-1949) 
003 Britain- India: Independence and Partition (1945-1948) 
004 France- Levant: Independence Crisis (1945-Dec.1946) 
005 USSR- Iran: Azerbaijan Crisis (Aug.1945-0ct.1947) 
006 Indonesian Independence (late 1945-Nov.1949) 
007 France- Indochina: Independence Struggle (Dec.1945-Jul.l954) 
008 Yugoslavia- USA: Air Incidents (Aug.l946) 
009 France- Madagascar: Nationalist Rebellion (Mar.1947-Aug.1947) 
010 Pakistan- India: First Kashmir War (Oct.1947-Jan.l949) 
011 Costa Rican Civil War (Mar.1948-Apr.1948) 
012 Israeli War oflndependence (May 1948-Jan.l949) 
013 USSR- Western Allies: Berlin Crisis (Jun.1948-May 1949) 
014 The Malayan Emergency (Jun.1948-Ju1.1960) 
015 India- Hyderabad: Secession Attempt (Ju1.1948-Sept.1948) 
016 Burma: Kuomintang Conflict (Aug.l948-1954) 
017 Costa Rica- Nicaragua: Border Conflict (Dec.1948-Feb.l949) 
018 Burma: Civil War and Insurgency (Jan.1949-1995) 
019 Eritrea- Ethiopia: Independence Attempt (Jul.1949-Dec.l950) 
020 Pakistan- Afghanistan: Border Conflict (Aug.1949) 
021 China- Taiwan: Straits ofFormosa (Oct.1949-Jun.1953) 
022 USA- USSR: Air Incidents (Apr.1950-0ct.1950) 
023 Afghanistan- Pakistan: Pathan Conflict (Jun.l950-0ct.1950) 
024 The Korean War (Jun.1950-Jul.1953) 
025 China- Tibet: Military Occupation (Oct.1950-May 1951) 
026 Syria- Israel: Lake Galilee (Apr.1951-May 1951) 
027 Oman- Saudi Arabia: Buraimi Crisis (1952-0ct.1955) 
028 Tunisian Independence (Jan.l952-Mar.1956) 
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029 Egypt- UK: Suez Canal Zone Dispute (Jan.1952-Jan.l956) 
030 Italy -Yugoslavia: Trieste Dispute (Mar.l952-0ct.1954) 
031 China- Portugal: Macao Conflict (Jul.1952-Aug.l952) 
032 Argentina- Chile: Beagle Channel Dispute (Jul.1952-1968) 
033 Kenya- UK: MauMau Revolt (Aug.l952-Dec.1963) 
034 USSR- USA: Air Incidents (Oct.1952-Jul.1956) 
035 Israel- Jordan: Border Conflict (Jan.l953-Dec.1954) 
036 China- USA: Quemoy Confrontation (Apr.1954-Apr.1955) 
037 Guatemalan Civil War and Insurgency (Jun.1954-1995) 
038 Algerian Independence (Nov.1954-Mar.1962) 
039 Nicaragua- Costa Rica: Invasion Attempt (Jan.1955) 
040 Turkey- Syria: Cold War Tensions (Mar.1955-1957) 
041 UK- Cyprus: Enosis Movement (Sept.1955-Feb.l959) 
042 Yemen- ill(: Aden Conflict (1956-1960) 
043 China- Tibet: Incorporation Struggle (Mar.1956-Sept.1965) 
044 Taiwan- South Vietnam: Paracel Islands (Jun.l956-Aug.1956) 
045 Israel- Jordan: Mt Scopus Conflict (Jul.1956-Jan.1958) 
046 The Suez War (Oct.1956-Nov.l956) 
047 USSR- Hungary: Reform Intervention (Oct.1956-Nov.1956) 
048 Syria- Israel: Lake Tiberias (Oct.1955-Dec.l955) 
049 Cuban Civil War (Dec.l956-Jan.l959) 
050 Honduras- Nicaragua: Mocoran Seizure (Apr.l957-Jan.l957) 
051 Israel- Syria: Golan Heights (Jun.1957-Feb.l958) 
052 Spain- Morocco: Sahara Conflict (Nov.1957-Apr.l958) 
053 Panama Revolutionaries Conflict (1958-May 1959) 
054 Egypt- Sudan: Border Dispute (Feb.l958) 
055 France- Tunisia: Military Bases Conflict (Feb.l958-May 1958) 
056 India- Pakistan: Surma River Incidents (Mar.1958-Sept.1959) 
057 First Lebanese Civil War (May 1958-Jun.1959) 
058 China- USA: Quemoy Islands Bombardment (Jul.1958-Dec.1958) 
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059 Cambodia- Siam: Border Conflict (Nov.1958-Feb.1959) 
060 First Laotian Civil War (Dec.l958-1962) 
061 France- Tunisia: Algerian Border Incidents (Feb.l959-Aug.1959) 
062 Syria- Iraq: Mosul Revolt (Mar.1959-Apr.l959) 
063 Cuba- Dominican Republic: Exiles Conflict (Jun.l959-Jul.l959) 
064 Cuba- Haiti: Haitan Exiles Conflict (Aug.1959) 
065 China- India: Border Conflict (Aug.l959-Feb.l960) 
066 China- Nepal: Border Dispute (Jun.1959-Jul.1960) 
067 The Congo Conflict (Jul.1960-mid-1964) 
068 Pakistan- Afghanistan: Pathan Conflict (Sept.1960-May 1963) 
069 The Vietnam War (Dec.1960-May 1975) 
070 African Territories- Portugal: Independence Struggle (1961-Jul.1975) 
071 Kurds - Iraq: Secession Attempt (Mar .1961-1966) 
072 USA- Cuba: Bay ofPigs (Apr.l961-May 1961) 
073 Iraq- Kuwait: Kuwaiti Independence Crisis (Jun.1961-Feb.l962) 
074 USSR- USA: Berlin Air Corridor (Jul.l961-Nov.l961) 
075 France- Tunisia: Bizerte Conflict (Jul.l961-Sept.1961) 
076 India- Portugal: Goa Conflict (Dec.1961) 
077 Indonesia- Malaysia: Borneo Conflict (1962-Nov.l965) 
078 Netherlands- Indonesia: West Irian (Jan.l962-Aug.1962) 
079 China- Taiwan: Invasion Threat (Mar.l962-Dec.1962) 
080 Nepal- India: Border Incidents (Apr.l962-Nov.l962) 
081 Syria- Israel: Lake Tiberias (Jun.l962-Aug.l963) 
082 USSR- USA: Cuban Missile Crisis (Sept.l962-Nov.1962) 
083 North Yemen: Royalist Rebellion (Sept.1962-0ct.1967) 
084 India- China: Border War (Oct.1962-Nov.l962) 
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085 Somalia- Kenya; Ethiopia: Somali Expansionism (Nov .1962-Sept.l967) 
086 China- USSR: Ussuri River Conflict (Mar.l963-Sept.1969) 
087 First Sudan Civil War (Sept.1963-Mar.1972) 
088 Algeria- Morocco: TindoufWar (Oct.1963-Feb.1964) 
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089 Cyprus Civil War (Dec.l963-Nov.l967) 
090 Somalia- Ethiopia: Ogaden War (Jan.1964-Mar.1964) 
091 Panama- USA: Flag Riots (Jan.1964-Apr.1964) 
092 Rwanda- Burundi: Ethnic Violence (Jan.1964-Jan.l965) 
093 North Vietnam- Laos: Second Civil War (Apr.1964-Dec.l966) 
094 France- Gabon: Aubanne's Coup (Feb.l964) 
095 South Vietnam- Cambodia: Border Conflict (Mar.l964-Dec.1964) 
096 Syria - Israel: Border Incidents (Jun.1964-Jul.1966) 
097 North Vietnam- USA (Aug.1964-May 1975) 
098 Israel- Jordan: Border Incidents (Dec.1964-Apr.1966) 
099 India- Pakistan: Border Skirmishes (1965-1970) 
100 Eritrea- Ethiopia: Secession War (1965-May 1993) 
101 Irian Jaya- Indonesia: Secession Insurgency (1965-1995) 
102 Colombian Guerilla Insurgency (1965-1995) 
103 Ghana- Togo: Border Incidents (Jan.1965-May 1965) 
104 Uganda- Zaire: Border Incidents (Feb.l965-Mar.l965) 
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105 USA- Dominican Republic: Constitutionalist Rebellion (Apr.1965-Sept.1966) 
106 North Korea- South Korea: Border Incidents (mid-1965-Mar.1968) 
107 India- Pakistan: Kashmir War (Aug.l965-Sept.1965) 
108 China - India: Border Incidents (Sept.1965) 
109 Lebanon - Israel: Houle Raids ( Oct.1965) 
110 Chad- Sudan: Intervention and Civil War (Nov.1965-1972) 
111 Namibian Independence Struggle (1966-Mar.1990) 
112 Ivory Coast- Guinea: Overthrow Plot (Mar.l966-Apr.1966) 
113 Ghana- Guinea: Nkrumah Tensions (Oct.1966-Nov.1966) 
114 Bolivian Guerilla Insurgency (Nov.1966-Ju1.1970) 
115 Zimbabwean Independence Struggle (1967-Jan.l980) 
116 Guinea - Ivory Coast: Hostage Crisis (Feb.1967 -Sept.1967) 
117 Cuba- Venezuela: Invasion Attempt (Apr.l967-May 1967) 
118 Israel- Arab States: Six Day War (Jun.1967) 
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119 Nigeria- Biafra: Secession Attempt (Jul.l967-Jan.1970) 
120 Zaire- Rwanda: Mercanaries Dispute (Aug.1967-Apr.1968) 
121 USSR- Czechoslovakia: The Prague Spring (Aug.1968) 
122 Iraq- Kurd: Suppression Attempt (Oct.1968-Mar.1970) 
123 China- Burma: Border Incidents (Jan.1969-Nov.1969) 
124 El Salvador- Honduras: Football War (Jul.1969) 
125 Guyana- Surinam: New River Triangle (Aug.1969-Nov.1970) 
126 North Yemen- Saudi Arabia: Border Conflict (Nov.1969-Jan.l970) 
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127 Cambodia- South Vietnam; USA: Bombing Campaign (Jan.1970-Apr.1975) 
128 Mindanao- Philippines: Secession Insurgency (Jan.1970-1995) 
129 PLO- Jordan: Coup Attempt (Feb.1970-Aug.1971) 
130 Guinean Security: Conalcry Raids (Nov.1970) 
131 Iran- Iraq: Border Tensions (1971) 
132 Uganda- Tanzania: Border Conflict (1971-0ct.1972) 
133 The Bangladesh War (Mar.1971-Feb.197 4) 
134 Iran- United Arab Emirates: Tunb Islands (Nov.1971) 
135 Oman- South Yemen: Dhofar Rebellion (1972-Aug.1974) 
136 Iran- Iraq: Border War (Jan.1972-Feb.1975) 
137 Syria- Israel: Golan Conflict (Mar.l972-Jan.1973) 
138 North Yemen- South Yemen: Border Conflict (Oct.l971-0ct.l972) 
139 Equatorial Guinea- Gabon: Corisco Bay Islands (Jtm.1972-Nov.1972) 
140 Ethiopia- Somalia: Second Ogaden War (mid-1972-1985) 
141 Iraq- Kuwait: Border Incidents (Mar.l973-Jul.1975) 
142 Israel- Egypt: Yom Kippur War (Oct.1973) 
143 Israel- Syria (Oct.l973-Dec.1974) 
144 South Vietnam- China: Paracel Islands (Jan.1974) 
145 Cyprus Conflict: Turkish- Greek Invasion (Jan.1974-Jun.1978) 
146 Kurds - Iraq: Secession Attempt (Mar.197 4-Jul.197 5) 
147 Israel- Lebanon: Arab Infiltrators (Apr.1974-Jul.1975) 
148 Western Saharan Conflict: Morocco-Mauritania (Oct.1974-1995) 
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149 Mali- Upper Volta(Burkina Faso): Border Conflict (Dec.1974-Jun.1975) 
150 Angola- South Africa: Intervention and Civil War (1975-1995) 
151 Chittagong Hill Tracts Conflict (1975-1995) 
152 North Korea- South Korea: Border Crisis (Feb.l975-Jul.l975) 
153 Lebanese Civil War (Feb.1975-end of 1992) 
154 Syria- Iraq: Euphrates Dispute (Apr.l975-late 1975) 
15 5 Cambodia - USA: "Mayaguez Incident" (May 197 5) 
156 Laos- Thailand: Borderlncidents (Jun.l975-Jan.l976) 
157 China- India: Border Incidents (Oct.1975) 
158 East Timor- Indonesia: Independence Struggle (Oct.1975-1995) 
159 Zaire- Angola: Border War (Nov.l975-Feb.1976) 
160 Cambodia- Thailand: Border Incidents (Dec.1975-Feb.1976) 
161 Iranian Civil War (1976-1980) 
162 Mozambique- South Africa: Intervention and Civil War (1976-0ct.1992) 
163 Uganda- Kenya: Border Incidents (Feb.l976-Aug.l976) 
164 Bangladesh- India: Border Incidents (Apr.1976) 
165 Kurds- Iraq: Kurdish Separatism (May 1976-1995) 
166 Chad- Libya: Aozou Strip (Jun.1976-Nov.l979) 
167 El Salvador- Honduras: Border Incidents (Ju1.1976-0ct.l980) 
168 Thailand- Kampuchea: Border Incidents (Nov.l976-Dec.l976) 
169 El Salvador Civil Conflict (Jan.1977-end of 1992) 
170 Kampuchea - Thailand: Border Incidents (J an.1977 -Oct.1978) 
171 Zaire- Angola: Shaba Invasion (Mar.l977-May 1977) 
172 Israel- Lebanon: Border Incidents (mid-1977-late 1977) 
173 Ecuador - Peru: Border Conflict (Jun.1977 -J an.1978) 
174 Egypt- Libya: Border War (Jul.l977-Sept.1977) 
175 Argentina- Chile: Beagle Channel (Jul.1977-Nov.1984) 
176 Nicaragua- Costa Rica: Border Incidents (Oct.1977) 
177 First Chad Civil War (Jan.1978-Jun.l982) 
178 Israel- Lebanon: Border Conflict (Mar.l978-Jun.l978) 
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179 Second Invasion ofShaba (May 1978) 
180 Nicaragua ~ Costa Rica: Border Incidents (Sept.1978-Dec.1978) 
181 Tanzania~ Uganda: Amin Overthrow (Oct.1978-May 1979) 
182 USSR- Afghanistan: Intervention and Civil War (1979-1995) 
183 Kampuchea- Vietnam: Invasion and Civil War (J an.l979-1995) 
184 China- Vietnam: Border War (Aug.l979-Jun.l982) 
185 North Yemen- South Yemen: Border War (Feb.1979-Feb.l980) 
186 Afghanistan- Pakistan: Peshawar Rebellion (Mar.1979-Jul.1979) 
187 Algeria- Morocco: Border Conflict (Jun.l979-0ct.1979) 
188 Israel- Syria: Air Incidents (Jun.1979-Feb.l980) 
189 India- Bangladesh: Border Incidents (Nov.1979) 
190 Iran - USA: Hostage Crisis (Nov.1979-J an.1981) 
191 Kampuchea - Thailand: Border Conflict (Dec.1979-0ct.1980) 
192 Honduras- Nicaragua: Contra War (Jan.l980-Feb.l994) 
193 Saudi Arabia- North Yemen (Feb.l980) 
194 The Iran-Iraq War (Feb.1980-1989) 
195 Santo - Vanuatu: Secession Attempt (May 1980-Sept.1980) 
196 Ecuador- Peru: Border War (Jan.1981-Apr.l981) 
197 Cameroon -Nigeria: Border Incident (May 1981 ~Jul.1981) 
198 Pakistan- India: Border Incidents (Jul.1981-Aug.1982) 
199 Libya - USA: Air Incidents (Aug.l981) 
200 Poland Crisis (Dec.l981-Feb.1982) 
201 Ugandan Civil War (Dec.1981-1995) 
202 Israel- Lebanon: Lebanon Invasion (early 1982-mid-1983) 
203 Zaire - Zambia: Border Dispute (F eb.l982-Sept.l982) 
204 The Falklands War (Apr.1982-Jun.l982) 
205 Indonesia- PNG: Border Incidents (May 1982-0ct.1985) 
206 Libya- Chad: Intervention and Civil War (mid-1982-1995) 
207 Laos- Thailand: Border Incidents (Jun.l982) 
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208 Sri Lanka- Tamil Conflict (Jul.1982-1995) 
209 Ghana- Togo: Border Incidents (Aug.1982-0ct.1982) 
210 Guatemala- Mexico: Border Incidents (Sept.1982-Jan.l983) 
211 South Africa- Lesotho: Anti-ANC Raid (Dec.1982) 
212 Second Sudan Civil War (Jan.1983-1995) 
213 Liberia- Sierra Leone: Doe Tensions (Feb.l983-Mar.l983) 
214 China- Vietnam: Border Conflict (Apr.1983) 
215 Chad- Nigeria: Lake Chad Conflict (Apr.1983-Jul.1983) 
216 Israel- Lebanon: Security Zone (mid-1983-1995) 
217 Zaire- Zambia: Border Dispute (Sept.l983-Jan.1984) 
218 USA- Grenada: Invasion (Oct.1983-Dec.1983) 
219 India- Bangladesh: Border Conflict (Dec.l983-Jun.l984) 
220 Ecuador - Peru: Border Conflict (Jan.1984) 
221 Vietnam- China: Border Conflict (Jan.1984-Mar.1987) 
222 India - Pakistan: Siachin Glacier (Apr.l984-Sept.1985) 
223 Burma- Thailand: Border Incident (Mar.1984) 
224 Turkey- Greece: Naval Incidents (Mar.l984-Jan.1988) 
225 Guatemala- Mexico: Border Incident (Apr.1984) 
226 Thailand- Laos: Border War (Jtm.1984-Dec.l988) 
227 Kurds- Turkey: Secession Struggle (Aug.l984-1995) 
228 South Africa- Botswana: Anti-ANC Raids (Oct.1984-May 1986) 
229 Third Invasion ofShaba (Nov.1984) 
230 North Korea- South Korea: Border Incidents (Nov.1984) 
231 Nicaragua - Costa Rica: Border Incidents (May 1985-Jun.l985) 
232 Fourth Invasion of Shaba (Jun.1985) 
233 Mali- Burkina Faso: Border War (Dec.1985-Jan.l986) 
234 India- Pakistan: Siachin and Kashmir Conflicts (1986-1995) 
235 USA- Libya: Sea Incidents (Jan.l986-Apr.1986) 
236 India- Bangladesh: Muhuri River Incidents (Feb.l986-Apr.l986) 
237 Qatar- Bahrain: Hawar Islands (Apr.l986) 
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238 Nicaragua- Costa Rica: Border Incidents (Apr.l986) 
239 Surinam Guerilla Insurgency (Jul.1986-Dec.l992) 
240 Togo Overthrow Attempt (Sept.1986) 
241 Zaire- Congo: Border Incident (Jan.l987) 
242 Ethiopia- Somalia: Ogaden Conflict (Feb.1987-Apr.l988) 
243 South Africa- Zambia: Anti-ANC Raid (Apr.1987) 
244 Congo Rebellion (Sept.1987-Jul.1988) 
245 Uganda- Kenya: Border Conflict (Dec.l987) 
246 Vietnam- China: Spratlys Dispute (Mar.l988) 
247 Somalia Civil War (May 1988-1995) 
248 Hutu- Burundi Conflict (Aug.l988-1995) 
249 Bouganville- Papua New Guinea: Secession Attempt (Oct.1988-1995) 
250 Maldives Invasion (Nov.l988) 
251 USA- Libya: Mediterranean Incident (Jan.l989) 
252 Uganda- Kenya: Border Conflict (Mar.1989) 
253 Georgia- South Ossetia; Abkhazia: Secession War (Mar.1989-1995) 
254 Mauritania- Senegal: Ethnic Conflict (Apr.1989-Jan.1990) 
255 Yugoslavian Civil War (mid-1989-1995) 
256 USA- Panama: Anti-Noreiga Invasion (Dec.1989) 
257 Liberian Civil War (Dec.l989-1995) 
258 USSR- Lithuania: Independence Crisis (Mar.l990-late 1991) 
259 Guinea-Bissau- Senegal: Border Conflict (Apr.1990-May 1990) 
260 Tuareg- Niger Conflict (May 1990-0ct.1994) 
261 Senegal- Casamamnce: Secession Struggle (mid-1990-1995) 
262 Kirghizia Ethnic Violence (Jun.1990) 
263 Tuareg - Mali Conflict (Jun.l990-1995) 
264 The Gulf War (Aug.l990-Mar.l991) 
265 Azerbaijan - Armenia: N agomo Karabkh Conflict (Aug.1990-1995) 
266 Rwanda Invasion (Sept.1990-1995) 
267 Gagauz; Dnestr- Moldova: Secession Attempt (Oct.1990-Jul.1992) 
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268 USSR - Latvia: Independence Crisis (J an.l991) 
269 Liberia- Sierra Leone: Intervention and Civil War (Mar.l991-1995) 
270 Djibouti Civil War (Nov.l991-Jul.1993) 
271 Myanmar(Burrna)- Bangladesh: Border Incidents (Dec.1991) 
272 Iran- UAE; Egypt: Tunb Islands (Apr.1992) 
273 North Korea- South Korea: Border Incident (May 1992) 
274 Tadjikistan Conflict (May 1992-1995) 
275 Saudi Arabia- Qatar: Border Incidents (Sept.l992-0ct.l992) 
276 Russia: Caucuses Conflict (Oct.1992-1995) 
277 Egypt- Sudan: Halaib Dispute (Dec.1992) 
278 Allies- Iraq: Incidents (Dec.l992-Jul.1993) 
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279 Myamnar(Burma)- Bangladesh: Border Incidents (Mar.l993-Sept.1993) 
280 Cyprus Incidents (Apr.l993) 
281 Yemen Civil War (Nov.1993-Jul.l994) 
282 Nigeria- Cameroon: Diamond Islands (Dec.1993-Mar.l994) 
283 Ghana- Togo: Border Incidents (Jan.l994-Feb.1994) 
284 Greece - Albania: Border Tensions (Apr.l994) 
285 Myanmar(Burrna)- Bangladesh: Border Incidents (May 1994-Aug.l994) 
286 USA- Haiti: Aristide Return (Sept.l994) 
287 Iraq- Allies: Kuwaiti Border Tensions (Oct.l994) 
288 Taiwan- China: Shelling Incident (Nov.l994) 
289 Saudi Arabia - Yemen: Border Conflict (Dec.l994) 
290 Ecuador - Peru: Border Conflict (J an.l995-Mar.l995) 
291 China- Philippines: Spratlys Incidents (Jan.1995-Feb.l995) 
292 Taiwan - Vietnam: Spratlys Clash (Mar.l995) 
293 Belize- Guatemala: Border Incidents (Aug.1995) 
294 Comoros Coup Attempt (Sept.1995-0ct.l995) 
295 Eritrea - Yemen: Hunaysh Islands (Nov.l995-Dec.1995) 
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APPENDIX 3: DATA FORMAT 
The data is set up in a standard SPSSx data file (MED97.dat). There are two 
records per case (mediation event). The first record contains the dispute and party 
data, incorporating 75 columns. The second record contains the conflict management 
data incorporating 43 columns including a 39 column repeating data format. The 
position of the data within the records is shown below. 
Variable Labels Column 
Record 1 
Vl Dispute Number 1-3 
V2a Dispute Start Date - month 5-6 
V2b Dispute Start Date - year 7-8 
V3a Dispute End Date - month 10-11 
V3b Dispute End Date - year 12-13 
V4 Duration (grouped) 15 
V5 Duration (raw) 16-18 
V6 Fatalities (grouped) 19 
V7 Fatalities (raw) 20-26 
V8 Dispute Intensity 27 
V9 System Period 28 
VlO Geographic Region 29 
Vll Primary Issue 30 
V12 Secondary Issue 31 
V13 Peripheral Issue 32 
V14 Final Outcome 33 
Vl5 Dispute Initiator 34-37 
V16 Identity Party A 38-41 
V17 Identity Party B 42-45 
V18 Time in International System A 46 
V19 Time in International System B 47 
V20 Alignment 48 
V21 Power A (raw) 49-50 
V22 Power B (raw) 51-52 
V23 Power A (grouped) 53 
V24 Power B (grouped) 54 
V25 Previous Relation 55 
V26 Political System A 56 
V27 Political System B 57 
V28 Number ofParties A 58 
V29 Number of Parties B 59 
V30 Homogeneity A 60 
V31 Homogeneity B 62 
V32 Political Rights A 62 
V33 Political Rights B 63 
V34 Civil Liberties A 64 
V35 Civil Liberties B 65 
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V36 Type of Conflict 66 
V37 Number ofMediations 67-69 
V38 Number ofNegotiations 70-71 
V39 Total Number Conflict Management 72-74 
V40 United Nations Involvement 75 
Record 2 
V44 Repeating Data Variable 1-3 
V45 Mediation Number 5-8 
V46a Conflict Management Start Date - day 10-11 
V46b Conflict Management Start Date - month 12-13 
V46c Conflict Management Start Date - year 14-15 
V47 Conflict Management Type 16 
V48 Third Party Identity 17-20 
V49 Mediator Rank 21-22 
V50 Strategies 23 
V51 Previous Relationship of Mediator with Parties 24 
V52 Previous Attempts at Mediation in this Dispute 25 
V53 Previous Attempts by this Mediator 26 
V54 Timing (grouped) 27 
V55 Timing (raw) ?8-30 
V56 Initiated by 31 
V57 Environment 32 
V58 Outcome 33 
V59 Hostilities 34 
V60 Durability Outcome 35 
V61 Rank Negotiator Party A 36 
V62 Rank Negotiator Party B 37 
V63 Number ofMediators 38 
V64 Functional Mediator Id. 39 
V65 Nature ofMediation 40 
V66 Mediator Experience 41 
V67 United Nations Mediator 42 
V68 Conflict Management Duration 43 
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DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
The following is a list of all the variables in the Med97 dataset. Included are 
the variable names and the variable labels that can be found in the original SPSSX 
command file, along with the value labels and codes for each variable's characteristics. 
Where necessary a brief description of the given variable is given. Calculation criteria 
and codes for the more complex variables can be found in appendix 4. 
DISPUTE CHARACTERISTICS 
V1 DISPUTE NUMBER 
Each dispute has an individual code number. 
See Appendix 2. 
V2a DISPUTE START DATE (YEAR) 
Year the dispute started: 
From -45 to -95 
V2b DISPUTE START DATE (MONTH) 
Month the dispute started: 
From January = 01 to December = 12 
V3a DISPUTE END DATE (YEAR) 
Year the dispute ended: 
From -45 to -96 (ongoing) 
V3b DISPUTE END DATE (MONTH) 
Month the dispute ended: 
As forV2b. 
V 4 DURATION (GROUPED) 
Total duration of the dispute in months 
(1) 0-1 months 
(2) 1-3 
(3) 4-6 
(4) 7-12 
(5)13-24 
(6) 25-36 
(7) 36+ 
(9) Unlmown 
V5 DURATION (RAW) 
The actual number of months 
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V6 FATALITIES (GROUPED) 
(1) 0~500 
(2) 501~1000 
(3) 1001~5000 
(4) 5001~10000 
(5) 10000+ 
(9) Unknown 
V7 F ATLAITIES (RAW) 
The actual number of fatalities 
V8 DISPUTE INTENSITY 
Fatalities per month 
(1) 0~500 
(2) 501~1000 
(3) 1001-10000 
(4) 10000+ 
(5) Unknown 
V9 SYSTEM PERIOD 
The system period in which the major part of the dispute occurred. 
(1) 1945-55 
(2) 1956~65 
(3) 1966-75 
(4) 1976-85 
(5) 1986-90 
(6) 1991-95 
Vl 0 GEOGRAPHIC REGION 
The geographic region in which the dispute occurred 
(1) North America 
(2) Central and South America 
(3) Africa 
( 4) South West Asia 
(5) East Asia and the Pacific 
(6) Middle East 
(7) Europe 
Vll ISSUE ONE 
(1) Territory 
(2) Ideology 
(3) Security 
(4) Independence 
(5) Resources 
(6) Ethnic 
V12 ISSUE TWO 
Coding as for V 11. 
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V13 ISSUE THREE 
Coding as for V11. 
V14 FINAL OUTCOME 
The eventual outcome ofthe dispute. 
(1) Ongoing 
(2) Lapse 
(3) One party victory 
(4) Abated 
(5) Partial settlement 
( 6) Full settlement 
V15 DISPUTEINITIATOR 
Code number of the initiating party. 
PARTY CHARACTERISTICS 
V16 IDENTITY: PARTY A 
Party identity code. 
V17 IDENTITY:P ARTY B 
Party identity code. 
V18 TIME IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM PARTY A 
Length oftime in the international system (IS), party A. 
(0) Not applicable 
(1) 0-5 years 
(2) 6-20 
(3) 21-50 
(4) 51-100 
(5) 100+ 
V19 TIME IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM PARTY B 
Length of time in the international system (IS), party B. 
Coding as for Vl8. 
V20 ALIGNMENT 
The political alignment of the disputing parties. 
(1) Members of opposing blocs 
(2) Members ofthe same bloc 
(3) Bloc member vs. unaligned 
(4) Both unaligned 
(5) Different regional organisation 
( 6) Same regional organisation 
(7) Regional organisation vs. unaligned 
V21 POWERPARTY A(RAW) 
Raw power score for party A. See Appendix 4. 
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V22 POWER PARTY B (RAW) 
Raw power score for party B. See Appendix 4 
V23 POWER PARTY A (GROUPED) 
Power score for party A. See Appendix 4. 
(1) Not applicable 
(2) 1-7 
(3) 8-13 
(4) 14-20 
(5) 21-26 
(6) 27-30 
(7) 30+ 
V24 POWER PARTY B (GROUPED) 
Power score for party B. See Appendix 4. 
Coding as for V23. 
V25 PREVIOUS. RELATIONS 
The nature of the parties relationship prior to the dispute. 
(1) Friendly 
(2) No previous relationship 
(3) Antagonism 
(4) Previous conflict, no (military) hostilities 
(5) 1 Previous dispute 
( 6) More than 1 previous dispute 
V26 POLITICAL SYSTEM PARTY A 
Nature of the political system in party A. 
(1) Monarchy 
(2) Multi-party 
(3) One party 
(4) Military regime/junta 
(5) Other 
V27 POLITICAL SYSTEM PARTY B 
Nature of the political system in party B. 
Coding as for V26. 
V28 NUMBER OF. PARTIES A 
Number of additional parties associated with party A. 
(1) No other party involved 
(2) Additional1-2 parties involved 
(3) Additional 3-5 parties involved 
(4) More than 5 parties involved 
V29 NUMBER OF PARTIES B 
Number of additional parties associated with party B. 
Coding as for V28. 
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V30 HOMOGENEITY PARTY A 
Index of internal homogeneity for party A. 
See Appendix 4. 
V31 HOMOGENEITYPARTY B 
V32 
V33 
V34 
Index of internal homogeneity for party B. 
See Appendix 4. 
POLITICAL RIGHTS PARTY A 
The political rights score of party A. See Appendix 4. 
POLITICAL RIGHTS PARTY B 
The political rights score of party B. See Appendix 4. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES PARTY A 
The civil liberties score of party A. See Appendix 4. 
V35 CIVIL LIBERTIES PARTY B 
The civil liberties score of party B. See Appendix 4. 
V36 TYPE OF CONFLICT 
The level of internationalisation of the conflict. 
(1) Civil/internal conflict which has been internationalised 
(2) Interstate 
V37 NUMBER OF MEDIATIONS 
The actual number of mediations attempted in this dispute 
V38 NUMBER OF NEGOTIATIONS 
The actual number of negotiations attempted in the dispute. 
V39 TOTAL NUMBER CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. 
The actual number of conflict management attempts made in the 
dispute. 
V 40 UNITED NATIONS INVOLEMENT 
(1) United Nations involvement in managing the dispute 
(2) No United Nations Involvement 
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CONFLICT MANAGEMENT CHARACTERISTICS 
V44 REPEATING DATA VARIABLE 
This is the key ('occurs') variable in the repeating data format. 
V45 MEDIATIONNUMBER 
A number allocated to the mediation: 
According to the actual order of the mediations in the dispute 
V46a CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (DAY) 
The actual day of the month of the conflict management attempt: 
V46b CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (MONTH) 
Month the conflict management attempt started: 
From January = 01 to December = 12 
V46c. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT START DATE (YEAR) 
Year the conflict management attempt started: 
From -45 to -95 
V 47 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT TYPE 
(0) No conflict management activity 
(1) Mediation 
(2) Negotiation 
(3) Arbitration I Adjudication 
( 4) Referral to international organisation 
( 5) Multilateral conference 
V 48 THIRD PARTY IDENTITY 
Mediator/Third party code number. 
See Appendices F & G. 
V49 MEDIATOR RANK 
(0) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
No mediation 
Private Individual 
Leader of a national organisation 
Representative of a regional organisation 
Leader of a regional organisation 
Representative of an international organisation 
Leader of an international organisation 
Representative of a small government 
Representative of a large government 
Leader of a small government 
Leader of a large government 
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V50 STRATEGIES 
The primary strategy employed by the mediator. 
(0) No mediation 
(1) Mediation offered only 
(2) Communication/Facilitation 
(3) Procedural 
( 4) Directive 
(5) Supervisory 
( 6) Unspecified 
V51 PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP 
The previous relationship of the mediator with the parties. 
(0) No mediation 
(1) No previous relationship 
(2) Different bloc 
(3) Same bloc as one party 
(4) Same bloc as both parties 
(5) Mixed relationship 
V52 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS 
The number of previous mediation attempts in this dispute. 
(0) 0 
(1) 1-2 
(2) 3-4 
(3) 5-6 
(4) 7-8 
(5) 9-10 
(6) 10+ 
(9) No mediation 
V53 PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS THIS MEDIATOR. 
Number of previous attempts by this mediator. 
(0) 0 
(1) 1 
(2) 2 
(3) 3 
(4) 4 
(5) 5 
(6) 5+ 
(9) No mediation 
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V54 TIMING (GROUPED) 
The timing of the conflict management attempt. 
ie. the number of months elapsed at the time of 
intervention. 
(1) 1-2 
(2) 3-6 
(3) 7-12 
(4) 13-24 
(5) 25-36 
(6) 36+ 
(9) No Management 
V55 TIMING (RAW) 
As for V54, but in this case the exact figure is given. 
V56 INITIATED BY 
Request for conflict management initiated by 
(0) No management 
(1) Oneparty 
(2) Both parties 
(3) Mediator 
(4) Regional organisation 
( 5) International organisation 
( 6) Unspecified 
V57 ENVIRONMENT 
The physical environment in which conflict management takes place. 
(1) Party A's territory 
(2) Party B's territory 
(3) Third Party territory 
(4) Neutral site 
( 5) Composite 
( 6) Offered only 
(7) Unspecified 
(9) No management 
V58 OUTCOME 
The outcome of the conflict management attempt. 
(0) No management 
(1) Mediation offered only 
(2) Unsuccessful 
(3) Ceasefire 
( 4) Partial settlement 
( 5) Full settlement 
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V59 HOSTILITIES 
Military hostilities during conflict management attempt 
(1) Yes 
(2)No 
(3) Unspecified 
(9) No Conflict Management 
V60 OUTCOME DURABILITY 
Number of weeks that the cease fire or settlement has lasted 
(0) Less than 1 week 
(1) 1 week 
(2) 2 weeks 
(3) 3 weeks 
(4) 4 weeks 
(5) 5 weeks 
(6) 6 weeks 
(7) 7 weeks 
(8) 8 weeks or more 
(9) Unspecified/Not applicable 
V61 NEGOTIATORS A 
Negotiators in the conflict management attempt Party A 
(1) Primary Decision-Maker 
(2) Senior-Level Decision-Maker 
(3) Low-Level Representatives. 
( 6) Unspecified 
(9) No Conflict management/Not Applicable 
V62 NEGOTIATORS B 
Negotiators in the conflict management attempt Party B 
Same as for V 49 
V63 NUMBER OF MEDIATORS 
Identification ofthe number of mediators involved in the current 
mediation attempts and the interests they represent. 
(1) One mediator 
(2) Two mediators- representing same interests 
(3) Two mediators- representing different interests 
( 4) Group mediator -members with same interests 
(5) Group mediator -members with different interests 
(9) no mediation/not applicable 
V64 FUNCTIONAL MEDIATOR IDENTITY 
The nature of the group the mediator represents. 
(1) Individual 
(2) Regional Organisation 
(3) International Organisation 
( 4) Functional Non-Governmental Organisation 
(5) State 
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(6) Mixed 
(7) Unspecified 
(9) No mediation/not applicable 
V65 MEDIATIONTYPE 
Wider diplomatic context of mediation effort. 
(1) Ongoing effort 
(2) Solo effort 
(3) Unspecified 
(4) Not applicable 
V66 MEDIATOR EXPERIENCE 
Known previous experience of the mediator in any international 
conflict situation 
(1) No previous experience 
(2) 1-2 previous mediations 
(3) 3-4 
(4) 5-6 
(5) 7-8 
(6) 9+ 
(7) At least 1 experienced mediator in Group/Pair 
(8) Unknown Mediators' Experience 
(9) Not applicable 
V67 UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR 
(1) United Nations Mediator 
(2) Non United Nations Mediator 
V68 CONFLICT MANAGEMENT DURATION 
The length of time that the conflict management attempt took to 
achieve an outcome. 
(1) 1 Day 
(2) 2-5 Days 
(3) 1 Week 
(4) 2-3 Weeks 
(5) 1 Month 
(6) 6-7 Weeks 
(7) 2 Months 
(8) 3+ Months 
(9) Unknown/not applicable 
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APPENDIX4: 
CALCULATION CRITERIA 
l.POWER 
This measure of the power of a disputing party is a modified version of the Cox-Jacobson 
Scalel. 
The power index score for a nation is calculated by adding its scores on the following measures. 
All currency-based measures are in US dollars at current prices. Since the purpose of the 
modified scale was to compare states at a particular point in time, it was felt unnecessary to 
convert figures to constant prices, as was done in the original. 
GNP 
Score $Billion 
1 0-0.9 
2 1-3 
3 4-6 
4 7-9 
5 10-19 
6 20-29 
7 30-39 
8 40-59 
9 60-99 
10 100-199 
11 200-499 
12 500+ 
GNP per CAPITA 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
$ 
0-199 
200-599 
600-999 
1, 000-4,999 
5,000-10,000 
10,000+ 
MILITARY SPENDING 
Score 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Score 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
$Million 
0-9 
10-50 
51-100 
101-250 
251-500 
501-750 
751-1,000 
1,001-5,000 
5,001-10,000 
10,001-25,000 
25,001-50,000 
50,000+ 
TERRITORY 
Km2 
0-50,000 
50,001-200,000 
200,001-500,000 
500,001-900,000 
900,001-2,500,000 
2,500,001+ 
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POPULATION 
Score 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Millions 
0-1.9 
2-19 
20-59 
60-99 
100-249 
250+ 
2. HOMOGENEITY 
The internal homogeneity of each each of the disputing parties is to be measured on the 
basis of religion, language, and race, with the index ofhomogenity an average of the 
three scores. Each measure is coded according to the following criteria: 
Score Criteria 
1 Homogeneous- No single significant majority (10% or more of the 
population) or significant combination of smaller minorities (15% or more of 
the population). 
2 Having a single significant minority (10-25% ofthe population) or a 
signficant combination of smaller minorities (15-25% of the population). 
3 Having a majority population (51% or more) but also having a large single 
minority or group of minorities (26-49% of the population) 
4 No majority group, but only one very large minority/plurality population 
(>30% ofpopulation and >10% more of population than any other single 
group). 
5 Greater fragmentation - More than one very large minority or several smaller 
minorities, but no majority or plurality population 
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3. DOMESTIC POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR 
This is coded according to two seven-point scales developed by the Freedom House 
Survey Team1• The domestic political behaviour (or human rights record) of each state 
can be given a rating with respect to both 'political rights' and 'civil liberties'. On each 
scale, 1 represents the most free and 7 the least free. The following is our slightly 
modified version of the Freedom House coding criteria2• 
Score 
1 
2 
3, 4, 5 
6 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 
Criteria 
-Free and fair elections; those elected rule 
-Competitive parties or other political groupings 
-The opposition has an important role and power 
-Self determination or high degree of autonomy 
-Self determination for minority groups, or minority 
participation in government through informal 
consensus 
-Decentralised political power and free subnational 
elections 
-Still free, but elements such as violence, political 
discrimination against minorities and foreign or 
military influence on politics may be present. 
-As well as the elements noted in category 2, polities in 
these three categories have increasing levels of: 
-military involvement in politics 
-lingering royal power 
-unfair elections and one-party dominance 
-civil war 
And decreasing levels of: 
-freedom to organise non-governmental parties and 
political groups 
-reasonably free referenda or other significant means 
of popular influence on government 
-Repressive polity 
-Military junta, one-party dictatorship, religious 
hierarchy, or autocracy 
-Only minimal political rights, such as competitive 
local elections 
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Score 
1 
2 
3, 4, 5 
6 
APPENDIX4 
(This category can include traditional monarchies 
which mitigate their lack of political rights through 
toleration of political discussion and acceptance of 
petitions from the ruled) 
-Political rights are absent or virtually nonexistent 
-Extremely oppressive regime 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 
Criteria 
-Freedom of expression, assembly, demonstration, 
religion, and association 
-The individual is protected from political violence and 
harms inflicted by the courts and security forces 
-Free economic activity 
-Equality of opportunity 
-Government free of conuption 
-Minor deficiencies in some aspects of civil liberties, 
eg: some human rights abuses in the courts, or some 
press censorship 
-Polities in these categories have increasing levels of: 
-state oppression 
-censorship 
-prevention of free association 
-racial, religious, or sexual inequalities 
-State and anti-state political tenor 
-And decreasing levels of: 
-personal freedom 
-freedom of expression, movement, and association 
-Little religious freedom 
-Few personal social freedoms 
-Restricted private business activity 
-Restricted expression and association 
-Political prisoners and other political tenor 
249 APPENDIX4 
7 -Vitiually no freedom 
-Society shaped by an overwhelming and justified fear of 
a repressive state 
1. Freedom House Survey Team, 1990, Freedom in the World, Freedom House, New York. 
2.ibid, pp.22-23. 
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